A Battlefield Tourist

Battle of Wanat, July 13, 2008

“A U.S. soldier approached me and I asked him if there were any other patients. He responded, ‘No.’ I pointed to the KIA and asked ‘Are they dead?’ He looked at me and stated, ‘They’re gone.’”

Captain Justin Madill, Flight Surgeon on MEDEVAC Flight “Dustoff 36”, OP Topside, July 13, 2008

Any new military installation is at its most vulnerable in the first few days of its inception. At this time, protective barriers such as HESCOs and stone walls are still under construction, defensive positions such as guard towers and FOB entrances are still being established, defensive obstacles such as concertina are being installed, fields of fire are being cleared, the best possible positions for heavy weapons systems are still being identified, permanent and redundant communications are being established. A certain amount of confusion is attendant as heavy construction is underway, and different contractors and workers circulate through the new installation. Additionally, from an insurgent’s perspective, once a military installation is firmly established, it inevitably brings jobs, employment and business to a community. Local workers are hired to help operate mess halls and clean latrines, local national trucks roll in and out and require fuel and servicing, their drivers require meals and lodging, construction workers are hired, inevitably local materials of various types such as concrete and wood are required. Once established, a coalition military presence brings in economic stimulus and improvements such as schools, jobs, construction, and businesses to the area that spread coalition presence and authority, and begin to convert the adjacent community from neutrality or hostility to support of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan central government. Attacking an established military installation inevitably engenders hostility from the adjacent community that has developed business ties with the coalition and is certain to be hurt economically by such an attack. Thus, COP Kahler at Wanat was at its most tenuous existence from the morning of July 9^th until heavy construction on the stone wall and HESCO barrier planned to encircle it was completed, and until the final kilometer and a half of good road from Camp Blessing could be finished and economic incentives and advantages could begin to flow. With a large insurgent force actively operating in the Waigal Valley and available for immediate employment, and the local populace ill disposed to the coalition as a fall-out from the earlier helicopter attack, it was unlikely that the ACM would let this fleeting opportunity slip away without taking action. Early in the morning of July 13^th, approximately one hour before BMNT, the insurgents launched a determined and furious assault upon COP Kahler at Wanat.

The Decision

Wanat was one of the nine major villages in the Waigal Valley, it was the farthest south in the Waigal Valley and thus the closest to the major American and Afghan government facilities in the Pech Valley, the Waigal District Center of the Nuristan Province was located in Wanat, the ANP Police Headquarters for the Waigal District Center was also located there, and a relatively modern road extended from Camp Blessing at Nangalam in the Pech River Valley to within one mile of Wanat. With a minimum of construction, this road could be completed to provide excellent ground trafficability to Wanat, thus eliminating the requirement for rotary wing resupply. LTC Bill Ostlund, Commander of TF Rock, specifically recalled:

We targeted WANAT for over a year as a place where we could effectively progress along the Lines of Operation (LOOs) of Security, Governance, Economic Development and IO. Wanat would position a base that was in close proximity to a new district center, a new police station, a market, and a population center – and was accessible by air and ground LOC. We had $1.4 million in projects planned or ongoing in WANAT’s area.

Captain Devin George, then Chosen Company XO and intimately involved in the planning process, echoed:

The reason we moved to Wanat was so we would be co-located with the district government so we could mentor them so they could police themselves up. We wanted to help them develop their government so they could do something other than just guard the district center and not really affect anything outside of their one-kilometer bubble.

As LTC Ostlund stated, TF Rock had been planning this consolidated move since their TOA in June, 2007. In March 2008 the TF Bayonet Operations Officer (S-3), Major Jack Rich, told TF Rock to aggressively move ahead with the evacuation of Bella and establishment of a new COP at Wanat. Major Rich specifically told the Battalion Command and Operations Officer, “We really want you to look at moving to Wanat. Come up with a course of action. I’m going to send our brigade engineer rep to go recon and we’ll get this thing moving.” In response, TF Rock initiated a series of visits to Wanat, and began serious negotiations with the elders and property owners. It took approximately a month, but the Brigade Engineer visited Wanat and formalized a plan for the permanent COP. By late June 2008 such a move, if it was to be implemented by TF Rock rather than left to the incoming 1-26^th Infantry of TF Duke, could no longer be delayed and TF Rock made the final decision to establish COP Kahler at Wanat. TF Rock then formalized the mission into a CONOP, and the CONOP was briefed to 173^rd Airborne BCT and the 101^st Airborne Division command, then operating as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-101) headquarters in Afghanistan and operating out of Bagram Airfield about sixty miles north of Kabul, for final approval.

The Anti-Coalition Militia

It cannot be determined, less than a year after the engagement at Wanat, the leadership and composition of the ACM force that attacked Chosen Company at COP Kahler. However, given the field craft and accuracy of firepower demonstrated, and the determined assault that was launched upon OP TOPSIDE, the evidence is that the attacking force consisted of a large body of dedicated Afghan fighters and takfiri foreign fighters, significantly augmented by a large component of local fighters. The single enemy body recovered was dressed in typical Afghan dress over military fatigues, indicative of takfiri foreign fighters. A member of the 1^st Platoon’s QRF specifically recalled engaging insurgents dressed in both BDUs and “man-jammies,” a soldier’s euphemism for traditional Afghan dress. The attack displayed highly effective leadership, considerable planning, effective intelligence, and accurate knowledge regarding the capabilities and effectiveness of American weapons systems and observation equipment. The great amount of firepower employed for two hours suggests that there was considerable local fighter support, simply to transport and supply the staggering quantities of ordnance expended, and evacuate the considerable number of casualties successfully from the battlefield. This was a large, and extremely skilled and dedicated, fighting force. The U.S. Army’s Article 15-6 Investigation suggested that two hundred ACM participated in the engagement, although other intelligence reports within the Waigal Valley mentioned a force of no less than two hundred operating against OP Bella in the days before the attack, most if not all of which would have participated in this engagement.

One of the major questions regarding this engagement is whether or not an adequate “risk assessment” of the operation was performed. LTC William Ostlund, 2^nd-503^rd Infantry Battalion Commander stated that just such an assessment was performed:

We all had concerns about weather and enabler support. We mitigated concerns by attaching 2 x mortars to the platoon and a TOW, giving WANAT priority of 155[mm Field Artillery] fires from 2 x platoons (4 tubes) [at Camp Blessing], placing Co C2 [Company Command and Control] with the platoon, and having echeloned QRFs available.^lx

LTC Ostlund has noted that the most serious concerns regarding CONOP Rock Move involved the evacuation of COP Bella. Helicopter pilots flying into the outpost were severely constrained by the topography into a single flight path, and were limited to varying their altitude of approach and the times of their flights, which were relatively ineffectual as defensive measures.^lxi Accordingly, the rotary wing evacuation of Bella was determined to be the most dangerous portion of the plan, particularly given the large ACM force known to be operating near Bella, and the comparatively large number of helicopter flights that would be needed for the evacuation.^lxii

The aviation question aside, an evaluation of the risk assessment contained within CONOP Rock Move suggests that much of it was actually “boiler-plate” that could have described any operation (even a routine tactical movement in Italy) such as assessing heat/cold weather injuries and negligent discharges. For example, the “heat injuries” included recommendations that “soldiers consume adequate amounts of water during the operation.” The risk assessment failed to estimate how much water would actually be required for the soldiers to “consume adequate amounts of water” even though such a calculation is readily produced using the U.S. Army hot weather injury table, anticipated temperatures, and estimated work load. As a result, the new COP at Wanat ran perilously low on potable water. The risk assessment as completed failed to reflect the intelligence assessment, or provide any meaningful risk evaluation for the conduct of the actual tactical CONOP.

Numerous soldiers at COP Kahler remembered Afghan citizens either speaking directly with them, or informing them through the ANA, that an attack was imminent. However, within Afghanistan, such warnings are routine and recurring and nearly always prove to be false or exaggerated, and after a year’s combat service in the nation the Chosen soldiers were relatively inured to such utterances. Still, the presence of a relatively large insurgent force of at least several score fighters operating in the vicinity of Bella was well documented, and efforts to locate and strike this force had resulted in the July 4^th AH-64 attack on vehicles believed to contain insurgents near the COP.^lxiii At the time that CONOP Rock Move was implemented, it should be noted that different officers assessed the actual size of this force at various strengths. However, all officers were in agreement that there was a substantial ACM force operating in the Waigal Valley. The capability of the ACM insurgents to rapidly move, and to swiftly divide into small parties and then just as rapidly reconstitute, had been repeatedly validated throughout TF Rock’s tenure in the Waigal and Korengal Valleys.^lxiv Inexplicably, the ability of this large insurgent force to quickly react to the transfer of American forces from Bella into Wanat and transfer operations less than ten kilometers to the south was discounted. There were multiple occurrences at Wanat between July 9^th and 12^th that should have raised concerns that a large event was going to take place at Wanat.

First, beginning the night of July 11^th-12^th, the ITAS and LRAS sensors at Wanat began to acquire small groups of individuals moving across the mountain slopes around COP Kahler, and then vanishing into the many precipitous draws and ravines of the countryside. With one exception, they could not be positively identified (PID) as insurgents. However, the sudden appearance of numerous small groups of individuals should have been a matter of concern. Almost certainly, these were contingents of the assault force moving into the town in preparation for the July 13^th morning attack. Second, Lieutenant Brostrom interrupted a Shura at the District Center the afternoon of July 12^th, under extremely suspicious circumstances. Third, the gathering of idle military age males (and no women or children) at the bazaar, clearly paying close attention to the American efforts at COP Kahler, was unusual enough to raise the suspicions of nearly every one of the 2^nd Platoon soldiers at Wanat. Fourth, a number of soldiers were alarmed at the absence of women and children or older men in Wanat. Ominously, only military aged males were seen on the streets, and many houses appeared to be recently abandoned or suddenly vacant. This alone was a positive indicator that trouble was imminent. Finally was the simple question asked by an interpreter the evening of July 12^th, regarding whether the force at COP Kahler had UAV coverage. This was an alarming and unprecedented inquiry, and should have been the concluding piece of the puzzle for Captain Myers that something unusual was on the verge of occurring at Wanat.

The process for passing intelligence reports from the 2^nd Platoon at Wanat to Battalion had to be done through radio, from Lieutenant Brostrom directly to the TF Rock Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at Camp Blessing. Because of Captain Myer’s heavy workload occasioned by the ongoing RIP, the numerous logistical details necessary to return his Company to Italy, and the Article 15-6 investigation ongoing for the July 4^th Bella helicopter attack, he was generally not available. Lieutenant Brostrom had a single radio FM frequency available to communicate within the platoon at Wanat (the Platoon net); and used the Battalion Command FM radio frequency to talk to Captain Myer and the TF Rock TOC, with a satellite communications link as a backup. Lieutenant Brostrom was in constant and frequent communications with the TF Rock TOC, and his logistical and intelligence reports were regularly forwarded to the Battalion Commander, Battalion Intelligence staff, and the Chosen Company XO and Battalion Supply Officer.^lxv Most of these reports were apparently not judged to be of significant import, although the TF Rock Assistant S-2 and S-2 both specifically remembered receiving a discussion of the Shura that Lieutenant Brostrom had interrupted at the District Center on July 12^th. Clearly by the time that these limited, apparently sketchy reports had been filtered by Battalion and Brigade, CJTF-101 G-2 saw no reason for alarm at Wanat. As a result, on the evening of July 12^th all intelligence collections and ISR assets were withdrawn from Wanat by the CJTF-101 G-2. As Lieutenant Matthew Colley, Battalion Assistant S-2, noted: “Normally when this occurs it is because the CHOPs or the DIV CM (Collection Manager) does not deem the threat credible enough to have an asset devoted to it, or something else is deemed a higher priority due to threat.  We fought with BDE and our BDE tried to get the assets reassigned to us, but DIV did not reallocate the assets to us.  I was the BN Collection Manager and synched all ISR assets and conducted the collection requests, so I am absolutely positive that collection was pulled that night.”^lxvi Major Scott Himes, the TF Rock S-3, and Captain Benjamin Pry, the TF Rock S-2, both recalled that it was typical for a CONOP to receive additional ISR assets during the first few days of the operation, and if “nothing happened” then the ISR assets would be withdrawn and transferred to other operations in Afghanistan.^lxvii

Captain Pry was absolutely furious at being stripped of his ISR assets. At the two CONOP briefings to TF Bayonet and CJTF-101 he believed that he had been given a commitment by CJTF that adequate ISR assets would be committed to CONOP Rock Move. Nearly a full year after the engagement he would state:

This was a major point of contention…between me and Colonel Hinton. I even got unprofessional with him the day before the attack happened because we were losing so many assets and had so little support. He was doing the best he could and in turn was doing the same thing to division. He was demanding the support we weren’t getting, but we weren’t the priority anymore because it wasn’t flashy.

Captain Pry would remark upon the heated conversation that he had with LTC Hinton: “I think there were six people in the office and about once a minute one person was getting up and walking out because they didn’t want to be witnessing the conversation.” By the evening of July 12^th, he fumed, “We had no support from brigade, division or theater level assets at the time.”^lxviii

Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Hinton, Brigade S-2, was similarly angry and frustrated nearly a year after the engagement:

The challenge for me and our headquarters was with collection assets. There were so many competing priorities for collection. CJTF-101 had a priority for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and those were approved by the assistant division commander for operations. We essentially did the same thing for ISR. There just wasn’t enough collection to meet all the demands that were out there. At the same time we were getting this reporting at Wanat, we had daily mortar attacks against a position that, terrain-wise, was even worse than Wanat and Bella up in northeast Nuristan. Our Shadows couldn’t reach it either, so we were relying on Predator for full-motion video support. It was an issue for us to provide adequate support, and I kind of referenced that earlier when I said the battalion S2 was upset that he wasn’t getting the level of support he thought he needed. He had guys that were building force protection on the ground and he didn’t think they had the adequate overhead collection to mitigate that limited force protection. It was really challenging to provide ISR because there wasn’t enough to go around to meet all the requirements that units had.

Lieutenant Colonel Hinton concluded: “It will burn in me forever.”^lxix What is clear is that a tactical intelligence breakdown (in collection, reporting, dissemination, and analysis) had occurred at the CJTF-101 G-2 level that directly influenced events in the Waigal Valley in early July, 2008.

Officers on the ground and at Camp Blessing (Captain Myer and LTC Ostlund) clearly believed that they had a firm grasp on enemy TTPs, as Captain Myer stated:

What we anticipated was that they were going to first attack us with rockets, because that was something they could do that didn’t take a lot of personnel to do it. If we had a new area occupied, they could try to affect us and try to dial in those rockets like they had done at Bella. They had shot rockets at Bella over time over time and then eventually they could get them inside the wire pretty consistently. So we thought if they were going to do a large-scale attack, they’re going to first refine all the assets they wanted to utilize to do that, and then after something like 90 days, then they’re going to try to do a large scale attack like they did at the Ranch House.^lxx

Platoon Sergeant Dzwik anticipated the same type of insurgent response to the occupation of Wanat: “I was expecting an attack. I thought the enemy would make their presence known. I was expecting harassing fire from any one of the high ground in every direction. I did not think the village itself would let the AAF turn their village into a battle zone.”^lxxi American combat commanders were confident that they would be attacked by indirect or harassing fires rather than a deliberate attack such as that launched at Ranch House in August 2007. American commanders thus assumed that the enemy would do precisely what the enemy had done previously, rather than adjusting or modifying their tactics, or introducing entirely new tactics.

After fifteen months in Afghanistan, the American commanders had grown complacent. In their hubris, they forgot that a new position is most vulnerable in the early days of its formation. The ACM were well aware of this fact, they had a large operational force available, and the July 4^th helicopter attack had generated considerable ill will against the Americans in the Waigal Valley which they could exploit. Such an ACM attack on a recently established position under cover of darkness was in fact a previously established and well documented ACM TTP in eastern Afghanistan. The 10^th Mountain Division’s previous experience in the year before was that once an outpost was established it was rapidly attacked, almost as a matter of course, by the ACM. A typical and nearly identical counterattack had occurred only eighteen months previously on January 10^th, 2007, upon the newly established Margah combat outpost on the Pakistan-Afghan border that had been set up by 2-87 Infantry and the ANA, and was garrisoned by a single platoon of each, a total of forty soldiers. The ACM rapidly deployed from secure bases within Pakistan under cover of darkness using local national trucks to achieve considerable tactical mobility. The well-organized, synchronized attack by two columns of 150 insurgents heavily armed with RPGs and machine guns was only disrupted by effective intelligence and a devastating integrated firepower attack.^lxxii

The ACM capability to launch a powerful deliberate attack in the Waigal Valley had been previously and recently demonstrated in the ACM seizure of Wanat in June 2007, by the nearly successful assault on Ranch House in August 2007, and in the devastating 9 November 2007 ambush near Aranas. The intelligence summary for CONOP Rock Move clearly stated that the enemy situation was: “…the AAF have begun to stockpile weapons and place forward caches in and around the high ground surrounding Wanat in anticipation of CF moving there and placing a base. The AAF have also likely started to construct fighting positions and determine hide sites to visit after engaging CF at Wanat. Many of the AAF from this area have actually gone north to participate in the attacks on COP Bella but will return north [south] within 24-48 hours of CF establishing a presence. AAF will likely attack CF in Wanat from the high ground to the southeast and southwest.” The TF Rock Intelligence officers accurately surmised the “…possibility of AAF establishing positions from within the bazaar at Wanat and engaging CF from these positions.”^lxxiii

Both 1^st Lieutenant Matthew Colley, TF Rock Assistant S-2 responsible for collection; and Captain Pry concurred that an attack was likely at Wanat. Colley specifically recalled, and in doing so revealed the extent of the OPSEC failure at Wanat: “We conducted numerous enemy analysis in our INTSUMs [Intelligence Summaries] and made it very clear that the enemy threat was increasing due to the increased Coalition interest in the area and the local belief that a base would be built.”^lxxiv Pry recalled:

When they [ACM] first heard we wanted to put stuff there, Mullah Osman [a prominent Taliban Commander in Nuristan] was absolutely furious. He started his intimidation of the elders and he started it strong. He started sending fighters there and moved some fighters into a small village just to the northeast of it where they set up shop. He did a lot of intimidation on the elders.”

