A Battlefield Tourist

Answer to an Associated Press Question

Jan 13 at 12:12pm by David Tate

In an artricle by Hamza Hendawi regarding the current fighting southeast of Baghdad in Arab Jabour, Hendawi writes, “That a major battle against al-Qaida should take place so close to the capital and nearly a year after the U.S. military began a large-scale offensive to calm Baghdad and its suburbs suggests either that the insurgents are elusive or that they are deeply entrenced.”  In particular, Hendawi is talking about a town in Arab Jabour called Zambaraniyah.  Regarding that question, the answer is the latter.

In mid-June 2007, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (3rd ID) moved into Arab Jabour; the tip of the spear for Operation Marne Torch and the “surge” strategy.   Arab Jabour had been void of any coalition presence for more than a year, becoming a playground for al-Qaida in Iraq, as well as a launching point for insurgent attacks into the capital barely 10 miles away.

Immediately, 1/30 re-occupied a large villa along the banks of the Tigris River, which some say was Uday Hussein’s former vacation spot.  The site was previously used as a base when US forces tried to establish a permenant footprint in 2006.  It’s now officially called Patrol Base Murray and it serves as battalion headquarters for the area operating in Arab Jabour.

From Patrol Base Murray, the soldiers of 1/30 Infantry continued clearing house after house, palm grove after palm grove.  The fighting was hot, dusty and dangerous.  The Bradleys and M-1 tanks had great difficulty navigating the narrow roads, many of which were lined with canals.  Dozens of deep-buried IEDs, many pre-placed months in advance, waited for the Americans.  By summer 2007, 2nd BCT had lost nearly 60 soldiers killed in action.

Even with the heavy cost, the fighting did produce tangible gains, giving the local Iraqis a feeling that the Americans were finally in Arab Jabour to stay.  The unit maintained pickets in the form of Bradley fighting vehicles that had overlapping fields of view; preventing roads previously cleared of explosives to stay that way.  Another patrol base farther into the region, PB Hawkes, was built in September. 

The positive motion on the battlefield ignited a local “concerned citizens” movement.  Led by a former Saddam-era army officer called, General Mustafa (his real name is Shabib al-Jabouri), the more than 300 local volunteers began directly challenging the terrorists and were even assigned their own area of operations.

All of this was laid out to me by 1/30 battalion commander, Lt. Col Ken Adgie, a tough Irish-American from New Jersey who loves to talk candidly and kick his enemy’s ass.  It’s mid-September inside 1/30’s TOC (Tactical Operations Center) and Lt. Col. Adgie and I are standing in front of a huge map of Arab Jabour.  He is clearly happy with the progress he and his men have made.

The whole time, however, like the AP’s rhetorical question, I couldn’t stop thinking about the fact that we were just 10 miles from Baghdad.  Nearly five years into the war, Arab Jabour was just being occupied with intent.  All I could think was, “…not enough troops”.  Then I heard it out loud.

“I don’t have enough troops.” said Adgie, as he pointed to a chunk of his area of operation he had no intentions of sending troops into.  “I feel bad for the people there, but I just don’t have the manpower.”  The place he was referring to was Zambaraniyah.

Adgie estimated the hamlet, farther south along the Tigris, held dozens of insurgents.  More importantly, Adgie was convinced the area was littered with literally hundreds of booby-traps and deep-buried IEDs that were patiently waiting to kill and maim American soldiers.  Even worse, was the fact that the area is notorious for producing experts in fertilizer bombs, some so powerful they can flip a tank.   At first I was a bit confused hearing a hard charging battalion commander concede a chunk of his responsibility to his enemy, but the more I thought about the hidden dangers that would eventually find his men, it was understandable. 

Now, four months later, it’s clear Lt. Col Adgie finally got the reinforcements needed to clear Zambaraniyah, although not in the form of American soldiers.  Four months of intelligence gathering and preperation paid off this week for Lt. Col Adgie as the United States Air Force supplemented his mechinized infantry with a devestating bombing campaign, allowing the men of 1/30 Infantry Regiment to roll into Zambaraniyah nearly unscathed.