Dec 7 at 7:07am by David Tate
Well… after several years I have finally put the full length of An Experiment in Democracy (thanks, Nam!) online. With that said, I am also in need of some funds to keep this site going for the time being. Good thing is, I don’t need a handout. If you donate to this site at the link below, I’ll send you a professionally made copy of An Experiment in Democracy as thanks!! I was rummaging through some boxes a few months back and stumbled upon 50 copies of the now unavailable DVD. So help a guy out!!!!
Donate here: Donate to ABT
If you donate, you MUST send your address to me at email@example.com in order for me to send it. Other than North America, please ad $3 for postage.
If you could care less or just can’t/don’t want to donate… that’s fine too!! Hope the site stays up long enough for you to watch it here for nothing:
Disclaimer – An Experiment in Democracy is a chronicle in history and not a true form documentary. This film simply shows my extensive travels through Afghanistan in 2004 with narration added for historical context and educational purposes.
Jan 2 at 12:12pm by David Tate
The picture above was taken from deep inside the citadel in Arbil, Iraq in February, 2003 – a month before US forces invaded that country. At that time, I had just changed my blog from “Adventure travels…” to “A Battlefield Tourist” (ABT) and had made my way across the border, from southern Turkey, looking for a front seat view of an American-led invasion.
I didn’t realize it at the time, but my self-funded trip into one war zone (southern Turkey) and a second, soon-to-be war zone, would arguably become the official launching of a journalistic phenomenon now know as “milblogging”. Since those days, milblogging has become big business for many – not including myself, and I think that is great. It was really inevitable; I just happened to roll dice early in the game.
All said and done between 2003 and 2009 I would make the trip to Iraq twice and Afghanistan three times. I was on the ground for nearly a year total, embedding a few dozen times with all sorts of units from at least five different countries. It truly was a great gift and even more rewarding that I was able to accomplish this on my own. The stories, the pictures, the insight – it has all benefitted many people in many different ways over the years.
I am writing this just days after the US rolled up the flag and departed Iraq; heads held high, mission accomplished. I say this because Iraq has certainly been, and will continue to be, a very interesting situation. The fact is, regardless of how flawed the data was, no matter how much people lied and embellished, no matter if President Bush was truly acting out his own sense of closure for his father – the Iraqis, overwhelmingly, wanted world intervention in their country for many years, and on the eve of war, they were overwhelming in their desire for change.
So, with that said, the US can hold their heads high. Is the situation perfect? No. I am very concerned about Iran and its influence on Iraq, first and foremost. However, the Iraqis had decided enough was enough. They voted to not allow legal protection for US troops. That decision would put our citizens in the arena with the Iraqi legal system. That is unacceptable. To force our way into a position that defied the agreed on time for departure would have then put the US truly in the position of occupiers. The resistance that would follow would once again suck us into a precarious spot which we can ill afford in money or blood.
By leaving, as promised, we have left the table with some winnings… just not the best it could be. I have to admit, I am very surprised that we did not work out an airbase in Kurdistan. That greatly surprises me, actually. I don’t know the reasons for this, but if it wasn’t worked hard on achieving, the ball was certainly dropped. Kurdistan would have been the IDEAL spot for a permanent presence – surrounded by a people who support us.
I learned that very well on my inaugural trip to Iraq. On the day the above picture was taken, I remember walking up into the citadel where hundreds of Kurdish refugees lived. Many of them displaced by Iraq’s Anfal campaign against the Kurds that began in 1988 and continued, in varying degrees, for several years. Others were victims of Iraq’s “arabization” of Kirkuk (don’t forget that name… Kirkuk will be a well known name before this is all over. That’s another story, though).
I remember walking up through the narrow alleys of this place, which is built on centuries and centuries of buildings that has now become a mesa in the flat plain of northern Iraq. If I recall correctly, it is one of the oldest constantly inhabited spots in the world. As I walk, people would come out to see who the crazy white guy is. It was hard to communicate, but with some pigeon english, arabic and hand gestures, we would get by fine. It was a great day and I learned a lot. Even got a nice picture with the kids. It’s one of my favorite pictures – not only for what it means to my past, but for what it makes me think of in regards to Iraq’s future. So I’m writing this for the people of Iraq:
Don’t take my country’s sacrifice for granted. Use this opportunity that you asked for and received. It is a great gift that has cost my neighbors a great deal of blood and hardship. I realize you have also paid with blood equity; as you should because freedom is not free. I hope your people find the wisdom and courage to forge bonds that put your country before your sect. The world is waiting and watching. In fact, I suspect many, many people want you to fail just so they can laugh at America. Prove them all wrong. Many of my neighbors died to give you this chance. Now it is up to you.