Also assessing the OPSEC failure that had occurred at Wanat, Captain Pry remembered: “We also had a massive spike on both SIGINT and HUMINT after they said we would be moving there.”^lxxv

Captain Pry continued:

I thought we’d get attacked if the same groups from Bella came down, which we had all indications that they would…. That was something that Captain Myer and I disagreed about. He expected harassment fire and I thought they’d do a large-scale attack. That was based off the leadership involved. Mullah Osman kind of gets made at little attacks. He liked stuff like the Ranch House…he wanted a large-scale attack and that’s what I thought he was going to bring down to Wanat.

Pry specifically discounted that the ACM would employ relatively inaccurate indirect mortar and rocket fires upon the new COP at Wanat:

Doing harassment attacks right next to a lot of people’s houses over a long term would significantly degrade the AAF’s ability to work with the locals or even intimidate them. Eventually they would just get fed up, and that had been happening in other areas of the Korengal, which used to be completely AAF dominated. If they could come in and do a spectacular attack, something everyone takes note of and they could stand up, shake their fists afterwards, and say ‘We were successful.” Of course they can mold their definition of success, but for them to stand up and say ‘We were successful’ and for the locals to believe them, that’s what they needed in that area in order for them to achieve victory and get us driven out of there. They had to do a big attack.^lxxvi

In the event, the intelligence estimates prepared for CONOP Rock Move proved to be remarkably prescient. Unfortunately, TF Rock, TF Bayonet and CJTF-101 leadership failed to configure the Wanat garrison against the possibility that the ACM could launch a Margah Outpost or Ranch House style assault upon this new COP before it was fully established. The potential that the large ACM force maneuvering against Bella would simply transfer operations less than ten kilometers to the south was also not given due deliberation. The risk assessment for CONOP Rock Move was understated, in large part was a “canned” risk assessment that failed to reflect the actual circumstances of the operation, and appeared to have been prepared in isolation from the intelligence estimate.

One recurring deficiency was the absence of a comprehensive understanding of the complex and convoluted cultural and ethnic considerations within the Waigal Valley. As a result, CONOP Rock Move failed to appreciate or contain any evaluation of the considerable dissension that the July 4^th Helicopter Attack had generated within the Waigal Valley population. One Waigal Valley resident clearly recalled, “The [US air attack on July 4] opened a way among the people for the militants to preach against US forces.”^lxxvii There was some circumstantial evidence of this, for example, when Lieutenant Brostrom was handed a list of the casualties from the attack that he later forwarded to Captain Myer.^lxxviii This could have had several meanings by the Afghan residents (a protest, a warning, or simply a request for compensation or condolences). There was a U.S. Army Human Terrain Team (HTT) located in Afghanistan, which was specifically composed of anthropologists and deployed to provide just this type of assessment to the combat elements. However, as stated by the HTT Team Leader:

…upon my arrival to then AO Bayonet (173rd ABCT) we were informed that we would not be allowed to enter, at the time, AO Rock in which Wanat is located, due to the kinetic activity that was prior to, during and after the time of the attack at Wanat.  We made requests and they were denied.^lxxix

Thus, this detailed expertise was denied to the TF Rock commanders and staff officers.  TF Rock performed no analysis of cultural circumstances or effects, or changed population conditions, caused by recent events within the Waigal Valley.

An additional concern was the absence of UAV support to the newly established COP Kahler. The 173^rd Airborne BCT and CJTF-101 stated that UAV support was not available to COP Kahler due to weather issues at Bagram Airbase and Kandahar Airbase on July 12^th and 13^th.^lxxx Additionally, there were limited UAV assets within Afghanistan, and they were always heavily tasked, and in great demand. As previously noted, CJTF-101 had withdrawn all the ISR assets from Wanat on July 12^th, and efforts by both TF Rock and the 173^rd Brigade had not been successful in getting these resources restored. However, the CJTF-101 and 173^rd BCT response only addressed major UAVs such as the well-publicized Predator and Warrior systems. The 173^rd BCT deployed to Afghanistan with two organic UAV systems- the RQ-7 Shadow and RA-11 Raven. The Brigade had four Shadow platforms, comprising one complete system (a system includes a launcher, recovery equipment, maintenance equipment, and two radio control vans). Because of limitations of the Shadow system (specifically, the requirement to have an airstrip to land upon) the Shadow had to be operated out of Jalalabad Airport. Given the extreme terrain of the Pech and Waigal Valleys that blocked radio signals, the Shadow could not be operated within the Waigal Valley from Jalalabad. During its fourteen month stay in-country the 173^rd Airborne BCT had considered constructing an alternate location at Camp Blessing, but there were terrain and space limitations that restricted its use for the Shadow, and in any event Jalalabad was more central to the Brigade’s overall Area of Operations. Thus, the organic Shadow system available to the 173^rd BCT could not reach Wanat.

The 173^rd BCT had a number of Raven systems available, it was considered to be a Battalion asset, and TF Rock had dedicated Raven systems available to it. The Raven system is a smaller, highly portable system with night vision capability that can be operated by a single soldier, can be carried in a rucksack, and re-charged from a HMMWV. It has a six nautical mile radius of operation, and one hour and thirty minute single flight endurance. The Raven is “launched” by literally being thrown into the air by hand, it contains an IR camera system that provides an “over the hill” capability, and is fully night capable. However, it must be acknowledged that the Raven system also possesses limited capabilities and numerous vulnerabilities, which had restricted and degraded its optimal employment throughout the TF Rock deployment. Within the difficult terrain dominated by the precipitous ridges and valleys, the Raven had to be carefully utilized due to cross winds and variable drafts that severely constrained the Raven’s utility. TF Rock had not enjoyed much success with the Raven system during its year in Afghanistan, and the Raven clearly has limited applications.^lxxxi TF Rock could easily have deployed a single Raven to COP Kahler. The use of the Raven UAV system would have certainly been warranted given the vulnerability of COP Kahler until its fortification was completed, and would have provided COP Kahler with a considerably enhanced ability to monitor behind the numerous hills, and within the various gullies and ravines that cut through the Wanat topography. This is particularly true if the Raven were primarily utilized at night, when the mountain winds were traditionally calmer. This capability was never deployed to Wanat.

By determining to occupy Wanat so close to the end of their tour of duty, TF Rock and TF Bayonet also diverted focus on the occupation of the COP. The majority of Battalion and BCT leaders and staff officers were focused upon the RIP, the lengthy and involved process of transitioning a new combat element into the battle space; and the Transfer of Authority (TOA), the actual ceremony at which responsibility is formally transferred from one command to another. At the Company level, in addition to the various tactical responsibilities associated with the RIP, a major and exhaustive effort was confirming property accountability, and transfer of remaining installation and organizational property accountability to the incoming commander. This is particularly stressful to a Company Commander, as he has pecuniary liability for any mistake. The relieving unit, Task Force Duke (3rd BCT of the 1^st Infantry Division), was scheduled to perform the RIP from 7 to 28 July 2008, and it was underway while COP Kahler was being established. The formal TOA was at the time scheduled for 2 August 2008, and in the event it was actually performed on 24 July 2008. Sergeant First Class Dzwik, 2^nd Platoon Sergeant, was adamant about his displeasure at performing such a major operation while a second major operation, the RIP, was underway:

…it is my own personal belief that this was the wrong time to start a new FOB. The RIP was going on so that was using up assets that could have been used. We should have set this up earlier in the deployment or waited till the fighting season was done to do this. I speak of this in terms of logistic, ISR, CCA, CAS and support. There was a lot of focus on the RIP and I believe that if we had done it earlier or waited we could have had more assets to properly cover and bring in the supplies need for a rapid build up of defenses and logistics. We could have moved more forces into the area instead of worrying about moving forces out of the area for redeployment. If we would have done it during the late fall or winter then we could have made it with very little threat of enemy attack and had it set up ready to go for the next fighting season. It would also have given us time to warm the locals to the idea and prosperity that we would bring.^lxxxii

The greatest logistical constraint that the ongoing RIP imposed was to further limit the number of available rotary wing flights. Within Afghanistan, helicopter support is always a constraining factor, and there is always considerable competition at obtaining sufficient numbers of flights for any given operation. Because of the ongoing RIP that demanded numerous helicopter flights, the number of helicopters available to establish COP Kahler was further limited. Additionally, within Nuristan and Kunar Provinces rotary wing flights to many of the remote outposts must be escorted by a section (two) of Apache AH-64 attack helicopters to provide adequate security to the relatively vulnerable cargo helicopters (one 10^th Mountain Division soldier who had served for twelve months in the same area referred to these helicopters as “giant bullet magnets”). As a result, there were insufficient helicopters available to adequately support the establishment of the new installation at Wanat.^lxxxiii

Further diverting the attention of Captain Myer at Camp Blessing was the numerous administrative, logistical and property accountability issues necessary to move the Chosen Few from Afghanistan back to Italy. For example, customs inspections had to be scheduled and planned for, and all pieces of equipment returning to Italy had to be meticulously and painfully cleaned. When combined with the demands of the major Article 15-6 Investigation, Chosen Company and TF Rock command attention was clearly diverted and diluted from activities at Wanat.

The Plan- CONOP Rock Move

CONOP Rock Move entailed establishing a permanent Combat Outpost at Wanat. This is in contravention of the Brigade Commander’s remarks in late July following the engagement, when Colonel Preysler stated:

That’s all it was, a series of vehicles that went out there. People are saying that this was a full-up [forward operating base]/combat outpost, and that is absolutely false and not true. There were no walls. FOB denotes that there are walls and perimeters and all that. It’s a vehicle patrol base, temporary in nature. If there’s no combat outpost to abandon, there’s no position to abandon. It’s a bunch of vehicles like we do on patrol anywhere and we hold up for a night and pick up any tactical positions that we have with vehicle patrol bases. We do that routinely…. We’re always doing that when go out and stay in an area for longer then a few hours, and that’s what it is. So there is nothing to abandon. There was no structures, there was no COP or FOB or anything like that to even abandon. So, from the get-go, that is just [expletive], and it’s not right.^lxxxiv

This statement requires considerable clarification. First, it must be understood that within U.S. Army doctrine there is no such thing as a “Vehicle Patrol Base.” “VPB” is not a recognized U.S. Army acronym. It is not defined in any Field Manual; nor is the concept, or any TTPs, for a “Vehicle Patrol Base” taught at any U.S. Army schools or institutions. Regarding the argument that COP Kahler was nothing more than a temporary patrol base, on July 9^th there were four Surveyors from the 62^nd Engineer Battalion present at COP Kahler, establishing survey for the FOB intended to be constructed on the site, an action that was only necessary if a permanent occupation was contemplated.^lxxxv The Staff Sergeant in charge of the engineers reported that on July 9^th, “There was a 4 man survey crew there for the day to put in locations of guard towers, the perimeter and hard huts.”^lxxxvi SFC Dzwik, the Platoon Sergeant of the Chosen Few who paid very close and meticulous attention to the fortification of the site, specifically recalled, “They [the Surveyors] were tracking that they were going to start building the FOB right away. They had marked off the guard towers and where the walls were going to go.”^lxxxvii Third, an engineering design prepared by the 62^nd Engineer Battalion specifically depicts a range of permanent structures intended for the COP such as billets, an exterior stone wall and interior HESCO barrier wall, HESCO guard towers, Shower & Laundry facilities, a Traffic Control Point at the entrance to the COP, a well pump house, and even a leach field for disposal of wastewater [Figure X]. One of the Engineer soldiers working on-site would note, “The 11^th [of July] was mostly just pulling guard and waiting on contractors to get there with the heavy machinery to level out the ground so we could start building.”^lxxxviii Fourth, a number of HESCOs were installed at COP Kahler, and the first permanent facility (the mortar pit) was already well along to completion by the evening of July 12^th. Fifth, LTC Ostlund specifically discussed that there were integrated plans for a wide range of projects intended to be implemented at Wanat:

We targeted WANAT for over a year as a place where we could effectively progress along the Lines of Operation (LOOs) of Security, Governance, Economic Development and IO. We would position a base that was in close proximity to a new district center, a new police station, a market, and a population center – and was accessible by air and ground LOC. We had $1.4 million in projects planned or ongoing in WANAT’s area.^lxxxix

Sixth, if Wanat was only going to be a temporary VPB, there would have been no necessity for TF Rock to develop a formal operations order, much less brief CONOP Rock Move to the TF Bayonet commander and CJTF-101 DCG-O Brigadier General Milley. Last, within the CONOP Rock Move operations order, three of the key tasks were:

• 
  

  Air Assault/Move of personnel and equipment from COP Bella to Blessing – to Wanat;

  
  
• 
  

  Establish COP Wanat – OPs, fighting positions, force protection walls, and bunkers; and

  
  
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  Maximize IO effects – closing Bella/opening Wanat.

These three key tasks clearly indicate that establishing a functional COP at Wanat was TF Rock and TF Bayonet’s intent. The Battalion S-3, Major Scott Himes, also recalled that the operation’s intent had been to establish a permanent COP that TF Duke could then operate out of.

In contravention of Colonel Preysler’s post-evacuation statement, the plan was to establish a permanent COP at Wanat that could be supported by a finished, high-quality road from Camp Blessing to Wanat, that would provide for a daily connection with the District Center at Wanat, facilitate coordination with the District Governor and District ANP, establish security for the Wanat village, and enable contact and influence with the Waigal Valley population. The COP was designed to be a permanent facility surrounded by a stone exterior wall and interior HESCO wall with permanent billeting, potable water and waste water facilities. Wanat was intended to be a permanent COP that TF Duke of CJTF-101 was going to assume responsibility for, and perform daily operations out of, rather than a temporary “Vehicle Patrol Base.”

In order to sustain this COP, and permit it to serve as a conduit for economic improvement and governance flowing from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan within the Pech and Kunar Valleys, the road from Camp Blessing had to be completed. The total distance of this road was approximately eight kilometers. Of this distance, the southern 6 ½ kilometers from Camp Blessing was finished, and was in excellent condition and capable of supporting heavy military and commercial vehicle traffic. The last northern 1 ½ kilometers to Wanat was poor, narrow, and rough and needed to be smoothed, straightened and widened before it could support regular and heavy military or commercial traffic. HMMWVs and Jingle Trucks could travel on the road, but slowly and cautiously. The road connection was crucial, as Ranch House and Bella had been abandoned because they could only be logistically supported by rotary wing (helicopter) operations, and COP Kahler was specifically sited at Wanat because it could be logistically supported by ground transportation.

