A Battlefield Tourist

Filling the Void

Jun 16 at 7:07am by David Tate

Now that the tide in southern Afghanistan is turning, how will the coalition sustain their gains?

The US Marines fighting to regain control of Garmser have had an, “astonishing effect”, Britian’s Defense Minister Des Browne recently told Reuters.  “We don’t intend to give up what we have created.”

To back that up, Britian announced on June 16th that they are prepared to send more troops to Afghanistan in coming months.  This on top of the extra maneuver unit they sent to reinforce last year.

Holding Helmand

The key to keeping Helmand Province is to keep control of that provinces’ “green zones”.  Afghanistan’s landscape in that area is incredible for a couple of reasons, but one of the main ones that sticks out in my mind is what are now called “green zones”.

You can look across the Afghan desert and see nothing but rocks, sand and mountains providing quite the rustic and inhospitable view.  As you drive along, all of a sudden you come to the rim of a bowl… a green bowl, or green zone. 

Far different than the “Green Zone” I have visited in Iraq.  These green zones are an oasis of life that includes villages, cattle and fields of crops and poppies.  Some green zones are small, others, like the Helmand River Valley, are dozens of kilometers across.  The point is, beyond these green zones, life is very, very difficult.  Control the green zones, you control Helmand.

The siege of Garmser indicates that controlling these green zones is the strategy underway.  Strategically, controlling Garmser is the key to cutting the free flow of fighters and weapons into northern Helmand, Oruzgan and beyond.  You control Garmser and the Taliban will have a very difficult time reaching these places in numbers, they will no longer have a transportation hub for their drug running and the poppy itself will inevitably have to change as crop of choice.

South of the town, beyond Garmser’s outlying villages (which number more than 100), is nothing but desert, for more than 40km, before running into the Pakistani border, an area known locally in translation as, “The Desert of Death”.  To Garmser’s east and west is nothing but hundreds of kilometers of scorching desert.  To the north is Nawa-i-Barakzayi, and the Helmand River Valley that snakes it’s way north, nourishing this parched part of the world, that could one day be Afghanistan’s bread basket.  You hold Garmser, you hold Helmand.

The Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which has done the bulk of the fighting for Garmser, will not be staying too much longer.  Regardless, by October, this surge force will be gone and. so far, not replaced from the outside.  If there is a move to increase forces to replace the Marines, it would have to be in the form of at least two battalions, something that has yet to be announced. 

What has been announced is a number of strategic moves from inside Afghanistan that may alleviate some of the concern about the 24th MEU leaving a security void once their mission here is over.

101st Airborne Heading South?

In April, the 101st Airborne Division’s Task Force Gladiator took control of Parwan and Kapisa Provinces (just north and south of Kabul) where 82nd Airborne paratroopers spent 15 months training Afghan Security Forces and building a law enforcement infrastructure.  The provinces are largely quiet, with the exception of the Tag Ab Valley in Kapisa.  That area has long been an area that is filled with HiG fighters and sympathizers of the Taliban regime.  The Afghan National Army also increased its presence here in 2007 from a battalion to a brigade.

Earleir this month France announced it would be sending a battalion of troops to the Kapisa area, particularly Tag Ab, which would free up the US paratroopers who could be shifted south. The paratroopers would be a perfect replacement for Second Battalion, Seventh Marines who are training Afghan Security Forces in Helmand and Farah Provinces.  Keep in mind that the mission of 2/7 is district-by-district and meant to be mobile over time, so whoever replaces the task of 2/7, will not be in the same districts that 2/7 operated in.

France also plans to send Embedded Training Teams to central Afghanistan’s Oruzgan Province, where primarily Dutch and Australian forces operate. France also maintains six fighters in Kandahar and roughly 1,700 troops stationed in Kabul.

Italians Moving South and East?

The Italians may prove to be the most effective force to help stabilize the area.  In late May, the Italian government announced it would reduce its force in Kabul by up to 300, but also make it’s 2,400 strong mission, based in Herat, more “flexible”.

Their plan is to be able to respond to NATO requests within six-hours versus the current 72 hour standard.  While the Italians say they have no plans to move their permenant base from Herat, the ability of Italian forces to go mobile in an offensive manner, opens great possibilities for taking over the role of the 24th MEU. 

How Big Will Australia Go?

In Early June, Austrailian Defense Minister Joel Fitzgibbon called on the coalition to come up with 10,000 more soldiers for Afghanistan, at the same time saying his country would not send any more troops.  As the largest non-Nato contributer, Australia has 1,000 troops in Oruzgan. 

While Australia has troops abroad in various peacekeeping missions in their area of the world, 550 Autrailians were just pulled from Iraq, a force that could make a difference in one of Helmand’s “green zones”.

40,000 Yanks and Counting

In May, President Bush opened the door for an additional 7,000 troops (two Brigade Combat Teams) to be added to the coalition, taking US troop levels to 40,000.  While the decision is not set, the order will almost certainly be signed as the last of five “surge” troops, from Iraq, will have made their way home by July, 2008.   Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publicly said in May that the US was prepared to boost its force in 2009, but did not get into numbers.

Don’t Count out the Afghans

One of the most important keys to success for the establishment of government authority across southern Afghanistan is a successful police force, a force which bears the brunt of the violence.  Nearly 1000 Afghan cops died in 2007.

In the past two years, since the Americans took over the training from the Germans in 2005, the Americans have pumped more than 2.5 billion dollars into new training strategies.

The Focused District Development (FDD) program is a new approach to the training that is hoped will root out the excessive corruption, lack of credibility and brutality the Afghan Security Forces (usually just local militia guys) have exhibited in the past.  Unlike the past, the US is focused on individual districts for specialized training, especially districts known for warlordism and corruption. 

In a nutshell, the coalition will sustain security in a particular district while the local police get shipped off to an eight-week boot camp.  Once the police unit is trained, a coalition (usually American) Police Mentoring Teams (PMT), works with and mentors the unit in the field. 

As the program develops, the Americans are using specially trained Afghans who go through 16-weeks of specialized schooling known as Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).  This force will eventually be used by the coalition to take over police duties in districts in which FDD is targetting, until local police can get trained and in place. 

The idea is to have the ANCOPs set the example of what the Afghan people should expect once their local police return from training.  The hope is that this example, and the American mentors, will help show the Afghan police the proper way to interact with the public (and respond to threats) in a manner that will build the trust neccesary to have successful police force.

Afterall, Afghanistan cannot succeed as a country unless its people have security, whether the world is there to help them or not.