You can follow that journey here: http://dgtate.blogspot.com/2003_01_01_archive.html
May 8 at 5:05pm by David Tate
Being in the media and being very interested in the military, it isn’t hard for me to find glaring errors in report after report involving military affairs. Beyond that, it isn’t hard for me to find copy that is plain old sloppy reporting and innuendo that often times cannot be construed in any other way than as intentionally anti-military.
There’s one main example that has reared its head in a non-stop barrage since just about the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. That example has received considerable overtime this week, so I thought it would be a good time to call it out. After all, as the US handover in Iraq is set for December, you’re going to be reading this a lot.
It really isn’t complicated. The fact is, just about every time there is an attack of the magnitude that would propel it into the news, this innuendo is added (my paraphrase): “This attack calls into question gains made…”.
Using the latest high profile attack:
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan – Afghan security forces on Sunday killed a few insurgents who had barricaded themselves inside a hotel in the southern city of Kandahar, ending a two-day battle that left more than two dozen militants dead, officials said.
Ok, so here we go.
“The battle raised new questions about the effectiveness of a yearlong campaign to secure Afghanistan’s south and Kandahar in particular.”
Oh really? Who is posing that question?
“The fighting began around noon Saturday when a Taliban force launched a major assault on government buildings across the city.”
Major assault, eh? 30-100 troops is not a major assault. In comparison to other Taliban attacks, this could be stretched into that definition. However by military definition, 100 troops (if that many) is not major.
“Nearly all the insurgents killed so far had escaped late last month from Kandahar city’s main Sarposa prison, Bashary said. More than 480 militants escaped through a 300-meter long tunnel that took five months to dig.”
Wait a second! A few sentences back the assault “raised questions” about a yearlong security operation and now you say the “major assault” is really part of the breakout scheme (without really saying that). So, really this assault does not raise questions about the yearlong security work since the manpower for the assault is a result of the prison break from a week ago (according to this article). Gee… I wonder if the timing of the prison break and this “major assault” are a coincidence?
“The Taliban claimed more than 100 fighters took part in the Kandahar attack and said their goal was to take control of the city.”
Ok that’s their claim, but do you really think 100 recently escaped Taleb fighters could “take control of the city”? Afghanistan’s second largest? No, all this attack was looking for was poorly written copy that questions the yearlong campaign around Kandahar and they scored. I’m not saying things are peachy in Kandahar, however, to belittle a year’s worth of work across an area much larger than two government buildings and a hotel that were attacked, is just lazy writing that interjects the authors feelings on the big picture opinion rather than focusing on the one event he was assigned to cover.
Apr 8 at 10:10am by David Tate
Front line journey with British mentoring team and Afghan National Army in Musa Qala, Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
Dec 30 at 9:09am by David Tate
There is little doubt that in order to progress in Afghanistan the Taliban will have to be involved in negotiations with the government, and whether directly or not, leadership within the International Security Assistance Force.
The fact is, those fighting coalition forces are not so much Al Qaeda as they are young hired guns or nationalistic Pashtuns concerned their culture is under attack from the west. The enemy that the coalition has been pursuing has changed, and so must efforts to fix the problem.
As I’ve always espoused, there are no simple fixes in this country, nor is there just one solution. Afghanistan is a puzzle that requires patience and an unorthodox vision for success. Part of that success, no matter how you slice it, will require the cooperation of “The Taliban”.
That in itself presents a huge challenge. ‘Who is the Taliban?’ should be the first question asked. When you see that noun tossed around the media in such a blanket fashion, you couldn’t be blamed for believing “The Taliban” is just one organization… and they are not.
So when you say, “Let’s talk to the Taliban”, or “It’s a mistake to talk to the Taliban”, it’s really a loaded question that cannot properly be answered within that context. “The Taliban” could be Islamic extremists that just want westerners out. They could be Arabs hellbent on killing westerners. They could be shepherds who need the money or who are avenging a family member killed in an errant air strike. Or they could be one of a large portion of the male population that are concerned the west is trying to change their way of life. The possibilities go on and on.
The biggest obstacle to talking with the Taliban is western perception that you are dealing with terrorists if you do. That perception needs to be dismantled for the above mentioned examples. The Afghan government and coalition leaders need to make efforts to divide “The Taliban” between those with cultural/domestic issues and those with extremist and criminal incentives. Dividing the enemy is half the battle, you just have to understand what’s going on first.