By late June, the decision had been made by the 2-503^rd Airborne Infantry and 173^rd Airborne BCT to evacuate COP Bella, and transfer operations to the new COP Kahler at Wanat. The 2-503^rd Battalion Staff developed the Operations Order for CONOP Rock Move. On July 6, 2008 TF Rock briefed Colonel Preysler on the operation. The next day, July 7^th, TF Rock briefed Brigadier General Mark Milley, DCG-O 101^st Airborne Division. On July 7^th, 2^nd Platoon of Chosen Company received the Operations Order, and it executed pre-combat checks on July 7^th and July 8^th. 2^nd Platoon and Chosen Few Company did not perform formal ROC (Rehearsal of Concept) drills, but key leaders did brief back their concept of operations. Platoon Sergeant Dzwik noted that: “The commander had set up where he was envisioning the positions, which was pretty much where we set up. We knew the area, so we knew from pictures we took and from visiting the positions where we were going to go.” As SFC Dzwik noted, the 2^nd Platoon had visited Wanat on several previous occasions in March, April and May 2008, and their specific squad positions were already selected. The precise location for COP Kahler had already been established before the 2^nd Platoon ever began their movement to Wanat. The general site for the OP had also been selected on a ridge to the east of the major platoon position, although its precise positioning had not yet been pitched upon.^xc

As briefed, the Operations Order was strictly a combat operation. Because of various timing issues, CONOP Rock Move called for the evacuation of COP Bella first, followed by the establishment of the new COP Kahler at Wanat. This would somewhat alleviate excessive demands upon rotary wing assets, particularly given the RIP then in progress. However, there was no accompanying I/O engagement explaining that COP Bella was simply being moved. By segmenting the operation, the population of the Waigal Valley perceived that the large insurgent force known to be operating against Bella had driven the U.S. Army out of that outpost. Positively establishing the new COP Kahler before Bella was abandoned would have alleviated this inadvertent and deleterious I/O message, along with performing a prominent, formal movement from Bella to Wanat in a highly visible manner that could be well publicized. There was no formal coordination with the Nuristan Provincial Governor, although the District Governor at Wanat had been consulted and was familiar with the operation. However, there was no incorporation of political objectives, or integration with Afghan governance, in CONOP Rock Move. There was no prior coordination with the ANP District Headquarters at Wanat. Although an ANA Company was included in the operation, the ANA was not incorporated into the planning process. LTC Anderson, the ANA ETT OIC later noted that: “They [TF Rock] were pushing the ANA out to the front but not so much in the planning phases. Their planning was to pack everyone on the backs of vehicles and just take off. That was something we had to work on.”^xci CONOP Rock Move did not include the distribution of any humanitarian aid to Wanat, and no Civil Affairs component was included in the CONOP. There was no MEDCAP (Medical Civil Affairs Patrols) or VETCAP (Veterinary Civil Affairs Patrols) associated with the operation. This was in accordance with guidance from CJTF-101: “The commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 101, General Schlosser, actually said, as part of the counterinsurgency doctrine, ‘All you folks up here in the Waygul Valley, if you don’t want to play then we’re not going to spend a dime in development. We’re not coming up to do medical civic assistance programs (MEDCAPs) or anything. If you’re all good with that, as long as you stay there, we may come in and do some operations if we know there are high-value targets….’ But we were just going to cut them off and let them rot on the vine a little bit as everyone else developed.”^xcii Some ISR and Collections Assets were provided to the operation by the CJTF G-2, although on the evening of July 8^th-9^th these were relatively ineffective due to the heavy weather that dominated that night. CONOP Rock Move did not move any organic UAVs (their Raven system) to Wanat, primarily because of previous challenges with operating the Raven system in terrain similar to that to be found around the community. Rock Move had no formal MILDEC component, although inserting the 2^nd Platoon convoy of five vehicles into Wanat under cover of darkness on July 8^th could be interpreted as providing some limited MILDEC. There was no associated show of force with the occupation of Wanat. The comparatively small force at Wanat, which had been quietly inserted into town at night, failed to impress anybody that the American army element establishing COP Kahler possessed overwhelming strength. Rather, the impression disseminated was one of weakness and vulnerability. Although considerable economic development and growth were planned for Wanat, and TF Rock had identified no less than $1.4 million in economic projects specifically to benefit the community, the 2^nd Platoon arrived at Wanat without bringing any of this economic activity with them. They carried only promises of future prosperity. 2^nd Platoon was not provided with any local currency to perform local purchases from the Wanat economy, such as Lieutenant Glen’s Engineers had done in the fall of 2006.

The Chosen Company soldiers, who had only thirteen days of duty remaining in Afghanistan following nearly fifteen months of continuous combat and operations, were not particularly thrilled to receive the mission. In fact, they had already shipped their personal items back to Italy, and only retained a single rucksack with immediate living gear, and their combat equipment and weapons. Specialist Stafford, a MG-240 Gunner with 2^nd Platoon, remembered:

…none of us wanted to go. We had about 13 days left before we were scheduled to get out of there on the choppers and we were all really pissed off that we had to go. We knew the intel reports of massing enemy attacks and very high-risk missions, so not a lot of us wanted to go.^xciii

Another soldier sadly echoed, “All of us knew this was going to be a bad mission, nobody seemed to understand it.” The burden of keeping the platoon intent upon the mission and motivated to accomplish it fell primarily upon recently promoted SFC Dzwik, as Platoon Sergeant the senior NCO in the platoon. Dzwik stated that he didn’t change the routine of combat checks and drills in preparation for an operation, and he simply told the soldiers that they had come here to do fifteen months of a job, not fourteen months of a job. SFC Dzwik noted that by this time the Platoon was a tight-knit, highly efficient organization that worked smoothly and efficiently together, and that their focus on mission accomplishment never slipped.^xciv

Lieutenant Brostrom was particularly displeased with the mission. On July 7^th he talked at Camp Blessing with his best friend and former Ranger buddy, 1^st Lieutenant Brandon Kennedy with Alpha Company:

… the topic came up about the Wanat mission. He told me he did not like it. He said he thought it was a bad idea and he knew he was going to get ‘fucked up’ because the last four times he had gone up there, he had been ambushed or IED’ed every time, often with very good effects. 1LT Brostrom told me that he wasn’t sure why they were trying to do this mission so close to the end of the deployment and that he had been told back in March or April (when he and his platoon had been pulled out of Bella) it was for the reason of establishing the Wanat FOB. 1LT Brostrom said he sat for three or four months waiting to do this mission and figured it just eventually wouldn’t happen, but then was surprised and disappointed at the same time that they were trying to push this mission. I asked who ‘they” was and he couldn’t quite tell me if it was coming down from Brigade, Battalion or just his Company Commander, but he knew he wasn’t too fond of the idea and nor were his men. 1LT Brostrom expressed concerns to me about the number of men he was taking with him for the mission (I think he told me it would be around 23-24 plus some ANA, who he felt didn’t really count towards combat power anyway) and that he was also concerned about the terrain surrounding the area…I did actually ask LT Brostrom if he had brought this up with his Company Commander. He told me that he had talked with Captain Myer and brought up a lot of his concerns, and that they had made plans to help mitigate some of the risks (like giving the new FOB mortar support), but 1LT Brostrom didn’t seem like all his concerns had been answered/mitigated. I don’t know if LT Brostrom ever brought his concerns to anyone else, or how exactly they were all mitigated, but he did tell me had talked with his commander about his concerns.^xcv

On July 8^th, COP Bella was evacuated. At Captain Myer’s insistence, the garrison there had been increased for the last few days of its existence, because Captain Myer feared that the large ACM force of two hundred fighters known to be operating against Bella intended a large scale attack on that post. Captain Myer specifically recalled: “I had a feeling that the enemy was trying to do a large-scale attack on Bella because they knew we were going to vacate it. They could do a large attack and then say they forced us out of Bella. That was basically an information operations part of the mission.”^xcvi Sergeant Aass, the RTO for Captain Myer, recalled that the structures at Bella were left intact: “Sergeant Major Meyer decided that we should leave it standing and just make an announcement that we were donating the buildings to the villagers. Either way, the Taliban were going to claim that they drove us off. This way, we could twist the argument and say we were giving something to the villagers. If the Taliban then chose to take it over, then we could say they stole it from the villagers.”^xcvii In the event, Bella was successfully evacuated without any contact. Captain Myer was among one of the last to leave Bella. All materials and personnel were transferred to Camp Blessing, and subsequently some of the Class IV (construction materials) and Class V (ammunition) were moved to COP Kahler at Wanat.

2^nd Platoon, Chosen Company (The “Chosen Few”) moved from Camp Blessing on the evening of July 8^th, departing for the approximately ninety-minute journey after sunset. Soldiers on the convoy that were interviewed provided various times for departure, but have consistently stated that their departure was after nightfall. Five HMMWVs were driven to Wanat, a HMMWV apiece for the three rifle squads, a single HMMWV for the 2^nd Platoon Headquarters, and a TOW HMMWV. Sergeant Hissong remembered the HMMWVs being loaded “with as much food, water, ammo, and people as they could hold.” Upon arrival at Wanat they established a vehicle laager in the open field near the bazaar. This was the identical site that Lieutenant Glen’s Engineers had used as a staging area and cantonment in the fall of 2006, during the tenure of their bridge construction. Shortly after they arrived a drenching rainfall descended for the remainder of the night. Sergeant Hissong remembered that it was “pitch black” and that the northern part of the field flooded. Specialist Stafford recalled, “We pulled in there, circled the Humvees and then about that time it started dumping rain and a big thunderstorm.” With the heavy rain and darkness, little could be done except to pull local security until morning.^xcviii At first light the field was swept for mines and IEDs by 2^nd Platoon, and then the Platoon leadership located fighting positions and entrenchment began. Lieutenant Bosworth and Sergeant Pitt selected the site for the OP on a knoll to the east.

An additional Chinook helicopter flight delivered the ANA Company from the 3rd Kandak [Battalion], 2nd Brigade, 201st Corps (24 ANA soldiers plus three US Marine Embedded Tactical Trainers (ETTs) and two interpreters) and additional 2^nd Platoon, Chosen Few Company soldiers to Wanat (who had not been able to fit into the HMMWV convoy the night before) on the afternoon of July 9^th. Several other helicopter flights also carried the 120mm mortar to the site, along with construction materials such as HESCOs, hand excavation tools (shovels and picks), sandbags, and concertina. Most of this material, along with supplementary ammunition, had been previously positioned at COP Bella, and was transferred to Wanat.

A six-man engineering squad from C Company, 62^nd Engineer Battalion (that had just been deployed to Afghanistan from Fort Hood, Texas) was also brought in by Chinook helicopter, along with a small CONEX filled with specialized equipment for them to work with. A large rubber fuel blivet for the bobcat was placed next to this CONEX, roughly located in the center of the COP.

The logistical approach was for COP Kahler to be constructed by a Jalalabad-based Afghan construction company, with CH-47 Chinook helicopter flights delivering specialized supply loads such as the ANA, 120mm mortar tube, and Engineers’ equipment. Accompanying the construction company were intended to be several LN “Jingle” trucks carrying the majority of the logistical supplies necessary for COP Kahler, recognizing that even five heavily laden HMMWVs could not carry everything that the 2^nd Platoon required. Unfortunately, there were problems with the construction company, including lack of a Route Clearance Package to ensure that the road from Blessing to Wanat (which had been the location of several previous IED attacks) was safe, and a lack of a combat escort to enable them to safely move into Wanat. Chosen Company had never worked with this Afghan construction company before. At one time, several trucks actually began moving to Wanat, but turned around before arrival, complaining (almost certainly truthfully) that: “…the AAF were watching the road.”^xcix This complex logistical plan required an Afghan construction company to work to a meticulous time schedule in coordination with an American Route Clearance Package and combat escort between Camp Blessing and Wanat, while COP Bella was being evacuated, and while a RIP was being implemented.

Among the mortar squad was PFC Sergio Abad, 21, of south Florida. Abad had served most of the deployment with the Battle Company mortars in the Korengal Valley, but had recently been transferred to the Chosen Few 120mm mortar squad. Abad was a foster child, was a fine salsa dancer, and had earned a reputation as a highly skilled mortar gunner, although like many young soldiers he possessed a bit of attitude. His Section Sergeant, Sergeant Hector Chavez, remembered of him:

He was one of those guys that you wondered why he was in the military. He was a very smart kid. He made us look like privates with the knowledge he had of the 120. He had a lot of knowledge. The only problem was that he was very cocky and had a street attitude that we couldn’t get him to shake, no matter how many times we smoked him. He was a good kid, though, and he listened to his NCOs. Had he learned to keep his mouth shut, he would have easily been promoted to sergeant (E5). He was a hell of a gunner, though. Probably one of the fastest guys I’ve seen on the 120. He knew his job. He studied very hard and was set on getting promoted to E5.^c

Abad’s fiancé was pregnant, and he was very much looking forward to getting home to her in a few days.

The ANA company that was ordered to support the Chosen Few at Wanat was a relatively new ANA Company, it had been formed only in January and February 2008 and received initial organizational training at Kabul, and then been moved to the Pech/Korengal/Waigal Valley region in March 2008. The majority of the enlisted men were relatively young, inexperienced recruits, from throughout northeastern Afghanistan. The Kanak Sergeant Major was an extremely experienced soldier, was from the Waigal Valley, and provided considerable local knowledge and familiarity. The Company was advised by three Marine ETTs, two of which had been with this same organization since their arrival in country in March 2008 (the NCOIC Staff Sergeant Luis Repreza and Corporal Jason Jones), while Corporal Jason Oakes was replacing another ETT member and had only joined the ETT team on the ground at Camp Blessing on July 9^th, just in time for the helicopter ride to Wanat. LTC Kevin Anderson, USMCR, the Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the ETT noted that the Company had been undergoing intensive training, and had made considerable progress. Weaknesses were logistics and communications, and the majority of these services were enabled by the Marine ETTs. LTC Anderson specifically noted that their level of training enabled the ANA to perform effective and independent dismounted and local security patrols.^ci

Eventually, a handful of Local National Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up trucks arrived at COP Kahler with supplemental water and rations, but not without shortages of these indispensible provisions prohibiting work for most of three days. The Toyota Hi-Lux ¼ ton 4×4 double cab pickup trucks are found everywhere in Afghanistan, in every conceivable condition, they carry anything and everything, and they can negotiate even the most brutal terrain. These tough little Toyota pickup trucks are the single most ubiquitous vehicles in Afghanistan, and they constituted the last reinforcements that would arrive at Wanat until the afternoon of July 12^th, when another helicopter flight delivered Captain Myer, his RTO (Sergeant Erik Aass), additional water and rations, and correct parts to operate a generator to pump the fuel from the blivet into the bobcat. Captain Myer and Sergeant Aass were the only personnel reinforcements that arrived at COP Kahler after July 9^th, and with their arrival there were 49 Americans (forty Paratroopers, six Engineers, and three Marine ETTs) at COP Kahler. Although LTC Ostlund had noted that stationing Company Command and Control (C2) at Wanat was a component of the planned mitigations for the risk assessment, the only Company C2 assets that were ever deployed to Wanat were Captain Myer and Sergeant Aass. The FSO, First Sergeant, and other Company assets such as communications equipment were never transported to Wanat. The additional Company 60mm and Battalion 120mm mortars remained at Camp Blessing, and Wanat was out of mortar range.

Defensive Configuration and Terrain Discussion

In order for COP Kahler to be effective, it had to be placed in close enough proximity to Wanat to facilitate regular coordination with the District Center and ANP, had to be positioned to be readily re-supplied by road from Camp Blessing, and to provide permanent security for the community against the ACM forces operating in the Waigal Valley. As with nearly every community in Kunar and Nuristan, Wanat was located within a valley. Wanat was specifically located at the junction of the Wayskawdi Khwar, a creek that flowed generally from the east, and the larger Darrehye Waygal (Waygal River). Fairly recent additions were the 150’ Bailey Bridge constructed over the Waigal River, and the 30’ Bailey Bridge over the Wayskawdi River, which had been built by local labor and Lieutenant Glen’s Engineers of the 10^th Mountain Division in the fall of 2006. COP Kahler had to be positioned to control these two bridges, as they were absolutely critical terrain within the Waigal Valley. Wanat is a community of approximately fifty families, and it contained a mosque, hotel, district government center, district police center from which a force of Afghanistan National Police (ANP) operated, and a large bazaar (market). A local resident, Amhad (not his real name for security purposes), noted that the community had initially enjoyed good relationships with the United States Army, “…people were treated very good by US and Afghan Forces, two years ago, while building two bridges by US Forces, a lot of people were hired from Want and nearby villages and people from Want Village were and still are nice with US forces.” This refers to the fall 2006 construction by the 10^th Mountain Division. Although the Chosen Company and TF Rock leadership felt that Wanat was hostile to American forces, Ahmad suggests that the people were more concerned with the conflict that an American base in their community would be certain to attract, as they were well familiar with the regular fighting that plagued Ranch House and Bella. Ahmad noted, “The most important reason I think was that Want Villages did not want their village be battle field. They knew that if US Army build base there, militant will attack or fire rocket and villages will be the most victim of fighting. That is why they were against the base. It was mentioned by villagers to the US Army in meetings.”^cii Here, Ahmad is referring to the two Shuras held at Wanat, and his statement is confirmed by American officers attending these meetings.

COP Kahler occupied a large open field, which the Chosen One soldiers described as the size of a football field, aligned from north to south, and located generally south of the Town of Wanat. The field was generally flat and level, declining slightly from north to south, with low terraces running east to west that were relatively easily negotiated, descending from north to south . The center of the field was at 3,350 feet elevation, and was generally devoid of vegetation, but contained numerous small rocks. As with nearly every community in Kunar and Nuristan, Wanat is surrounded by prominent ridges to the northwest, northeast, southeast and southwest, that consistently approach 10,000 feet in peak elevation. One Chosen Company soldier candidly referred to the location of COP Kahler as “being at the bottom of a bowl, surrounded by a whole lot of shit sandwich.” For this reason, during the previous American occupation of Wanat in the fall of 2006 three OPs had been specifically established by the ANA to provide over-watch of the valley community.

To ameliorate this exposed set of necessary circumstances, dictated by the realities of the Afghanistan topography, a strong, deliberate defense was planned for COP Kahler including an exterior stone wall, an interior HESCO barrier, and four guard towers. Unfortunately, because of various factors, there were minimal defenses in place at COP Kahler as night fell on the evening of July 12^th. COP Kahler at that moment consisted of a number of squad sized fighting positions, generally oriented towards the village of Wanat, to the north (twelve o’clock). From the southwest (8 o’clock) clockwise the position consisted of:

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  A field latrine area (at 8 o’clock) protected by several HESCOs;

  
  
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  The mortar firing pit and Ammunition Supply Point [ASP], well-constructed of HESCOs (9 o’clock). The 120mm mortar was emplaced in this firing pit;

  
  
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  ANA Fighting Position (10 o’clock), with approximately half of the ANA Company;

  
  
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  Third Squad, 2^nd Platoon Fighting Position with Up-armored HMMWV and Mk 19 grenade launcher (11 o’clock);

  
  
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  ANA Fighting Position (12 o’clock), with the other half of the ANA Company;

  
  
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  To the rear of the ANA fighting positions a 3-man fighting position was constructed by the three ETT Marines and their interpreters, positioned so that they could provide command & control to both of the ANA fighting positions, and have somewhat better fields of vision;

  
  
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  Second Squad, 2^nd Platoon Fighting Position with Up-armored HMMWV and Mk 19 grenade launcher (1 o’clock);

  
  
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  A Platoon/Company Command Post (CP) with the Platoon Leader’s Up-armored HMMWV with a .50 M2 Heavy Machine Gun (3 o’clock). The CP was placed directly against the southwestern wall of the “C” shaped building which offered it considerable protection from any fires from the north, but also obstructed lines of sight directly to the north;

  
  
• 
  

  To the west of the Command Post the Bobcat constructed a ramp on the late afternoon/early evening of July 12^th for the 3-man TOW HMMWV, to enable it to have a better field of fire. The TOW HMMWV only occupied this position just before dark on July 12^th;

  
  
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  The 60mm mortar was set up in the middle of the COP, approximately mid-way between the mortar pit with the 120mm mortar and the Command Post. It was installed in a firing position with limited protection.

To the southeast (4 o’clock) and across the road from Camp Blessing the 1^st Squad, 2^nd Platoon had a Traffic Control Point (TCP) with an up-armored HMMWV and a .50 M2 Heavy Machine Gun, with a single strand of concertina stretched across the road as an obstacle. The Machine Gun was oriented towards the south, facing down the road from Camp Blessing. To the south of the 1^st squad TCP, there was a small ANA position, with less than a dozen ANA assisting this TCP. By the night of July 12^th, the 1^st Squad TCP was a fairly robust position. One soldier recalled:

This was…improved to a triple wall of sandbags four feet high and two 4’ HESCOs with camo-netting overhead, more for shade than any sort of concealment. The end result was a position overlooking the road, with an 8’ trace behind (west) of us, a 4’ triple thick sandbag wall forming the left side and 1/3 of the front wall [south] and two interlocked trapezoidal 4’ HESCOs forming the remainder of the wall. The truck remained due west of the position, covering south down the road.^ciii

The west and north side of the COP was defined by a ravine (seasonably dry) filled with trees and heavy vegetation. The road from Camp Blessing to Wanat ran from south to north, and defined the eastern periphery of COP Kahler. A large building with a prominent blue roof was located to the northwest of the COP (at about 10 o’clock), surrounded by a high stone wall. To the due north was a single large building that served as the Wanat Mosque. The District Center was farther to the northwest of the mosque and located on a narrow isthmus between the two rivers, immediately adjacent to and west of the road to Camp Blessing. A cluster of buildings existed to the northeast and east, just across the road from Camp Blessing, from approximately 1 o’clock to 3 o’clock. This cluster of buildings included several multiple storied buildings, one of which served as a hotel, and a long single storied building to the due east that served as the community bazaar or market. There was a gap between the bazaar and these other buildings, so that soldiers could easily walk or run from the COP to the OP to the north of the bazaar. Just to the south of the bazaar was a small, separate building that served as the local public latrine for the market. To the south of this building was the 1^st Squad TCP. Although soldiers could walk directly from the COP to the OP, they most typically followed a path that had been created through the 1^st Squad TCP.

Within the open field was an unfinished (walls only) “C” shaped building on the eastern side of the field, with the open portion of the “C” facing to the northeast. This “C” shaped building was not authorized to become a portion of COP Kahler, and it was not occupied by Chosen Company. Platoon Sergeant David Dzwik recalled that they were specifically told that they were not permitted to use this building, and the formal plan for the completed COP Kahler did not include this building within its limits.^civ The orientation and location of this unfinished building suggested that it was intended, when completed, to become an expansion of the market. The road from Camp Blessing to Wanat ran between the market and the “C” shaped building. Agricultural terraces ran for a considerable distance to the south. Commanding enclosed Nuristani compounds of multiple buildings that included lookout towers and firing positions were located on high prominent knolls to the southwest and southeast of the COP; and to the southeast and northeast of the OP.

The Chosen Company Squad and ANA fighting positions were dug two to four feet deep as the ground permitted, with layers of sandbags raising them another one to three feet above the ground surface. Platoon Sergeant Dzwik specifically recalled that the ground was hard with a lot of rocks, and that it was very difficult digging given the limited hand tools and personnel entrenching tools that were available, and that excavating more than a couple of feet down was not feasible. Nearly all of the fighting positions were covered with camouflage netting, primarily installed to provide shade to the soldiers rather than providing any meaningful concealment (the COP was in the middle of the town in an open field, surrounded entirely by high ground and village structures, and a few camouflage nets were certainly not going to conceal the COP from anybody). Some fighting positions, such as the mortar firing point, had camouflage ponchos stretched above individual sleeping positions or the soldier’s cots. None of the positions had overhead cover, as there was no available material to provide this. Sergeant First Class Dzwik later noted that he had located some large wooden beams that could have been used for this purpose, but they were located in a vacant Afghan house, and he did not want to take the wood without gaining the owner’s permission and properly paying for it.^cv

On the morning of July 9^th Lieutenant Brostrom, working with Sergeant Pitts, established an Observation Post (OP) on a ridge to the east of the main COP Kahler position. The general site for this OP had been previously selected, but not the precise location. The site of this OP was dictated by the exigencies of the terrain. The OP was to be located on a prominent, heavily terraced, agricultural ridge located east of the Blessing-Wanat Road, and southeast of the junction of the Wayskawdi Khwar, the creek that flowed from the east into Wanat, and the larger Darrehye Waygal (Waygal River). This knoll was oblong shaped and consisted of a large number of flattened agricultural terraces. The terrace walls were constructed of stone, were probably about one hundred years old, and were three to four feet high. Chosen Company soldiers noted that they varied from “waist” to “mid-chest” in height. This ridge was high enough to completely block all observation and fields of fire from the COP to the northeast (about 1 o’clock) through to the southeast (about 5 o’clock). This ridge prevented any visibility or control of the Wayskawdi Khwar, which flowed through a large ravine to the north, northeast, and east. Thus, placing on OP on this ridge permitted visibility to the east of terrain that would otherwise have been entirely concealed. Lieutenant Brostrom and Sergeant Pitts selected a site for the OP that was located just west and near (but not at) the topographical crest of the knoll, six terraces up (approximately twenty feet in elevation above the road or ground level), and on the western military crest of the ridge. It was separated by the long, single story market (bazaar) from the road and COP Kahler.

This OP was informally named “OP Topside.” On February 16, 1945 during the airborne assault on Corregidor by the 503^rd Airborne Infantry, Drop Zone Topside had been the parade ground on ‘Top Side’, a 550-foot-high elevation that dominated Corregidor. Topside was the most important Drop Zone in the history of the 503^rd Airborne Infantry. The OP to the east of COP Kahler dominated the terrain, just as Top Side had dominated Corregidor.

The actual OP site, which eventually consisted of three fighting positions, was west of and about two terraces below the top terrace at the pinnacle of the knoll, and there was rising ground to the south and east, and descending ground to the north and west. The OP was located on the northwestern portion of this terrace and thus the ridge. Sergeant Ryan Pitts, the Platoon’s Forward Observer, noted that Lieutenant Brostrom had specifically positioned the OP here because, “…he said he didn’t want the observation post to be too far out, because we didn’t really have a lot of people.”^cvi A large, strong Afghan compound was located several hundred yards to the southeast on extremely prominent terrain. Following the engagement, an OP would specifically be located at this compound, as it was clearly key terrain. However, Lieutenant Brostrom did not feel that he had adequate soldiers available to defend this relatively remote and isolated position. This compound was also outside of the site boundaries designated by CONOP Rock Move for the OP. A third position farther to the east of the actual OP position selected, that provided better observation and fields of fire into the deep ravine to the north and east, was also considered. However, if the OP had been farther to the east in either of these other two positions, the distance to reach the OP from COP Kahler would have been farther, and the route to reach them would have been particularly exposed to enemy observation and potential fire, because the top of the terraced ridgeline would have had to be crossed.^cvii When Captain Myer arrived on the afternoon of July 12^th, he was not particularly pleased with the topographical location of OP Topside, in fact: “I suggested moving it higher on the hill but all the paratroopers and the PL [Platoon Leader] said it would be more exposed on the hilltop and they would rather have the force protection of the rocks. I agreed we would move it when we had more force protection.”^cviii Thus, neither the prominent compound, or another location to the east were selected. A fourth OP location that was contemplated was the two-story hotel that dominated the mosque-hotel-bazaar complex of buildings within Wanat village. However, an OP in the hotel would not have improved observation or obtained fields of fire to the east, which was the entire purpose of the OP, and it was also outside of the boundaries dictated for the OP by CONOP Rock Move. Additionally, the Afghan residents of the hotel would have had to have been dislocated, and Lieutenant Brostrom did not possess this flexibility.

By placing it adjacent to the western terrace, access to the OP would be somewhat protected, and the western terraces that provided egress to the OP could be observed and controlled by gunfire from the main COP and the OP itself. However, this tactical positioning of the OP did not provide complete observation or fields of fire of the low ground to the north and east, although it should be noted that the precipitous variations in terrain caused by the multiple terraces on this ridgeline would have resulted in dead ground in the immediate vicinity of the OP regardless of its precise location.

Three fighting positions were constructed at the OP, as with the fighting positions at COP Kahler, both excavated and raised with sandbags. OP Topside consisted of a north facing fire-team sized fighting position, an east facing fire-team sized fighting position, and a southern facing fire-team sized position. Both the north and south positions were rectangular and anchored on large boulders. The southernmost fighting position had been constructed at Specialist Bogar’s specific recommendation.^cix The east-facing fighting position was semi-circular, and was dug into the next terrace to the east. For some obscure reason, it became known as the “Crow’s Nest.” A long, strong sandbag wall was constructed along the western side of the OP, with the three fighting positions all anchored to this sandbag wall. Because of the topography of the agricultural terrace, the ground descended sharply to the north and east about thirty to forty feet forward of the OP, and there was extensive dead ground to the north and east. Several large trees on the western periphery of the OP provided shade, and some limited concealment, for the OP. An area of dense brush and numerous small trees was immediately to the northwest (10 o’clock to noon) of the OP. The paratroopers did not possess adequate equipment such as axes or chain saws to enable them to cut down the trees and brush, although the engineers had some limited equipment capable of dealing with this vegetation. When adequate construction equipment and personnel arrived, the intent was to entirely clear this small copse of brush and trees.

The Crown’s Nest was at a higher elevation than the other two fighting positions. To cover the dead ground in close proximity to the OP, four Claymore command detonated anti-personnel mines were emplaced at the periphery of the dead ground to the north, east and south. These were emplaced after dark, and recovered at first light after stand-to. They were not entrenched or dug-in, they were simply placed upon the ground surface, and were not positioned in depth. Two claymores were controlled from the northern firing position, one to the north, and the other to the east. Two more claymores were controlled from the southern firing position, one to the south, and another to the east. Specialist Stafford specifically recalled testing the Claymores the night of July 12^th when installing them, and noted that they were “good Claymores.”^cx A large number of hand grenades were carried up to the OP along with an M-203 Grenade Launcher, to assist with the defense of the dead ground. Sergeant Pitts established several target reference points to also control the dead ground, a mission for which the 60mm mortar was ideally suited. Field artillery was formally registered by Sergeant Pitts on one of these targets, and both the 60mm and 120mm mortars were fired to settle their base plates.

The terrace immediately to the west (and below) of OP Topside was used as the sleeping position for the soldiers assigned to the OP, and individual tents were located there. The sleeping terrace could be swept with fire from COP Kahler proper. There were no fighting positions at the sleeping terrace, because it was not intended to be defended. During hours of likely attack such as dawn and dusk all the soldiers were always awake and at stand-to in the fighting positions at the OP, rather than being asleep. A short stretch of sandbags had been constructed running east to west across the northern portion of the sleeping terrace, to provide protection from the dead ground to the north. The intent was to eventually extend this wall to provide protection to the entire sleeping terrace, but there were only enough sandbags to finish this short stretch of north-facing sandbag wall by dusk on July 12^th. The thick concentration of brush and trees continued northeast of the sleeping terrace (from 1 to 2 o’clock).

Both the sleeping terrace and OP fighting position were surrounded by a single strand of concertina wire, which had been routed through the trees and brush at the northwest corner of the OP. As previously noted this concertina had not been staked down or secured to the ground because the 2^nd Platoon had run out of posts and stakes. This concertina generally ran along the periphery of the agricultural terraces, where the dead ground began.

Organic ISR assets included the TOW Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS), a thermal system mounted on the TOW launcher on the TOW HMMWV; and the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS), a ground mounted thermal system that was installed at OP TOPSIDE. Detailed technical capabilities of these two systems are classified, but they provided the Chosen Company soldiers with formidable night vision and long range surveillance capabilities, although both of these systems were line-of-sight.

Major weapons systems at COP Kahler were the single Battalion 120mm mortar, the single Company 60mm mortar, and the single TOW Missile Launcher on the HMMWV. All three weapons systems were positioned as previously described. The 120mm mortar was emplaced within a fortified firing pit that was generally completed. The 60mm mortar was simply set up in the middle of the COP in a supplemental firing position with limited protection. The TOW was mounted on an up-armored HMMWV, which had been moved to its newly constructed ramp in the center of the COP late in the afternoon/early in the evening of July 12^th.

The Commander at COP Kahler from July 8^th through July 12^th was the 2^nd Platoon Leader of the Chosen Few, 1^st Lieutenant Jonathan P. Brostrom, 24 years old from Hawaii. Brostom’s father was U.S. Army Colonel David Brostrom, who had retired in 2004, following a successful career to include tenure as Commander of the 10^th Mountain Division’s Combat Aviation Brigade. Although born in Germany, Lieutenant Brostrom had grown up in Hawaii and was an avid outdoorsman, a dedicated weight lifter, and an accomplished swimmer who had worked as a Life Guard throughout high school and college. Brostrom had graduated from the University of Hawaii in 2006 with a degree in Human Resources, and was commissioned through that University’s ROTC program. While an ROTC Cadet he earned the Air Assault, Airborne, and U.S. Navy Scuba Diver Badge. Following graduation from Ranger School, Lieutenant Brostrom deployed to Italy and then Afghanistan in June 2007. Brostrom planned on making the Army a career, and hoped to transition to Special Forces as he gained more experience. He had initially served as Assistant S-3, and by July 2008 had been 2^nd Platoon Leader for eight months in Afghanistan, with considerable combat experience at COP Bella, and was a seasoned Platoon Leader who was popular with his soldiers, and well respected within TF Rock.

All platoon weapons and supplementary weapons systems were carefully placed in overlapping fields of fire by Lieutenant Brostrom and SFC Dzwik, with established azimuths of fire and formal range cards. When Captain Myer arrived on the afternoon of July 12^th, he personally walked with 1LT Brostrom around the entire perimeter. Captain Myer and Sergeant Dzwik later recalled that 1LT Brostrom had drawn a detailed tactical diagram of the platoon defensive positions on an MRE box, but unfortunately this diagram could not be located following the engagement. Formal range cards with measured azimuths for primary directions of fire, limits of fire, and Final Protective Fires (FPF) were completed for every major weapons system. Sergeant Pitts pre-plotted target reference points for indirect fire (mortar and field artillery) completely around the COP, and in particular to cover the dead ground to the north and east of the OP, and on July 10^th he forwarded updates to this target plan to the Battalion TOC at Camp Blessing. COP Kahler had priority of fires within the Battalion, which meant that it could call upon the single platoon (two tubes) of newly fielded M777A2 155mm Field Artillery howitzers, located at Camp Blessing. These weapons were manned by C Battery, 1-321 Airborne Field Artillery (the “Cobras”) out of the 18^th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (there were never four 155mm artillery pieces at Camp Blessing as LTC Ostlund stated, only two guns).^cxi

The limited extent of these defenses reflected not a lack of permanency for COP Kahler, but rather severe constraints of materials and resources. Chosen Company and the 62^nd Engineer soldiers present used every available means at their disposal to construct their defenses. All HESCOs available were emplaced. However, because of technical limitations of the Bobcat, the HESCOS had to be cut down to a 4’ height rather than their full 7’ height. HESCOs are woven metal baskets, lined with heavy fabric, shipped flat, and easily erected and filled. They are manufactured by the HESCO Barrier Ltd. Company of England. Per their company marketing literature: “HESCO Concertainer® is a prefabricated, multi-cellular system, made of Galfan coated steel welded mesh and lined with non-woven polypropylene geotextile.” Essentially, HESCO barriers are nothing more than the gabions used in military engineering throughout the 18^th and 19^th centuries, giant baskets filled with dirt, gravel, rock or any other available materials, but made of metal mesh instead of the woven sticks of their forefathers. There were only enough HESCOs to provide limited protection to the field latrine and construct the mortar pit which included a rudimentary ASP; with two HESCOs left over for the TCP. However, none of these HESCOs were completed to their full seven feet height, none of them were filled more than four feet because of the Bobcat’s limitations, and several of the HESCOs had been simply placed in position and were never filled with dirt at all because the Bobcat had run out of gasoline. In fact, when a CH-47 Chinook helicopter landed directly in the middle of the COP late on the afternoon of July 13^th, the second tier of HESCOs at the mortar pit were blown over and scattered by the prop blast. No HESCOs were emplaced at OP Topside, because the Bobcat could not ascend the hill to fill any HESCOs there. All available sandbags were filled. All available concertina wire was emplaced. The main COP was surrounded by a perimeter of double concertina wire, properly staked down. Because the platoon ran out of concertina wire, stakes and posts, the OP could only be surrounded by a single strand of wire that could not be properly staked down, and the wire had to be simply laid down on the ground, resulting in a barrier with extremely limited capability.