The door appears to be opening for talks with some elements of “The Taliban”. Rumors (which are likely true) that the Karzai government has been secretly negotiating with “The Taliban” have since progressed into recent news that the overtures may be finally paying off. Much of the talk has been about the Taliban setting up in a neutral, third country to help facilitate safety during talks. This is a good thing and should be looked at carefully. President Karzai thinks so too and has now openly embraced the idea of setting the Taliban up in Turkey. All with the active work of Turkey’s Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan.
In order for the west to succeed in Afghanistan the elements need to be in place that can allow that country to function well enough to keep terrorists from once again using it as a launching pad for international attacks. Period. That’s the end game. Problem is, if we don’t get everyone on board, it will never be achieved. With that said, westerners need to get a grip on the culture that we are dealing with here and realize that talking must be in the cards.
If you think anything can get done using force alone… you are mistaken. A recent article in National Geographic by Elizabeth Rubin may illustrate what faces the west in Afghanistan best. The article, called “Changing Lives of Afghan Women”, illustrates just one of many significant hurdles facing the west. However, one story caught my eye that, I think, truly illustrates what lies ahead in order to achieve success.
In the article, Rubin relays a story she heard in a women’s shelter in Kabul. She talks about a girl, from a well-to-do southern family who fell in love with a boy from another tribe. In the end, the girl’s father killed the boy and four of his brothers. Then, when he found out his own mother helped his daughter escape, he killed her too. The girl is now on the run with a $100,000 dollar bounty on her head.
Rubin writes that the foundation of a man’s honor in Afghanistan consists of gold, land and women. Within that foundation includes hospitality, shelter and justice or revenge.
Mix this code, called pashtunwali, in with the scars of three decades of war and you can start to understand the big picture.
Quoting Sahera Sharif, a female parliament member from Khost province, Rubin later summed it up, in my opinion: “Much of the violence and cruelty you see now is because people are crazy from all these wars.”
Stopping this cycle will be difficult, but for the majority of the Afghan people – and the sake of the entire region and world – the cycle must be stopped.
Dec 10 at 1:01pm by David Tate
Hey everyone. All is well going into the holidays as I am spending a lot of time with Davin. In the meantime, I am halfway through a three year contract with WSET-TV, which is also going well. Still haven’t made the decision whether or not I will return to Afghanistan in 2012 on a full time basis. Funding, as always, is the issue. Get that resolved and I’m in.
With that said, I am looking for a business partner, with capital, interested in launching a webmag based on my concept, “A Battlefield Tourist”. I know this model will work – the years of testing it have proven so. Interested? Let me know. I have costs to minimal amount with plenty of upside potential.
Enough of that….
My current employer, WSET-TV puts together a special every December that honors local vets. Check out this year’s stories. They are very good. Mine is about one of the few African-American soldiers to hit Omaha Beach on DDay. Enjoy!
Oct 21 at 7:07pm by David Tate
Creating a Level Playing Field for Afghan Businesses
While Safeguarding the Future
LtCol Asad Khan, USMC (Ret.)
A central element to the success of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is based on the development of the country’s economy and on the ability of Afghan businesses to create economic growth, jobs and sustained opportunities for Afghans. The Department of Defense (“DOD”) is the largest contributor to the Afghan economy. DOD uses the US Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE”), Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (“AFCEE”) and US Military Contracting Officers to oversee its projects. Unfortunately, many aspiring Afghan businesses are either excluded from the DOD related projects or if they are allowed to participate, they are put under heavy financial strains due to our inability to pay them in a timely manner – thereby failing. In this counterinsurgency, one cannot underestimate the benefits created by Afghan businesses contributing to Afghanistan’s long-term development, prosperity and stability.
Therefore, we need to focus more on the Afghan businesses rather than the international companies who have greater influence and access. While international companies take the money out of Afghanistan, local companies reinvest into their own country. Afghan companies are competitively disadvantaged in many ways that international companies operating in Afghanistan are not. Examples include:
• Restricted access to information, bases, and contracting officers / finance
• Visa and travel restrictions to attend key meetings in the US;
• Complex US/DoD contracting and Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”);
• Limited corporate knowledge and experience;
• Language barriers.