Improvements to the position were constrained due to the high temperatures and insufficient water, resulting in the soldiers becoming dehydrated, and not being able to work during the heat of the day. Although the 2^nd Platoon had loaded the HMMWVs with all the water, food, and ammunition that they could carry, water is bulky and heavy, and given the requirements for one man to consume one quart of water during heavy labor in the heat of the day, the large quantities of water (no less than twelve gallons per hour) required by 2^nd Platoon simply could not be carried in on the HMMWVs. SFC Dzwik would later note that he thought that he had brought enough water with him to Wanat, but the unexpectedly high temperatures, and heavy labor that he had not anticipated (the platoon had expected construction equipment and engineers to be available to construct the COP), required prodigious quantities of water to maintain his soldier’s health.^cxii The only water purification capability carried by the 2^nd Platoon was several bottles of iodine tablets propitiously carried by the Platoon Medic. This provided some meager water purification capability, enough to ensure that the platoon never actually ran entirely out of water. However, the iodine tablets require time to function (approximately one hour), a large number of tablets would be required to decontaminate even five gallons of water (five gallons of water requires no less than forty tablets, practically the entire bottle), the water acquires a distinctive and unpleasant taste that some people find offensive, and some soldiers become ill when forced to drink water with iodine in it or actually prove allergic to iodine (thus requiring even more water to stay hydrated).

A number of Chosen soldiers specifically recalled the limits upon construction efforts that could be performed between July 9^th and July 12^th. Sergeant Queck remembered: “There was only so much we could do seeing as we had almost no supplies to use for construction. We have very few HESCOs and sandbags to use for fighting positions. We ended up having to cut HESCOs just to get them to the proper size. On top of that, the only piece of heavy equipment we had to fill HESCOs was a bobcat, which could not even fill our 8’ HESCOs in our mortar pit.” One of the Engineer specialists similarly discussed, “We couldn’t do much manual labor that day [July 10^th] because we ran out of water, or close to it, that morning. The 11^th…a group of soldiers put up the C-wire around the perimeter, but couldn’t finish because they ran out of pickets.” Sergeant Gobble also stated: “However due to the limited supplies i.e. sandbags, C-wire, water, etc. we were only able to do so much.” Another junior enlisted man echoed: “11 July…Work was halted a couple times due to a “BLACK” Status on water and MREs. Air would not come out to resupply us and had rely on a hired local nat. [national] to bring water out in hi-luxs. I believe the 11^th was the second day for this.” Specialist John Hayes, the Platoon RTO, also mentioned, “There were many logistical issues such as water resupply, blivets & fuel that we couldn’t pump & a bobcat out of fuel so we couldn’t build HESCOs.” Another Sergeant echoed: “When we first started digging our fox hole we had to wait on shovels and pick axes not being used at the time…. I remember on the 10^th, 11^th we down to less than a liter of water per person and subsequently we did not dig or work to conserve our energy and water supply.”^cxiii Specialist Michael Santiago specifically recalled: “I remember manning the radio in the turret and hearing the day before we ran out of [fuel for the Bobcat] our PL [Platoon Leader- Lieutenant Brostrom] calling and asking when were we going to get resupplied. Chosen Base did not know.”^cxiv

The only mechanized equipment present was the Bobcat, and although there was sufficient fuel contained within a large rubber blivet, incorrect equipment was transported to transfer the fuel from the blivet into the Bobcat, and as a result the Bobcat ran out of fuel on July 11^th until correct equipment to transfer the fuel finally arrived on the helicopter that delivered Captain Meyer and Sergeant Aass on the afternoon of July 12^th. The Bobcat was only provided with a bulldozer blade, and it could only fill the HESCO barriers to a 4’ level as it could not lift any higher than that. There was no other construction equipment at the COP, only picks, shovels and E-tools were available to excavate the fighting positions and fill sandbags. Given the extreme constraints of limited available manpower and materials, and insufficient hydration, the position was fortified to the maximum extent possible within the time constraints.

Occupation, July 9^th to July 12^th

Beginning with first light on July 9^th, the permanent occupation of COP Kahler began. By that afternoon, the available forces for construction were:

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  Thirty-eight Paratroopers of 2^nd Platoon, Chosen Company; one TOW section and a 120mm mortar section from D Company; and one 60mm mortar section from Chosen Company headquarters, accompanied by one Afghan interpreter;

  
  
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  Six engineers from Company C, 62^nd Engineer Battalion operating one Bobcat; and

  
  
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  Three Marines ETTs with 24 ANA soldiers and two Afghan interpreters.

During July 9^th, 10^th, 11^th and 12^th consistent actions were performed at COP Kahler, with relatively little daily variation:

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  Local security was continuously maintained;

  
  
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  Two hours each of stand-to was performed at dawn and dusk, with particular emphasis being paid to the period before BMNT;

  
  
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  Construction of crude field latrine with some protection by HESCOs;

  
  
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  Construction of 120mm mortar firing pit and rudimentary ASP of HESCOs;

  
  
• 
  

  Construction and improvement of squad fighting positions, 60mm firing position, and the CP against the “C” shaped building using sandbags;

  
  
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  Construction of TCP to the south including two HESCOs and sandbags;

  
  
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  Construction of OP Topside by sandbags; and

  
  
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  Emplacement of concertina around the COP and OP.

This work was constrained by six factors:

• 
  

  Lack of water, which ran low as early as July 9^th. It should be noted that the ANA never suffered from a lack of water, as they drank local water from the community of Wanat’s water source. Because of health concerns, the American paratroopers could not drink this water. The Chosen Few lacked the capability to sterilize the readily-available water from the Wanat community in large quantities (they possessed only “a couple” of bottles of iodine tablets to prevent the 2^nd Platoon from entirely running out of water).

  
  
• 
  

  High temperatures during mid-day, which combined with the lack of water seriously limited construction. Platoon Sergeant David Dzwik remembered of this labor: “…the first couple days was just nothing but digging in hard ground, which you could only get maybe a foot to two down. It was still the dead heat of Afghanistan, so during the hottest parts of the day in the afternoon there was a lot less being done just because even working for 10 minutes, you’re using up a lot of water. We tried to do as much as we could from first light at four o’clock in the morning until it got just too hot. Then we would rest up and then try to get some more stuff done when it started cooling down a little bit towards sundown.”^cxv It should be noted that the established U.S. Army work/rest table for hot weather mandates that only ten minutes work, and fifty minutes rest, are required for heavy labor in temperatures above ninety degrees F, and thus SFC Dzwik was rigorously adhering to published Army standards.

  
  
• 
  

  Limited manpower, as local security had to be continuously maintained, and major weapon systems such as the 120mm mortar and TOW had to be continually manned;

  
  
• 
  

  Limited construction equipment ( a single Bobcat), which ran out of fuel on July 11^th, and was not re-fueled until July 12^th;

  
  
• 
  

  Limited construction materials (constrained quantity of sandbags, HESCOs, concertina and concertina supplies such as stakes and posts); and

  
  
• 
  

  No heavy construction material for overhead cover or bunkers.

Patrols were not conducted between July 9^th and 12^th. This reflected a lack of manpower, problems with maintaining proper hydration of the soldiers to avoid hot weather injuries, and the need to prioritize construction of a fortified, defensible position at COP Kahler. The 2^nd Platoon did not make effective use of the ANA, who could have performed at least rudimentary presence patrolling within the community, and who could consume local water without health restrictions. The Marine ETTs certainly felt that the ANA were fully competent and capable of performing dismounted local security patrols. Because of the previous poor relationship between 2^nd Platoon and the ANA and ASG, it appears that there was some level of distrust between the 2^nd Platoon and the ANA. The first patrol was scheduled for the morning of July 13^th, and was intended to be a joint patrol between Chosen Company and the ANA, but it was never completed because of the engagement. Some of the NCOs at the site were displeased with the decision to dispatch even this patrol, Sergeant Hissong recalled, “I remember arguing with SSG Samaroo about having to build a base and still do patrols with such a small amount of people.”^cxvi

One major constraint was the absence of the Afghan construction company, who had been contracted to perform the heavy labor and major construction at COP Kahler by TF Rock. This Afghan construction company never materialized, and as a result no construction equipment (save the single Bobcat that ran out of fuel) and insufficient construction materials were present at COP Kahler. The reason for the absence of this construction company cannot be positively ascertained. It was an Afghan company, but it came from the Jalalabad area. Thus, the company was Safi-Pashtun, and was entering the Nuristani community of Wanat. The company would certainly encounter hostile resistance from locals, who would feel that the Safi-Pashtuns were invading their community, and stealing jobs that otherwise would go to local Wanat laborers. In 2006, another Jalalabad construction company that was improving the road between Wanat and Bella suffered the loss of considerable equipment under nearly identical circumstances, and this incident would definitely have been well known to the Afghan firm.^cxvii The company may have determined not to travel to Wanat for this reason, or it may have actually been “warned off” by local agitators (or both). The final kilometer and a half of the road was not completed from Camp Blessing to Wanat, and although Jingle Trucks could transport the heavy construction equipment and materials over this portion of the road, movement would be slow and cautious. A more viable strategy would have been to negotiate with Wanat community leaders to hire local labor, while providing hand-tools and construction materials as done in 2006 by Lieutenant Glen. If heavy construction equipment was required, then a Shura could have informed the community of this fact, and given other incentives the community leadership would probably have permitted an “outside” heavy equipment construction company to enter Wanat since this would not be work that the Wanat community could realistically perform. This exact process was previously employed by the U.S. Army during the construction of bridges in Wanat with considerable success that garnered marked good will in the community, as described by Ahmad and [formerly Lieutenant] Captain Andrew “Andy” Glen. The absence of this Afghan construction company not only incurred severe constraints upon the construction of the COP, but the concept of using an outside construction company seriously harmed the already deteriorated relationships with the population of Wanat.

For whatever reason, the 2^nd Platoon was not equipped with any humanitarian supplies, nor was it accompanied by any MEDCAP or VETCAP capability. No humanitarian initiatives were scheduled to be a component of CONOP Rock Move, no humanitarian supplies were flown in between July 9^th and July 12^th, and no MEDCAP or VETCAP augmentation arrived. The 2^nd Platoon performed no Civil Affairs actions of any type during their tenure at Wanat. No local workers were hired, as the 2^nd Platoon had no Afghan funds to pay such local workers. The soldiers were not permitted to make local purchases from the bazaar, and because of the absence of local currency the 2^nd Platoon did not buy bread or food from the Wanat bazaar as their counterparts had done earlier when the bridge was constructed by the 10^th Mountain Division in the fall of 2006. Until Captain Myers arrived, no Shuras or meetings with the local elders of village leaders, or the District Governor or ANP, was performed, although Lieutenant Brostrom did attempt to organize just such a meeting. His efforts were rebuffed, and the only Shura held between July 9^th and 12^th was the one that Lieutenant Brostrom interrupted in the District Center. The 2^nd Platoon soldiers were not permitted to have any contact with the Afghan citizens of Wanat. Given their sunglasses, body armor, and heavily armored vehicles, the Chosen Few soldiers appeared as remote robots to the few residents of Wanat that hadn’t fled upon their arrival.

Because of months of negotiations and Shuras, the ACM was well aware that the U.S. Army intended to establish a Combat Outpost in the large field immediately south of the District Center, and west of the Bazaar (Wanat Market). Further violating good OPSEC and MILDEC TTPs, this same field was the one previously used by the U.S. Army Engineers for 45 days in the fall of 2006. Sergeant Dzwik angrily noted: “If the intelligence was there that Bella was in danger of a large scale attack, then they had to of known that the fighters would move down to Wanat. They (AAF) knew that we were planning a base there for months. They had the time to develop a plan and spend a few days refining it before they hit us.”^cxviii A number of insurgents deposited their weapons and military equipment with their compatriots, donned local clothing, and took advantage of the presence of the market to gather intelligence regarding the combat outpost being established by Chosen Company. Following the engagement, boots and shoes were recovered within Wanat, suggesting that Taliban and foreign fighters had ditched their footgear to better blend into the local Nuristan community.

Nearly every soldier at COP Kahler was well aware of these efforts directed against them. The Chosen Few were receiving reports from the few citizens that remained in Wanat that an attack was eminent, but such warnings had been received so often, and were so vague, that they were discounted. Of greater concern, as Sergeant Jason Oakes, a U.S. Marine Corps ETT with the ANA, specifically remembered:

There were civilians who were watching us all through the day. There was nothing we could do to tell them, “You can’t watch us digging in the ground here.” They knew exactly where we were. You could do eye judgment 30, 40, 50 feet and then be in the city just walking around doing a pace count and there was nothing we could do… You can’t shoot somebody for walking around slowly.^cxix

Corporal Tyler Stafford, a Machine Gunner stationed on the OP, echoed: “A lot of guys would sit at the bazaar and just watch us really closely. They watched everything we did… military-age males…we all kind of knew they were bad dudes, but you can’t do anything about it.”^cxx Sergeant Hissong also noticed that they were under observation:

As it got later in the morning [July 9^th] we started to notice that there was a group of about 15 to 20 local men gathering in the bazaar. We later learned that the locals had told CPT Myer that they didn’t want us there. As we built our fighting position we noticed that small groups of men were gathering in the bazaar and appeared to be watching us work and talking about our base.^cxxi

Another soldier echoed Sergeant Hissong: “Also the people in the bazaar from 09 July 2008 through 12 July 2008 were all fighting age males, no women or children. At some points they looked as if they were pointing things out/drawing in the dirt.” Using the soldier’s vernacular, another one young Specialist was still furious about this when he prepared his post-battle statement: “I absolutely noticed the shady fucks in the bazaar the day before drawing in the sand and staring down the FOB.”^cxxii Beginning on the first full day of occupation on July 9^th, both COP Kahler and OP Topside were under continuous ACM observation. Every American and ANA fighting position and weapon system’s precise location were almost certainly known, through previous knowledge of the open field that would become the COP, augmented through pace counts and triangulation performed by the insurgents through careful observation from the bazaar.

On the afternoon of July 12^th, while visiting the bazaar, Captain Myer took the advantage of speaking to the few local men who were standing there. During Captain Myer’s conversation, according to his RTO Sergeant Aass, “…one of our soldiers, Specialist Denton, recognized one of the civilians hanging around as a former member of the Bella Afghan Security Guards (ASG). When confronted, he admitted freely that he was. Many of the soldiers had grown accustomed to being very suspicious of the ASG.”^cxxiii Because of the former poor relationships between the 2^nd Platoon of the Chosen Few and the ASG, particularly resulting from the fatal shooting of SFC Kahler at COP Bella, this served to heighten the soldiers’ concerns with their security.

On the night of July 11^th-12^th, a small group of personnel was observed moving in a draw to the west/northwest by the ITAS and LRAS observation systems. Although weapons could not be observed, packs were visible, and the fact that it was a group moving rather than individuals were nearly proof positive in that part of Afghanistan that they were insurgents. Accordingly, a 60mm mortar fire mission was initiated against them, without discernable effect. An engagement with a 60mm mortar was a relatively ineffectual attack, and almost certainly this marginal response was interpreted by the insurgents and Wanat citizens as a demonstration of American weakness.^cxxiv

Additional spottings continued to be made by the ITAS and LRAS sensors. SSG Jesse Queck with the Mortar Section recalled that “on the night of the 12^th/morning of the 13^th fifteen to twenty individuals were observed on a ridge about one to two kilometers to the south, that looked as if they had packs on.” Because of the absence of positive PID, these individuals were not engaged, and they soon vanished from sight. Sgt Grimm with the TOW section wrote, “At dusk on the 12^th we spotted one person to the west near a fighting position 1,500 meters away high on the mountain we were told not to engage.” Other soldiers, on guard and observation duty at different times, reported “at two separate times, they saw two elements moving (5-7 guys) but couldn’t [PID or engage].”^cxxv In retrospect, these sightings were almost certainly members of the ACM assault force moving into position, and should have provided warning that forces were massing against COP Kahler. One soldier would brusquely comment, “I just want to say we should have ghosted those dudes that night but didn’t.”^cxxvi Engaging these small groups of individuals moving around the COP had the potential to disrupt the ensuing ACM assault, and permitting even small groups of personnel to freely move about the mountains under cover of darkness exposed the base to encirclement and harassment, if not outright attack.