These factors have created grave concerns among the Afghan business community regarding DoD contracting and international commitment to supporting the long-term economic development of Afghanistan. Many Afghan businessmen believe the “Afghan First” initiative is undermined by the preferences given to international companies who have the right connections and relationships as well as access to bases and contracting / finance officers that Afghans do not have. Afghan businessmen know they have greater obstacles to overcome and lack resources solely because of their Afghan heritage. Sadly, many Afghan businessmen perceive “Afghan First” as nothing more than a bumper sticker ad campaign.
For the larger projects, Afghan companies are completely barred from participating in the bidding process. For example, Request for Proposals (“RFPs”) for large construction contracts require bidders to have executed projects valued at $10 million or more; a prerequisite that precludes nearly all Afghan businesses from bidding. Rather than excluding Afghan businesses from the tender process due to lack of experience on large construction projects perhaps a better strategy might be to require international companies to formally team with interested Afghan companies in a mentor protégé relationship – thereby facilitating the education, training and development process of
these Afghan companies enabling them to become self sufficient on future opportunities. By excluding them, we stunt their growth and relegate them to being subcontractors and providing cheap labor – without growing their management and technical skills. Afghan businesses suffer from a lack of information and business networking that international companies do not experience. Creating new business opportunities relies on a company’s ability to stay informed of opportunities and develop essential business relationships.
US / DoD contracting puts little to no effort into overcoming language differences. RFPs and announcements are not written in Dari or Pashtu and Afghan businesses do not have access to USG / DoD websites such as www.fbo.gov. It seems absurd that Afghan companies receive and have access to less information about projects in Afghanistan than US and international companies, but that is precisely the case.
In many cases contract pre-proposal conferences and business development conferences are held in the US (generally in the Washington D.C. area where USACE [Winchester, Va.] and many contracting companies are based). Meanwhile Afghan participation in these events is prevented by visa requirements, terror watch lists and compounded travel costs. Ironically, Afghan government officials and key military leaders are frequently brought in for the benefit of US and international companies that attend. The resulting options for Afghan businesses are to either “stand on the outside looking in” or to be relegated to subcontracting for a US or international company.
Afghan businesses have limited or no access to bases and facilities where contracting and finance offices are located. Obtaining identification badges for Afghan nationals is slow, sometimes taking weeks or months to complete the process. If they do gain access privileges, they often have to wait in long lines with local laborers to be searched and processed onto the camp – this is very demeaning in the Afghan culture. Afghan companies frequently hire US expatriates, at increased cost, for their ability to access coalition installations and interact with American systems. Moreover, these austere forward-deployed offices are the sole point of entry for Afghan companies
conducting business with the US/DoD.
These offices are frequently understaffed and unresponsive to Afghan business needs. Senior executives for Afghan companies often find themselves handling routine administrative tasks through junior enlisted US service members. US and international companies, on the other hand, have the ability to work invoices, payments and bids through USG / DoD offices that are designed for efficient service on the larger FOBs or back in the US. Efficient government business offices allow executives and staff employees to transact business at appropriate peer-to- peer levels. One has to wonder what Afghan executives are learning from a process that takes them away from strategic and operational level management to speak to an Army Private about collecting payment of overdue invoices.
The complexity of the US/DoD contracting processes, procedures and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) create a nearly insurmountable barrier to Afghan companies. The FAR has not been translated into Dari or Pashtu, nor should it be. The complexities of the FAR are beyond the capabilities of current Afghan corporate knowledge. Once again, Afghans must hire American expats to navigate the system. Construction projects, in particular, are overwrought with FAR-specific technical requirements.
For example, nearly 60 pages of construction project RFPs are FAR-specific. The US RFPs are overly complicated and lengthy, containing boilerplate technical specifications that confuse Afghan companies. This makes for an unlevel playing field as most Afghan companies understand the work that must be done, but not the reasoning behind all of the regulatory requirements that is imposed – such as prohibition of conducting business in Sudan, supporting the secondary Arab boycott of Israel, et cetera.
I have yet to find a single Afghan company conducting business in Sudan or supporting the Arab boycott. The point being is that the 60+ pages of FAR listed in every proposal is a daunting challenge for an American to understand – let alone an Afghan. We need to remain sensitive to the environment in which we are operating. One can make the point that these are designed to ensure compliance and minimize corruption. If so, we failed in Iraq and are failing in Afghanistan. We need rules that allow people to make decisions, ensure local compliance and help the Afghan contractors succeed – not navigate toward failure.
Afghan companies that are successful in receiving an award face critical cash flow problems from the outset. Contract execution requires immediate expenditures of capital that can only be recouped through the government’s payment of invoices. The government’s disbursement process is delinquent and insensitive to the vital needs of Afghan businesses. The finance offices are staffed with low ranking military personnel who lack both the understanding of business needs and the authority to correct problems.
Cash flow is the life blood of any business – especially in Afghanistan. Afghan
companies, unlike US and international companies do not have sufficient resources or
access to credit to sustain their operating expenses to survive frequent negative cash
flow circumstances. The prevailing interest rate, for Afghan companies that can get
credit has been up to 20% per month – that is if they can find someone to lend them the
money. Afghan companies rely solely on cash flow to survive and pay their employees
The current system causes challenges that frequently threaten the survival of Afghan
businesses and the entrepreneurial spirit which is essential for the economic growth and
stability of Afghanistan – and our vital national security interests. A company’s failure to
meet its financial obligations results in loss of trust and can quickly lead to business
failure. The Afghan culture, unlike American culture, regards business failure as an
extreme personal embarrassment. High rates of business failures can decrease the
entrepreneurial spirit by increasing the risk of dishonoring the family. It goes without
saying that business failures result in unemployment and adversely affect large Afghan
families. Bottom line: the survival of Afghan companies and businessmen should not be
threatened by the US government’s failure to pay in a timely fashion nor should we have
fledgling Afghan companies bear the financial costs of our operations – for the short
The “Afghan First” initiative should do much more to enable Afghan businesses
to compete with at least an equal footing, and at best, with a helping hand. A true
“Afghan First” strategy would look for ways to stimulate entrepreneurialism, incubate and
mentor new Afghan businesses and projects, and foster their continued growth and long
term ability to build their capacity to provide jobs and improve the economic health and
infrastructure of their nation. This is currently not the case; according to some estimates
approximately 80% of US aid is spent on US and international companies that take the
money out of Afghanistan. The money the US spends in Afghanistan neither remains in
the country nor contributes to helping the Afghans for whom it is intended. “Afghan First”
should mean that work is being given to Afghan companies that create jobs and invest
their profits back in Afghanistan – not take them out for their shareholders.
As we progressively increase security and reduce insurgent influence, opportunities for employment and prosperity become increasingly important to lasting stability. The current presence of large numbers of coalition forces corresponds directly to US government expenditures in Afghanistan. Since force reductions will begin in the near future, Afghan businesses expect corresponding reductions in US government contracting opportunities. Once the contracts dry up, the international companies will leave creating greater unemployment – so the time to begin a focused effort to develop Afghan businesses is now.
The below examples represent common trends among Afghan companies working
on USG / DOD projects:
• Late Payments Creating Cash Flow Crisis: An Afghan security company was
owed over $1.4 mil of which $857k was past due over 30 days; This may not
seem significant to a large international corporation, but as mentioned earlier,
small Afghan companies do not have access to financial credit to secure bridge
loans. They rely on being paid on time – so they can pay their employees and
vendors on time.
• US & International Companies Location and Access Advantage: The
USACE Pre-Proposal Conferences for Operations and Maintenance Services for
the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police Site and Facilities
throughout Southern Afghanistan (solicitations W912ER10R0002 and
W912ER10R0003) were recently held in Winchester, Virginia. Although 38
Afghan companies were on the bidder’s list, none participated. It is not easy for
Afghans to get visas or travel to the US.
• US Companies Location, Access and Networking Advantage: The 2nd
Afghanistan Aviation & Defense Summit is scheduled to be held on March 25-26,
2010 in Washington, D.C. The stated purpose of the conference is to focus on
business opportunities that will aid in the recovery process of Afghanistan and
help in the effective implementation of the country’s development programs.
Afghan businesses will not attend due to challenges with the visa process and
excessive travel costs. The following excerpts were taken directly from the
conference announcement and are provided to highlight the disregard for
developing Afghan business opportunities and the advantages US and
international companies have over Afghan companies:
– The important people who you will meet at the conference are Afghan
government officials responsible for security and defense procurements,
high-ranking military commanders from Afghanistan Ministry of Defense
and International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan, senior
industry executives from defense companies, prime contractors for
Afghan projects, senior directors and government advisors.
– We can also arrange for your exclusive One-on-One Meetings with
Afghan officials who will provide you with insights and analysis of the
current challenges facing Afghanistan’s aviation, security and defense
• Insensitivity to Afghan Business Needs: On the last day of the month the
Chief Operating Officer of an Afghan company had to personally make the third
follow up visit to the Camp Eggers Finance Office to seek payment of $858,000
of unpaid and delinquent invoices. Although Sunday is a normal workday in
Afghanistan, the office was closed.