Although the soldiers paid it little attention at the time, another possible indicator of impending action revealed itself on the morning of July 12^th when an irrigation ditch to the north of OP Topside suddenly began to fill with swiftly rushing water. Although there had been considerable rainfall during the early morning hours of July 9^th, none of the fields were in cultivation, and both Sergeant Pitts and Specialist Stafford at the OP though it was odd that an irrigation ditch would suddenly fill with rushing water. Sergeant Pitts later stated: “The only thing that in hindsight could have possibly indicated about an attack was the irrigation ditch in front of the N. position began to flow with water after previously being dry. It stopped halfway through the day and then it started again after only not flowing for approximately two hours. In hind sight it may have been done to help add noise allowing AAF to sneak closer to our positions without being heard.” Stafford echoed: “It started the day before. The fields weren’t being used and there were irrigation ditches that ran right in front of my position, on the other side of the sandbags, touching the sandbags. They had turned it on. At first Phillips had dug a ditch to divert it, a couple meters in front of the OP. But then it just kept running so we didn’t think anything of it, really, other than we were all kind of joking like, ‘Wow, if somebody sneaks up on us, we can’t hear them.’”^cxxvii

Early in the afternoon of July 12^th Lieutenant Brostrom received word that a Shura was taking place within the town, between the community elders, the District Governor, and the District ANP. Lieutenant Brostrom was extremely angry that he had not been invited to this Shura. Platoon Sergeant Dzwik specifically recalled:

The Wanat Shura gathered at the Wanat District Center without inviting any Coalition Forces. I don’t know who was all at the Shura but I do know that the Police Chief & Police XO were there. I believe that the Sub Governor was…I was digging my fighting position when 1LT Brostrom came over, quite upset & said they had a shura going. He was upset because we had spent the whole time trying to get a shura together. He went down with a few soldiers plus the ANA commander. They were shocked to see him. 1LT Brostrom said they were pretty much done when he got there. They were not that open to him & I remember him saying that they were rather surprised & seemed upset that he showed up since he was not invited.

Lieutenant Brostrom, Staff Sergeant Benton, the Interpreter, and five other soldiers traveled rapidly to the Shura. They were accompanied by the ANA Commander and a squad of ANA soldiers. Within Nuristan and Kunar cultural traditions, Lieutenant Brostrom had every right to be insulted. As the senior American Officer, he could be considered to be the Elder or Leader of the Tribe of American warriors that had just arrived in town. Deliberately excluding him (and thus the Americans) from a community or District Shura was a considerable insult. As SSG Benton recalled, “The reception was not warm at all. The ANP did not respond to any of our greetings and seemed very nervous that we were there.” Some soldiers have speculated that the attack was actually being planned at this meeting, which would account for the response of the ANP. SFC Dzwik specifically recalled: “It is my belief, due to the cold welcome & the events of the 13^th that they were discussing an Attack on the VPB.”^cxxviii By inserting himself into this Shura and expressing his displeasure, Lieutenant Brostrom was behaving appropriately within the local culture. Unfortunately, this single action (although well executed), was by itself unable to reverse the chain of events that would culminate the next morning. This interrupted Shura was positively reported up the chain of command by Lieutenant Brostrom, and was deemed important enough to be brought to the attention of the Battalion Intelligence Officer.

Shortly after Lieutenant Brostrom’s unsuccessful visit to the District Center, a helicopter with Captain Meyer and his RTO, Sergeant Aass, landed. Myer and Aass had hitched a ride on a re-supply helicopter moving the replacement pump for the fuel blivet so that the bobcat could be refueled, along with water and MREs to Wanat. Captain Myer was demonstrating his accomplished skill of hitch-hiking a ride on helicopters, a talent which any traveler in Afghanistan has to rapidly develop to transit between bases. The Chosen Few soldiers were particularly pleased to receive the additional supplies onboard the helicopter.

Captain Myer had been detained at Camp Blessing since he departed OP Bella on one of the last flights out from that outpost on July 8^th. Myer had been busy working on an Article 15-6 investigation regarding the July 4^th helicopter attack and various RIP actions. Although LTC Ostlund had specifically mentioned that: “We mitigated concerns by … placing Co C2 [Company Command and Control] with the platoon…” this was the first moment that any such Company C2 element had actually been at Wanat since the first arrival of Second Platoon late on July 8^th, and this “Company C2” only consisted of Captain Myer and Sergeant Aass. The Company FSO, XO and First Sergeant did not accompany Captain Myer, and no additional company assets were deployed to COP Kahler.^cxxix

Captain Myer first walked around the position and greeted his soldiers (a standard troop leading procedure), then Lieutenant Brostrom briefed him upon the defensive configuration and fire support plan within the COP, and they held a joint inspection of defensives completed to this point. At some point Captain Myer walked past the bazaar and attempted to make contact with the local Afghans gathered there, and in the process briefly spoke with Ibrahim (not his real name for security purposes), a senior member of the community if not formally an elder. Captain Myer knew Ibrahim from previous visits to Wanat. Ibrahim was a strong advocate of the Afghanistan government and American forces, and his son Ishmael (also not his real name) spoke fluent English and served as an interpreter with U.S. forces at Jalalabad. Ibrahim invited Captain Myer to dinner although he specified it must be “after dark.”^cxxx

After nightfall on July 12^th, Captain Myer and a small party walked to Ibrahim’s house for the meal (not a formal Shura). 1LT Brostrom, Captain Myer, Sergeant Aass, and Specialist Hayes (Lieutenant Brostrom’s RTO) attended from the American leadership, along with Ibrahim and one other senior member of the community. Ishmael translated throughout the dinner. Ibrahim told the Chosen Company leadership that “…if they saw any people up in the hills, we should shoot at them because they’re bad. He pretty much said that everybody up in the hills was bad and that we should shoot at them…he said that there were bad people around.”

As the meeting broke up, Ishmael pulled Sergeant Aass and Captain Myer aside and specifically asked them if the Army had UAV support. Captain Myer deflected the sensitive question by simply responding that he didn’t know what that was. This brief, simple inquiry should have alarmed Captain Myer. There are two possible explanations for Ishmael to ask such a question. First, if Ishmael was an ACM supporter or had been compromised by the ACM, he may have been attempting to gather intelligence. This should have been a positive indicator, particularly when coupled with Ibrahim’s warning, that a major attack was eminent. The second and more likely explanation is that Ishmael knew that a serious attack was going to occur shortly, and he was warning the Americans that they needed to have UAV coverage to help them identify the attack, and then repel it. Again, when coupled with Ibrahim’s warning, this should have served as a positive indicator that an attack was eminent. Because of the late hour of Captain Myer’s return to COP Kahler, no report of this meeting was ever transmitted to TF Rock TOC, and no intelligence analyst or officer was aware of Ishamel’s question regarding the UAV coverage.

While the majority of the Americans except for the sentries slept, those ACM insurgents who had not already infiltrated Wanat to gain intelligence on the newly established COP Kahler began their movement from nearby villages into assault and firepower support positions. Subsequent American BDA and intelligence determined: “We know they used the low ground with the water coming in from the east [the Wayshawal River] as well as the [Waigal] river running north-south to conceal their movement, both visual and for sound as they walked over the shale and rocks in the area. We do know they had OPs up on the west.” The ACM also established command and control positions on at least one of the mountain tops that offered excellent vantage points of Wanat.^cxxxi

Early in the morning of July 13^th, well before dawn, the ITAS system which had been manned continuously since the 2^nd Platoon had arrived at Wanat revealed five individuals moving on a hillside to the west of the COP. Although shepherds and citizens regularly moved around Wanat or any other Waigal Valley community, five individuals moving in a group across the mountains in the dead of night was extremely unusual. Soldiers observing through the ITAS also confirmed that the individuals were wearing packs, which was also unusual; and that they were carrying something in their hands, also unusual for a shepherd, although the sights could not identify the actual objects they were holding. Alerted over the radio, OP Topside turned their LRAS in this direction to observe, and confirmed their location and activities. Lacking any UAV support, the COP was entirely dependent upon its own equipment (line-of-sight) to monitor the COP vicinity.

There was no other indication of anything amiss around COP Kahler. Specialist McKaig at OP Topside specifically remembered, “It was very quiet just before we got attacked… no movement in our area.”^cxxxii The ACM demonstrated considerable field craft by maintaining strict noise and light discipline during the approach, and they were able to establish assault and fire by support positions with absolute stealth. This feat, although impressive, is not extraordinary for the insurgents. An attack on a 10^th Mountain patrol in Nuristan on June 21, 2006 and the Ranch House attack on August 22^nd had demonstrated precisely the same capabilities. During the 1936 frontier conflict in Waziristan, Lieutenant John Masters, a British Company Commander, described just such a movement by Pashtun tribesemen:

The next night twenty tribesmen arrived in the dip at three a.m., scattered among the rocks, and lay still. They were hard men and had full control of their bodies. No one of them coughed or cleared his throat, but all lay utterly still among the boulders. The nearest soldiers were four miles away, but if an undisciplined young tribesman had moved a pebble the infinite, murderous patience of his elders would have withdrawn the whole ambush, just in case. They would have crept away, to return again three or five nights later- never the same night. Every man carried a straw so that, if he had to, he could urinate silently down the stem.^cxxxiii

The ACM also demonstrated considerable skill in utilizing the convoluted terrain around Wanat to ingress into their assault and attack positions while absolutely minimizing their exposure, and maximizing the utilization of dead space and defilade to mask their approach. Again, this was a capability that the ACM had frequently demonstrated, and again it only echoed what Lieutenant Masters had observed decades previously: “From the Pathtans [Pashtun tribesmen] we learned more about the tactical value of ground than any of our competitors or future enemies knew.”^cxxxiv

While the TOW section and OP were observing the progress of the small group of suspected insurgents to the west, the COP and OP were coming to life. 2^nd Platoon had a rigorously enforced daily “stand-to” routine that was nothing more than a continuation of Major Robert Roger’s famous Rules of Rangers or “True Plan of Discipline” first formulated in the late fall of 1755, and which Major Rogers used to train British and Provincial officers as early as 1758: “At the first dawn of day, awake your whole detachment; that being the time when the savages choose to fall upon their enemies, you should by all means be in readiness to receive them.”^cxxxv Soldiers were woken up for reveille between about 3:45 p.m. and 3:50 p.m. At this daily stand-to all soldiers were at their posts at least one hour before BMNT, all fighting positions were manned, all weapons were loaded and oriented on their primary fields of fire, all soldiers were dressed in “full battle rattle.” Platoon Sergeant Dzwik rigidly enforced stand-to: “I was in the Ranch House attack back in August 2007 when they hit us at five o’clock in the morning, so I knew that was a time that they liked to hit. I’m a huge believer and a huge enforcer of stand-to. Everybody was ready, even a half hour before it got light. Everybody was up and in their armor, 100 percent security and not a lot of movement around. It’s one thing I preach: you’re down in your position scanning in your sector.”^cxxxvi The ANA and ETTs similar participated in stand-to, and thus COP Kahler and OP Topside was fully alert and ready for action at 04:00 a.m. local time.

In addition to stand-to, Lieutenant Brostrom was organizing members of the joint American-ANA patrol consisting of thirteen soldiers intended to evaluate a potential OP site, located on prominent high ground to the south. If the location was found to be acceptable, the site would be subsequently occupied, and CONEX containers would be air-lifted in with the necessary pre-packaged materials to establish an OP. Lieutenant Brostrom’s patrol was scheduled to depart at 04:30.

Although it would not impact the subsequent fighting, the Bobcat and the two engineer Specialists responsible for operating it were also busy at the mortar pit in the pre-dawn darkness. Sometime during the night a natural spring had opened up, possibly because of the heavy rain the night of July 9^th, and poured water into the mortar pit. One of the engineer Specialists who had just completed his tour of nighttime guard duty discovered the natural disaster when he dropped his body armor to the ground to get some sleep, and it landed with a prominent splash. He woke his fellow engineer up, and they began using the bobcat to excavate a ditch around the mortar pit to divert the water. At the southern portion of the Mortar Pit, the water was “boot-top” to “mid-shin” deep, the water was only a couple of inches deep in the center, and the mortar pit was just wet and muddy to the north.^cxxxvii

Captain Myer was alerted by the sentries on the ITAS system about 04:00, and he immediately recognized the individuals as a threat to the COP. Captain Myer would later state: “Five shepherds aren’t going to be together. Based on the terrorist videos that we’ve seen and things like that, a group of five to ten guys in the mountains is commonly enemy personnel.”^cxxxviii Myer immediately began to coordinate an integrated attack, using a TOW missile and the 120mm mortar. Staff Sergeant Phillips had his crew lay the mortar on the target, and Sergeant Grimm at the TOW recalled, “We had the back of the turret dropped ready to fire.”^cxxxix Twenty minutes passed and still the attack was not initiated, suggesting that there was a lack of urgency, or some sort of confusion, in engaging the enemy. Just to the southeast at the 1^st Squad TCP, Sergeant Brian Hissong was talking to Staff Sergeant Samaroo regarding the TOW team’s observation of personnel moving around them in the hills. Concerned with the delay in launching a strike, Hissong growled, “We better fucking kill these guys before we get hit.” Samaroo’s reply was interrupted by two bursts from an RPD Machine Gun, and “then about a thousand RPGs at once.”^cxl

The Attack on COP Kahler

No ACM sources were available to support the preparation of this Occasional Paper. The ACM force, although its composition cannot at this moment be positively ascertained, likely contained a contingent of foreign fighters (identified by their use of military clothing such as BDUs), a contingent of Afghan-centric dedicated fighters, and a contingent of local fighters. Captain Pry believes it to have been commanded by Mullar Oman, a veteran Nuristani fighter with Taliban ties. Regardless of the precise organization of this force, the initial attack element is believed to have contained about 120 fighters, and reinforcements from local Nuristan villages that poured into the engagement area on July 13^th probably increased the size of the attacking force to a total of two hundred fighters.^cxli

One media report has suggested that the attacking force had an Al Qaeda combat element known as Lashkar al Zil, or “the Shadow Army,” at its core:

The Shadow Army has had some recent successes in Afghanistan over the past year. In July 2008, the unit made up of al Qaeda, the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Hizb-e-Islami [HIG] joined forces and conducted a complex assault on a US outpost in Wanat in Nuristan province.^cxlii

This is supported by several observations by Captain Pry, that: “One thing that was very odd about the Bella attack that never actually materialized was that there was a lot of reporting, probably 30 days prior, of foreign fighters coming into Waterpor [Valley, east of the Waigal Valley, there are intimate family ties between the Waterpor Valley and Wanat].” Captain Pry also observed, “I wouldn’t be surprised to find more evidence than we had that the foreign fighters had been brought in as an influx for the attack on Bella.”^cxliii

The attacking ACM most likely consisted of a solid central component of trans-national foreign fighters comprised of Al Qaeda and Taliban supporters; allied with Afghan-centrist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and HIG that contain hard core, experienced fighters from Afghanistan; and almost certainly supported by numerous local fighters from Nuristan energized by the July 4^th helicopter attack.^cxliv This provided the ACM with the outside logistical assets and arms necessary to launch a large attack; experienced, professional leadership familiar with the terrain and population; a core contingent of not only skilled and trained, but committed and determined fighters to lead the assault; and local fighters intimate with the ground around Wanat and capable of moving the necessary logistical assets and foreign fighters forward without being detected through the terrain in the Waigal Valley. It was a lethal, talented fighting force whose capabilities should not be underestimated.

The ACM attack was focused upon striking a heavy blow against COP Kahler, and overrunning OP TOPSIDE. It should be admitted that ACM documents are not available to provide a detailed ACM plan, and obviously Mullah Osman remains an active combatant against coalition forces in Nuristan. Most likely there was no formal commander’s intent or operations order as the U.S. Army implements them. However, the ACM had obvious objectives, and it is clear that the insurgent fighters were executing an integrated attack plan. The ACM objectives and intent are derived by the author from the conduct of the actual engagement obtained through Bomb Damage Assessment [BDA], from the observations of American soldiers at COP Kahler, from the assessment provided by the TF Rock Intelligence Officer, and from other similar attacks mounted by the ACM in northeastern Afghanistan and Iraq between 2006 and 2009. The ACM objectives appear to have been:

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  To engage COP Kahler with an overwhelming firepower attack that would enable an assault to be launched against the main American force if circumstances proved favorable;

  
  
• 
  

  To employ this firepower attack to pin down the US defenders in COP Kahler, to eliminate or suppress the major American weapons systems (Mortars and TOW); and isolate COP Kahler from OP TOPSIDE;

  
  
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  To further isolate OP TOPSIDE by placing major insurgent forces with heavy firepower into the bazaar, hotel complex, and mosque;

  
  
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  To penetrate OP TOPSIDE’s defensive perimeter, and then overrun OP TOPSIDE;

  
  
• 
  

  To obtain an IO victory at OP TOPSIDE by capturing an American soldier, seizing the body of an American soldier, or capturing American arms and equipment; and documenting this achievement with a videotape.