• Insensitivity to Afghan Business Needs and Late Payment: Two senior
executives (COO and Commercial Director) of an Afghan development company
had to intercede on an outstanding invoice for $53,000, 46 days pending. The
Private First Class at Camp Eggers Finance Office disagreed that businesses
need to be paid within 30 days. He pointed out that the office was “really backed
up” and that he had higher priorities. When asked if there was someone senior
they could talk with, the Private told them no one was available and asked them
• Insensitivity to the Afghan Culture: In November 2009, before the Islamic Eid
al-Fitr holiday (celebration at the end of Ramadan that is similar to Christmas in
America) the Finance Office refused to pay invoices a few days early (24 November)
so companies could meet their payroll and send their employees home to their villages
in time for them to purchase gifts and food before the long holiday.
• Enforce the Prompt Payment Regulation (Title 5, CFR 1315) in Afghanistan by
establishing policies and procedures to disperse funds to Afghan companies no
later than 15 days after receiving an invoice which allows time to address issues
before late payments cause disruptions of business operations.
• Simplify RFPs and the FAR as it applies to Afghan companies so they can
understand the process and requirements.
• Create Afghan accessible Contracting and Finance Offices that include a local
ombudsman and a simple process for quickly resolving problems and addressing
• Conduct government sponsored business/contracting conferences in Kabul or
Dubai rather than in the US.
• The Nunn-Perry Mentor Protégé Program is a USG funded program and has been
very effective for smaller companies being mentored by larger companies. We
should start a similar program in Afghanistan requiring US and international
companies, profiting from US government contracts in Afghanistan, to mentor
Afghan business in better practices and successful execution of larger projects.
• Allow Afghan companies seeking and performing government contracts to travel
aboard ISAF military or contracted aircraft and use government facilities.
• Allow Afghan companies to access to ISAF facilities by establishing a system to
screen and provide badges in a timely fashion.
In summary, Afghan businesses are central to our long term success in Afghanistan.
We need to focus more on their success by fostering a climate within the USG / DOD
contracting world that levels the playing field and understands the business imperatives
that the Afghans must deal with. By excluding them or allowing our own inefficiencies to
hamper their success, we ultimately undermine our own success. As we encourage and
assist small businesses in the US, we need to do the same for Afghan entrepreneurship
and businesses – through them we can reach out to the Afghan people and create
sustainable opportunities for their collective future – and our national security.
Sep 28 at 9:09am by David Tate
Sep 1 at 9:09pm by David Tate
Just wanted to take a few minutes to catch you folks up on some things and to direct you to where you can find some of my current war related writings. Unfortunately my personal life has taken a significant hit that has forced me to sideline ABT until I can pull it all back together. Recently, however, a PBS editor approached me about joining a small team of vets, journos and other folks connected to U.S involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, contributing to a blog called, “Regarding War”. After a lot of thought, I agreed… partially because it may be good therapy for me.
Anyway, that’s the skinny and here’s my first post. There’s also a QA interview if interested.
Aug 22 at 11:11am by David Tate
Every once in a while I do something I shouldn’t. Now, in my defense, I make it clear this is just “internet chatter”. However, on the other hand, I really should be more careful about what I post. My apologies.
Picked this post up from a discussion board and found it very interesting. We’ll see.
Three successive explosions reported at or near Bushehr, Anarak, and Arak, in Iran within the past ½ hour!!!!
According to the Courant Communiqué Radiotélégraphie, three explosions spread over less than 25 minutes were heard in or around the sensitive areas of Bushehr, Anarak, and Arak in Iran. The CCR had been monitoring the local radios in and around these areas. “Emergency alarms are blaring and announcements are urging all the residents to move out of the areas rapidly but without panic” report says.
A phone call made by Courant Communiqué Radiotélégraphie to IRNA got immediate response. The IRNA explained that there has been an accident at Busher but denied anything happening at Anarak or Arak. IRNA scoffed at the question whether these areas were bombed. However, the messages aired on the local radios contradict the IRNA about the situations in Anarak, and Arak. Stay tuned! – Kevin Remmington
From Dave Tate: Of course Arak and Bushehr are nuclear reactor sites. If this post is true, something big is going down.
Update: 1155 – This report is being spammed across Yahoo discussion boards and is considered VERY unreliable at this time.
1214 – More research into this account certainly points at BS. Sorry to ruin your day.