The insurgents in the nearby Korengal Valley had attempted to seize an American soldier from Battle Company earlier in the deployment. A Vanity Fair magazine article recorded: “One of the [Battle Company] dead, Specialist Hugo Mendoza, was killed trying to prevent Taliban fighters from dragging off a wounded sergeant named Josh Brennan. He succeeded, but Brennan died the following day at a U.S. military base in Asadabad.”^cxlv Following the engagement at Wanat, Lieutenant Moad from Battle Company speculated:

We had seen in the past that AAF had tried to capture either KIA or WIA soldiers during an attack as a means to increase their credible propaganda, so it was potentially one of their objectives by overwhelming an outpost like OP Topside which was detached from the rest of the platoon. I am not sure if they actually tried to take any soldiers, but the situation seemed probable as the majority of the fires were centered on OP Topside.^cxlvi

These objectives suggest that Mullah Osman organized a sophisticated, carefully planned attack that had a high probability of success in the narrow window available to the ACM insurgents to execute their plan prior to the arrival of American air support.

Chosen Company sources are specific that the entire COP and OP were surrounded by the ACM, who infiltrated into firing positions at extremely close range to the Americans. Insurgent fighters had been inserted into the hotel/mosque complex and the bazaar, specifically to isolate OP Topside from COP Kahler. Corporal Oakes, one of the three-man Marine ETT, specifically recalled a 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun being emplaced in one of the bazaar/hotel buildings (he is quite positive that he was shot at by it while moving to the OP).^cxlvii The DShK is a relatively heavy weapon, with the gun alone weighing 76 pounds and its attendant tripod and ammunition considerably more than that, suggesting that carrying such a heavy weapon by hand into the hotel/bazaar complex under cover of a few hours of darkness while maintaining stealth in close proximity to the American paratroopers would be a challenging if not impossible task. Still, takfiri videos from fighting in Nuristan in 2007 clearly depict a DShK machine gun in use. A study of mujahideen tactics during the Afghan-Soviet War reveals that the mujahideen insurgents regularly employed DShK machine guns in tactical assaults and ambushes.^cxlviii ACM insurgents have also been documented to have used a DShK machine gun in the nearby Korengal Valley during the 2007-2008 campaign. The presence of a DShK heavy machine gun in the hotel complex is an entirely likely scenario, and would be entirely consistent with the ACM inserting a major fighting force between COP Kahler and OP Topside to isolate the small American force at the OP. If not a DShK, then certainly another model of machine gun, most likely a PKM General Purpose Machine Gun, was located in the bazaar. At least one RPG was also observed to be fired from an unfinished stall under construction/repair in the center of the bazaar. The back blast from this RPG launcher, or tracers from return gunfire by the Americans, caught loose construction materials in this stall on fire. By the time of the arrival of the AH-64s at 05:22 local, this stall was fully involved in flames.

The ACM fire was initiated from all directions surrounding both COP Kahler and OP Topside, and most particularly from the bazaar and building complex east of the road and west of OP Topside, this last being specifically intended to isolate OP Topside from the remainder of COP Kahler. The ACM employed an extremely intensive fire, particularly using the DShK and RPGs, to isolate the OP from the main COP. Sergeant Grimm noted: “…the RPG fire, that day, was very rapid, in quick and methodic succession and relatively accurate.” SFC Barbaret, Platoon Sergeant from the Battle Company QRF that arrived at the very end of the engagement, recalled: “BDA gathered up and where it was located showed that the AAF had made use of all available dead space and buildings surrounding the area where COP Kahler was established and the high ground on all sides. The OP was open to fires from the high ground on its north and west sides which was evident by the RPG tail fins found inside of the position on the south and east walls.” Specialist John Hayes, Platoon RTO, was staggered at the rate of fire the ACM sustained: “The enemy engaged with RPGs. Lots and lots and lots of RPGs. It seemed like they went on forever. They must have had someone running resupply or a major cache of RPGs.”^cxlix

After regularly contesting ground with 1-32 Infantry and then 2-503^rd Infantry since April 2006, the ACM was well aware that radio communications were being monitored. Additionally, radios were typically a commodity in limited availability. Accordingly, the ACM fired two long bursts of RPD fire as an unmistakable signal for the attack to be launched. Once the initial two bursts of RPD fire echoed off the surrounding hills, the ACM launched an immediate wave of small arms and RPG fire against the Americans. ^cl These first two rounds of RPD shots were fired at about 4:20 a.m., and the TF Rock TOC recorded that the initial “SALUTE” report from Wanat was received at 4:23 a.m. The first American vehicle targeted was the TOW HMMWV.

Although the location of the four gun trucks within the COP and at the TCP were not modified except for relatively minor re-positioning, the TOW HMMWV was frequently and regularly moved within the confines of the COP, during both daylight and under cover of darkness. In fact, the TOW HMMWV had been moved approximately fifty yards to the south to a newly constructed ramp late on July 12^th.^cli Still, this new location did nothing to enhance the TOW truck’s survivability. The insurgents clearly understood the importance of the TOW system and were determined to knock it out at the first fire. Sergeant Justin Grimm, the TOW Section Leader, recalled the initial wave of fire that swept over the TOW vehicle:

Within 30 seconds of initiation the TOW truck was hit with two RPG round on the driver’s side which was facing the [east], the first round hit the engine compartment setting the engine on fire and disabling the truck, the second RPG hit driver’s side rear. Then a third RPG hit from the north, passenger side rear. The vehicle started flaring up and I ordered the crew to evacuate the vehicle.^clii

Two of these RPG had to have been fired from the vicinity of the bazaar/hotel to the east of the COP. Even though it was ready to fire at the five insurgents moving against the COP, the TOW system was put out of action so rapidly and violently that the missile could not be launched. As the combat progressed the TOW HMMWV began violently burning, along with the nine TOW missiles onboard (eight spares, one ready to fire).^cliii

The other primary weapons systems at COP Kahler were the Battalion 120mm and Company 60mm mortars, and the insurgents focused considerable efforts upon suppressing them. Although the 120mm mortar was protected in a HESCO surrounded firing pit, and the 60mm was in a sand-bagged firing position, the rate and accuracy of the insurgent fires proved highly effective at silencing both mortars. At the first onset of fire the two Engineer specialists had abandoned the Bobcat to its fate, and immediately terminated their ditch digging exercise to dive into the now nearly dry mortar pit for cover. Platoon Sergeant Dzwik was visiting the Mortar Pit at the onset of the attack, and was also forced to take shelter within it. Sergeant Aass specifically recalled, “During all this time I could see all of our positions being hit by intense volleys of RPG fire (at least several dozen RPGs were fired) and intense machine gun and SAF (Small Arms Fire).”^cliv Staff Sergeant Phillips and PFC Scott Stenoski managed to fire four rounds without re-aiming the 120mm mortar, so that these four rounds were fired at the position where the insurgents had been spotted by the TOW and ITAS just a few minutes earlier that morning.

Sergeant Chavez saw insurgents climbing into the trees to fire over the HESCOs into the mortar pit. He would later remember:

I could see guys (enemy) trying to climb the trees behind the HESCO baskets to our northwest but I kept shooting them down. I did this about 3 times and then I informed SSG Phillips that they were to our northwest and were on top of the buildings trying to shoot us and also trying to get over the HESCOs. We decided to throw grenades.^clv

Here, the inability of the Bobcat to fill the HESCOs to their full seven foot height was revealed to be a failure of greatest magnitude, as the 120mm mortar could not be further manned due to the intense volume of accurate small arms and RPG fire directed into it. PFC Stenoski recalled:

We were surrounded. They were popping up behind [the] HESCOs and shooting RPGs at us. Sergeant Phillips and I hung four 120 millimeter rounds. It was all we could get off before an RPG round came in from the south side and hit inside our mortar pit, so we stopped firing the 120. We started getting potshots from the mountain side so I launched 203 rounds up there… They were at least 15 to 20 feet away from us. There were trees behind the HESCOs and most of them were trying to climb the trees to shoot over the HESCOs. One guy actually side-stepped and shot an RPG through the crack of the HESCO in the corner. It went right between the middle of Sergeant Phillips and me and right over the 120 tube. It hit the bazaar and missed us. The enemy was smart, though, because they were using the latrine we had built for cover, and I threw a couple grenades at the latrine.^clvi

One of the Engineer Specialists in the mortar pit recalled, “During the firing RPGs and rounds were hitting the pit constantly.” In the mortar pit, Sergeant Chavez specifically recalled AK and Machine Gun rounds sparkling as they ricocheted off the 120mm mortar tube.^clvii

The men in the mortar pit fired their personal weapons furiously and frantically into the trees. Sergeant Chavez killed three ACM alone who had ascended the trees to fire over the HESCOs. Staff Sergeant Phillips poured out fire, as recalled by another Engineer Specialist loading for him, “…[SSG Phillips] went through three rifles using them until they jammed.”^clviii. SSG Phillips recalled: “My M4 quit firing and would no longer charge when I tried to correct the malfunction. I grabbed the Engineers SAW and tried to fire. It would not fire, so I lifted the feed tray tried clearing it out and tried to fire again. It would not.” Staff Sergeant Phillips did not realize that Sergeant Queck had earlier attempted to fire this SAW, and it had failed at its first shot when a bullet jammed in the barrel. Queck had quickly discarded the SAW, swearing profanely in frustration that it was “fucked up!” ^clix This did not deter Queck for long, as he launched an AT-4 missile at the building to the west of the mortar pit. Other soldiers in the mortar pit began throwing hand grenades over the top of the HESCOs, to keep the ravine clear of enemy. As this gunfight continued, one RPG exploded striking Specialist Abad in his legs and shoulder and seriously wounding him. First aid was immediately started on Abad, but his wounds did not appear to be life endangering, and as he lay on the ground being treated he continued to hand ammunition to Sergeant Chavez.

Sergeant Chavez and Sergeant Queck attempted to run out to the middle of the COP to reach the 60mm mortar, so that it could be put into play. However, the enemy small arms fire sweeping the interior of the COP was absolutely vicious, and despite their best efforts they simply could not reach the mortar. The 60mm mortar would not be fired during the entire engagement.

Then, as one of the Engineers recalled, “…a RPG hit in the east corner of the ASP & hit the stack of 120mm mortar rounds. SSG Phillips fell over because of the concussion and when he got back up, I looked around the cases were sparking and he yelled to all of us, ‘Get the hell out of here.’”^clx With the gunpowder charges on the 120mm mortar rounds throwing sparks and the possibility that the entire ASP would explode into fire, the soldiers in the mortar pit hurriedly left the shelter of the HESCOs to run across the open field for the Command Post. Specialist Abad was by now unable to move on his own, and Specialist Morse (one of the Engineers) and Sergeant Chavez each grabbed a shoulder and began dragging him through the intense fire. While evacuating his soldier, Sergeant Chavez was also shot through both legs and incapacitated. Chavez was knocked down, but he still continued to crawl, pulling Abad towards cover even though wounded himself. Immediately Sergeant Aass, Sergeant Queck, and other soldiers poured out of the CP to haul both of the wounded mortar men into its shelter. With the Platoon Medic, PFC William Hewitt, already shot through the arm at nearly at the first fire and incapacitated, Specialist Scantlin who had received previous supplemental medical training, stepped up and became the platoon medic. He handed his SAW over to another soldier, as the weapon was needed to maintain fire support against the ACM assault. Scantlin’s frantic and skilled efforts treated everybody within the COP Kahler, to include another soldier shot through the left wrist, one of the engineers who had been shot directly through his buttocks, and now he had Abad and Sergeant Chavez from the mortar pit. Specialist Scantlin was able to keep everybody alive with the exception of Specialist Abad. Sadly enough, Specialist Abad’s condition began to rapidly deteriorate, and he began to have problems breathing. Apparently his wounds were quite severe, much more serious than anybody had at first realized, and at this moment in the firefight bringing in a MEDEVAC was simply not feasible. Specialist Scantlin frantically tried to insert a needle to decompress his chest, but this did no good, and as a desperate last resort Scantlin initiated CPR, but all of his efforts proved to be in vain, and Specialist Abad slipped away.^clxi It was a devastating emotional blow to the soldiers in the CP, particularly as they had assessed his wounds as not being life endangering. One of the soldiers in the CP later acclaimed Scantlin’s efforts: “I can’t say enough how brave he was and did his job as well as a medic’s job with huge courage and disregard for his own safety.”^clxii

The gang from the mortar pit had just arrived at the CP when the burning TOW vehicle finally exploded, scattering flames and burning TOW missiles in all directions. One unfortunate ANA soldier was caught in the fireball, and was severely burned. Two of the Marine ETTs, Corporal Jones and Corporal Oakes, sprinted from their position to assist the badly burned ANA soldier to cover and assistance. When the HMMWV went up the explosion also knocked out the TACSAT antenna and with it all TACSAT communications. Fortunately this was only being employed as a means of backup communications, and the ability of the COP to communicate with Camp Blessing was never impaired. The fireball flung two of the smoldering TOW missiles into the air, and they landed directly in the CP, one landing literally in the lap of a soldier. Alarmingly, the missile’s motor was activating, and a number of soldiers recalled hearing the motor spinning up. Staff Sergeant Phillips, who had previously been awarded a Distinguished Service Cross for his actions in the defense of Ranch House, hastily grabbed a pair of empty sandbags and wrapped the fabric around his hands, then grabbed the hot missile and at great personal peril he carried the live anti-tank round through heavy gunfire into the middle of the open field, well away from any American or ANA soldiers. At the same time, Captain Myer scooped up the other missile in the CP and heaved it over the side of the sandbag wall. To add to the confusion within the COP, several HESCOS that had been unfilled or partially filled with dirt caught fire from their proximity to the raging inferno that had just a few moments previously been the TOW HMMWV.^clxiii The HESCOs smoldered, adding considerable quantities of thick, black smoke emanating from the burning truck and bazaar.

At the first wave of RPGs sailing through and impacting within the COP, Captain Myer immediately called to the Battalion TOC at Camp Blessing and announced in un-mistakeable terms, “This is a Ranch House style attack.” The urgency of the situation was clearly announced by the sounds of machine gun fire and RPGs exploding in the background of his radio transmission. Captain Myer had two FM radios, one on the 2^nd Platoon net and the other on the TF Rock Battalion Command Net; with Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) as backup until the antenna was destroyed. Specialist Hayes (2^nd Platoon RTO) and Sergeant Aass assisted CPT Myer with coordination, until Aass later departed to reinforce OP Topside. Having unfortunately left his FSO back at Camp Blessing, Myer focused his efforts upon obtaining and coordinating fire support. The first fire mission was called in at 4:23 a.m., and was an immediate suppression mission called in on a target approximately five hundred meters to the northwest of the COP, danger close for 155mm field artillery, and about as close to friendly positions as high angle artillery could be safely fired. The fires were delayed for only a few moments as LTC Ostlund confirmed that all the Chosen defenders were within the perimeter, as he knew that a patrol was scheduled to depart the COP first thing in the morning. Once he confirmed that all his soldiers were within the COP’s confines, LTC Ostlund released the first fire mission.^clxiv Within six minutes of the RPD bursts the first 155mm rounds from Camp Blessing impacted. Captain Myer initially focused the fire on the southern and western sides of the COP, and brought the rounds in “danger close” (within six hundred meters of friendly positions). However, the artillery’s effectiveness was limited because the insurgents had infiltrated to within “belt buckle” distance of the Americans. To the north of the COP, the two gun trucks equipped with the Mk19 grenade launchers were also limited in their ability to aid the defense, as the insurgents had gotten within the minimum arming distance of the grenades. Because of the topographical location of Camp Blessing (within a topographical bowl), and the soaring terrain intervening between Camp Blessing and Wanat, all the field artillery had to be fired “high angle.” The result is a relatively large probable error in range, a field artillery term for routine variation between individual rounds that cannot be controlled or reduced, precluding the field artillery from being brought in as close to COP Kahler as it was needed.^clxv For the first half hour of the engagement, the only fire support that COP Kahler received was this relatively ineffectual artillery fire. Between 4:29 a.m. and 5:05 a.m. the platoon at Camp Blessing would execute five fire missions, firing a total of 52 rounds of High Explosive projectiles. This can be considered to be a relatively low rate of field artillery fire, less even than the sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute, and considerably below the maximum rate of fire for the M777A2 howitzer. Close Air Support arrived on station shortly thereafter, with the first B-1 bomber dropping two bombs at 4:58 a.m. Generally, CAS in the initial stage of the engagement was employed to control access to the battlefield by the 1^st Platoon QRF, and to deny ACM insurgents from transiting to and from the battlefield, rather than providing direct support to the beleaguered defenders. The necessary use of fire support at distances generally beyond danger close reflects the absence of a qualified fire support coordinator at Wanat.

Sergeant Aass, helping Captain Myer operate the radios, was stunned at the intensity of the fire that the insurgents were able to maintain, “The RPG fire was like machine gun fire.” Sergeant Queck specifically recalled, “Every time, it seemed, I would poke my head up from behind the sand bags I would hear bullets whizzing by my head.” ^clxvi Platoon Sergeant Dzwik retained enough composure to assess the ACM attack professionally:

There was a lot of small arms, a lot of AK, definitely a lot of PKM and RPK from their fire support positions. There was a lot of that raining in. The RPGs were pretty heavy. When I was down at that mortar pit, there was a guy shooting either in a tree or from behind a tree, and luckily enough he wasn’t smart enough to realize that when he shot the RPG, it would come out, the fins would pop out, they’d catch the branches and it would send that RPG off in a different direction. He did that multiple times and he had a good eyes-on into the center of the pit, so it was pretty fortunate that he wasn’t intelligent enough to figure out that he had to move to a better position.^clxvii

There were three vehicles that could still fire from the COP, the two squad HMMWVs on the northern segment of the perimeter, both armed with Mk 19 40mm automatic grenade launchers, and the Platoon HMMWV with a .50 cal at the CP. The TOW HMMWV was now merrily burning to the ground, and was well and truly out of action. The Marine ETTs also had a single M240 Machine Gun manned by Corporal Jones, described by the paratroopers as “the big Marine with a moustache.” This gun’s presence was fortunate as both the 2^nd Platoon’s M240 Machine Guns were located at OP Topside. The insurgents so aggressively pushed their advance that their positions were within the minimum arming range of the 40mm grenades. Additionally, their small arm fire was so devastating that one of the grenade launchers was struck with a bullet through the feed tray, permanently disabling it. The other Mk 19 grenade launcher jammed, which they are prone to do. Thus, the American defenders at the main COP had only a single .50 caliber machine gun, the Marine M240 Medium Machine Gun, and their own small arms to repel the assault. It is to the credit of the Chosen soldiers that they maintained at least fire parity from the COP. To achieve this, the 2^nd Platoon soldiers were firing their weapons “cyclic,” on full automatic at the highest possible rates of fire. As a result, numerous soldiers experienced weapons malfunctions, just as Staff Sergeant Phillips had faced at the mortar pit. One young specialist fighting at the COP Kahler later complained, “…I ran through my ammo till my SAW would not work anymore despite the ‘Febreze’ bottle of CLP I dumped into it.”^clxviii Another Sergeant described the desperate struggle at the COP when the 2^nd Platoon QRF departed to reinforce OP Topside:

…to fight off the AAF attacking us from the mosque and bazaar and hotel. Right before Sergeant Garcia left to help Topside there was a AAF fighter popping up and down behind the wall of the mosque shooting at us and [Sergeant Garcia] grabs Specialist’s weapons M-203 and shoots a grenade and hits the pillar right beside where he was fighting from. We did not see him again…I then grabbed the Engineers weapon that was left at our position and which was a SAW and…started laying down about 800-1,000 rounds at the bazaar and wood line around the mosque. Specialist… then fired a SMAW-D and AT-4 at the same time at the bazaar….

Private Krupa, a new soldier who had only joined the platoon as a replacement less than two months previously and was in his first real action, manned the .50 cal heavy Machine Gun in the HMMWV at the CP. Several of the soldiers were concerned with how Krupa would perform in his first engagement, but he shortly alleviated these concerns. Sergeant Aass stated in admiration:

Private Krupa … was up in the turret, taking direct fire from multiple locations, and he was literally standing ankle-deep in .50 cal casings from all the rounds that he’d fired. I was worried that after he shot off his first can of ammo he wasn’t going to know what to do next, but under fire he changed maybe a dozen cans of ammo.^clxix

PFC Krupa described his efforts from the HMMWV’s gunner turret:

RPGs were coming in constantly from the west. I remember at one point I had to slow my fire down because the barrel was red hot and there was a debate on how much ammo was left. By this time I had shot about ten .50 cal 100 round ammo cans…I would wait for the tree leaves to kick up so I knew where the AAF were at. Immediately after they would fire, I would fire at their positions….^clxx

The 1^st Squad TCP to the south was also under extreme duress. Sergeant Hissong watched Specialist Hamby firing the .50 M2 Heavy Machine Gun to the south, “…the truck was taking very heavy fire, I’ve never seen a truck take so many hits as it was right then.” Specialist Hamby fired a one hundred round belt of ammunition at an enemy position from which a RPG had been fired, “…an RPG came sailing impacting in the same place on the same building. It left a very definitive trail from the point of origin I then dumped what was left in that location.” Incredibly, the volume of fire actually increased, Hamby remembered, “I went down into the truck and grabbed a can of .50 cal ammo to reload as I was reloading the turret I was in became overwhelmed with gunfire.” Sergeant Hissong was alarmed, “When he ducked down to reload, it was like the turret of the truck exploded from all of the bullets hitting it and RPG’s impacting around it.” As Specialist Hamby attempted to get the .50 M2 Heavy Machine Gun back into action, it was struck by a 7.62mm round directly in the top of the feed tray cover which was raised for re-loading, which put that gun out of action permanently.^clxxi Staff Sergeant Samaroo believed that the .50 cal was out of action within five minutes of the start of the engagement.^clxxii The situation was so desperate, and the fire raining down upon them so incessant, that Sergeant Hissong expended an AT-4 missile against the large compound house on a prominent hill to the southeast of the TCP.

The insurgents were so close, and so aggressive in pushing their attack, that the American defenders regularly observed and engaged them, a fact which is distinctive in Afghanistan where many soldiers rotate through an entire tour of duty and never actually see their enemy. That was never a problem at Wanat on July 13^th, 2008. Some of the soldiers recalled how the ACM were dressed (not always employing politically correct terminology): “Some were wearing masks, others were wearing rags on their heads, some with BDUs, others with “man jammies.”^clxxiii Sergeant Hector Chavez, fighting from the mortar pit, specifically recalled firing upon ACM insurgents dressed in BDU tops and “man-jammy” pants.^clxxiv Following the engagement, bloody BDU clothing was found in the town of Wanat. Additionally, a number of pair of footwear were found discarded in the same locations, strongly suggesting that the foreign fighters and dedicated fighters (who are typically quite well supplied) had abandoned their modern shoes for bare feet or sandals that are routinely worn by the Nuristan population to enable them to blend in with the locals, and also to enable them to more quietly approach the American positions in the early morning hours of July 13^th.

During this time, the ANA Company remained in their fighting positions, in the middle of the COP, and to the south at the southernmost TCP. Numerous Chosen Company soldiers complained of their inactivity. One soldier with the 1^st Squad TCP claimed that: “The ANA had fled from their position.” Another Sergeant stated, “I also remember ANA not shooting that much and never leaving their foxholes.” Sergeant Dzwik was not professionally impressed with the ANA performance:

They never got out of their holes. They only had four wounded, which tells me that the enemy directed their fire at the Americans, not the Afghans. The Afghans sprayed and prayed. That’s about it. To be honest, though, it was more than I expected. The other numerous occasions I’ve been on with Afghan soldiers as our backup, they ran. ^clxxv

Sergeant Hissong summed up what most of the Chosen soldiers felt, “they were still pretty much totally useless.”^clxxvi However, the Marine ETTs supervising the ANA stated that their soldiers carefully monitored their fields of fire, and that they controlled their fire to avoid expending all of their ammunition. Unfortunately, the ANA has a tendency to adopt the popular (in Afghanistan) “spray and pray” technique of weapons firing. This methodology serves to expend large quantities of ammunition with no proper aiming of the weapon, thus serving little or no purpose. The ANA apparently did not engage in this at Wanat, which some Americans interpreted as the ANA not adequately participating or supporting them in the firefight. There were comparatively few ANA wounded (four wounded that had to be evacuated), and none killed. However, the ANA were not ordered to OP Topside where the majority of the Chosen Company casualties were sustained, deliberately because of language difficulties that could have easily resulted in a “blue on blue” or friendly fire incident. There is some evidence that the ACM may have deliberately avoided targeting the ANA, rather they focused their fires upon the Americans. As previously noted, it must be stressed that the ACM were interested in attacking the COP with firepower only to suppress the position, while they committed their greatest effort against the OP. Thus, the ANA were only exposed to suppressive fire, and were never engaged in the intense fighting at OP Topside. Their numbers of casualties at their two firing positions within the COP were slightly less than the Americans manning the COP (who suffered one KIA and four WIA), but were still within the range of casualties sustained by the Chosen Company paratroopers within the main position. Regardless of the opinions of the Chosen Company troopers, which were doubtless influenced by the previous problems experienced by the Platoon with the ASG at Ranch House and Bella, it appears that the ANA fully participated in the defense of COP Kahler, and none of the locations that they were responsible for were occupied, overrun or seized by the ACM.^clxxvii

Sergeant Grimm, TOW Section Leader, specifically recalled of the ACM assault:

They infiltrated a couple of days before. Fire initiated from multiple locations at once, from covered and concealed positions, engaging heavy weapons first. They fired on the VPB to keep us pinned down in the low ground so that they could isolate and overwhelm the OP. It felt like they were not trying to come inside the perimeter at the low ground, only at the OP. There was a heavy volume of fire on us, but I did not see AAF attempting to enter the main COP perimeter.^clxxviii

The ACM plan to control the COP itself with firepower had succeeded admirably well .The 120mm mortar and 60mm mortar were effectively suppressed with RPG, small arms fire, and hand grenades; while RPGs had destroyed the TOW HMMWV. However, although the bazaar was occupied with a strong, well-armed fighting force this ACM contingent could not prevent regular reinforcements from moving from COP Kahler and the 1^st Squad TCP towards OP Topside, which was under extreme duress at this moment.

Defense and Sacrifice at OP Topside

The OP Topside position consisted of three connected firing positions, and was manned by nine soldiers on the morning of July 13^th.^clxxix A roughly square firing position at the north faced to the north and northeast. It was anchored to a large rock to the northwest. It contained a single M-240 Machine Gun, operated by Specialist Tyler Stafford. His Assistant Gunner was Specialist Gunnar Zwilling. This Firing Position was also occupied by the 2^nd Platoon Forward Observer (FO), Sergeant Ryan Pitts, and his radio. Sergeant Pitts did not have an RTO with him. This northernmost firing position controlled two Claymore anti-personnel command detonated mines, placed to fire down into the dead ground to the north and east. A semi-circular firing position was in the center, and was oriented to the east. This position was given the moniker “Crow’s Nest” by the soldiers. It was manned by PFC Jonathan Ayers and Specialist Pruitt Rainey, and also contained a single M-240 Machine Gun. The Crow’s Nest was actually at the pinnacle of the knoll, and it was located on a terrace above the remainder of the position. A roughly square firing position faced to the south and southeast, which had been constructed at Specialist Bogar’s insistence. It was also anchored to a large rock to the southwest. This position was manned by Specialist Jason Bogar, Sergeant Matthew Gobble, and Specialist Chris McKaig. It contained a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), an M203 Rifle/40mm Grenade Launcher, and controlled two more Claymore mines, oriented into the dead ground to the south and east. These positions were attached to each other, and shared a common, long western sandbagged wall. All positions were excavated a couple of feet deep, and were then raised with a double layer of sandbags to mid-chest height. The LRAS sensor was located in the middle of the OP. Specialist Matthew Phillips, the Platoon Designated Marksmen, was stationed in the sleeping terrace behind the short stretch of double sandbagged wall facing to the north, where he could employ his M-14 Sniper Rifle to greatest advantage. Specialist Phillips was not isolated, Specialist Stafford recalled that he could see him from his machine gun firing position, and that he was “just about ten feet away.” The OP was approximately fifty yards to the east of the bazaar building. The OP also contained one Vietnam Era vintage M-72 66mm Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW), two more modern AT-4 Anti-Tank Weapons, personal weapons (9mm Beretta pistols for the two M-240 gunners, four M-4 5.56mm carbines for the other soldiers), and a large quantity of hand grenades. The intent was to cover the dangerous dead space to their east and north with the M-203 grenade launcher, hand grenades, and Claymore mines. Sergeant Pitts was specifically located at the OP to control artillery and mortar fire onto the targets previously plotted to control the dead space.

Specialist Pruitt Rainey, 22, from Haw River, North Carolina was a large, powerful soldier who fanatically worked out. Since his assignment was humping the M240 Machine Gun and its ammunition and tripod, his physical size and strength was an invaluable platoon asset. Rainey had been a star wrestler in high school, was good with youth, and intended to use the G.I. Bill to return to college and become a Physical Education teacher and wrestling coach at the high school level. He also liked to sleep, and his friend Specialist Tyler Stafford had a collection of photographs of Rainey in repose in various improbable locations. Specialist Matthew Phillips, 27, of Jasper, Georgia was another southern boy, a deadly accurate shooter and accordingly served as the 2^nd Platoon’s Designated Marksmen. Like many young men from the Old Confederacy, Phillips was unabashedly patriotic, telling his father that he was proud to be serving in Afghanistan: “He felt that that’s where the evil really was, that people like those who attacked us in 2001 were there.” Specialist Jonathan R. Ayers, 24, of Snellville, Georgia loved the Airborne Infantry, and seemed destined for a military career. Even as a child, his father recalled: “Jon was just very military since he was 3 years old. He looked at your shoes, and if they weren’t perfect, they were no good. He loved the regiment of the military; he loved order and schedule.” Specialist Gunnar Zwilling, 20, of Florissant, Missouri was extremely concerned about the Wanat mission. Candidly, he told his father, “It’s gonna be a bloodbath.” Zwilling’s father was a Navy Vietnam Veteran, and like many southern families the military tradition ran strong in the Zwilling clan. Zwilling’s younger brother was also in service to the nation, serving in the Air Force where he was responsible for servicing a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Specialist Jason Bogar, 25, of Seattle, Washington was a skilled photographer. Bogar’s father, Michael Bogar, is a widely published and highly talented religious educator. Bogar’s family did not want him to join the Army, but Bogar was an extremely idealistic young man who felt that it was his responsibility and his duty to serve the Republic, and he also enlisted so that he could take advantage of the G.I. Bill to eventually attend art school for photography. Bogar always had his camera with him, and sent home scores of spectacular, professional quality photographs of Afghanistan that were cherished by his family.^clxxx

Specialist Stafford had just completed monitoring the five individuals on the hillside through the LRAS and was walking back to the northern fighting position, when he heard the two bursts of machine gun fire, and then the OP was struck by a wave of RPGs. This first round of explosions was devastatingly accurate, and everybody in the OP was immediately wounded, stunned, or both. Specialist Stafford remembered:

… I yelled to Zwilling, then we got hit and I got blown out of that position back into the middle of the OP. I could feel all the shrapnel. It was burning pretty badly in my legs and my stomach was burning really bad and my arm. I thought I was on fire because it burned so bad, so I started rolling around screaming that I was on fire and then I just woke up from that. I regained my senses from that and sat up looking back towards the west. I could see Zwilling, who was just a couple feet from me, and he had the same look I would have on my face after getting hit in the face by Mike Tyson, probably. Then there was another explosion that happened right behind me. I’m not sure if it was a hand grenade or an RPG, but that threw me down onto the terrace where we slept. It had blown my helmet off but that one really didn’t hurt me because I think my interceptor body armor (IBA) caught most of that. My helmet went down just a little bit and I crawled over to it and put it back on. I knew I was hit pretty badly. I looked up and saw Phillips and he was kind of hunkered down on his knees below that sandbag position. He was just popping his head up over the sandbags. I called to him, “Hey, Phillips, man, I’m hit, I’m hit. I need help.” He just looked at me and nodded his head yes and just gave me a Phillips smile like he was saying, “I’ll get you, man. Hold on. But I need to kill these guys first.” He had a grenade so he pulled the pin on his grenade and he stood up and threw it. Right as he threw it, an RPG either hit the sandbags right in front of me or the boulder that was right behind me that was protecting us from the west. The RPG, once it exploded, the tail [fins] ricocheted and hit me in the helmet. I put my head down and it smacked me right on the top of my helmet. There was a big imprint in my helmet and everything… I looked up after that, after the dust settled, and I could see Phillips who was slumped over like he was sitting on his knees. He was slumped over with his chest on his knees and his hands all awkwardly beside him, turned backwards. I screamed at him four or five times, “Phillips! Phillips!”

Stafford’s friend Phillips never responded, and he would never see his comrade Zwilling again. Sergeant Pitts told a similar story: “The next thing I knew, things just started exploding inside our fighting positions. Multiple RPGs were shot at us, along with hand grenades…I was shell-shocked for a couple of seconds and I had been hit immediately.” Specialist McKaig recalled, “We were getting hammered.” At this first volley, Zwilling and Phillips were killed, Sergeant Gobble was so badly wounded that he was effectively knocked out of the fight, and everybody else in the OP was wounded to some extent.

Stafford crawled back up to the protection of the southern post of the OP, where he watched Specialist Bogar put up a heroic defense, nearly single-handedly, with his SAW. Bogar placed it on top of the sandbags, notwithstanding as Stafford noted, “I’m just watching that boulder pop with rounds coming in.” Stafford was badly wounded and drifting in and out of consciousness, but he distinctly remembered, “Bogar had just set his SAW on top of the sandbags and he was just kind of spraying, going through SAW rounds pretty quick. I remember him, loading and spraying, loading and spraying.” At the Crow’s Nest, Specialist Ayers was also going cyclic with the M-240. Stafford also remembered being impressed at the volume of fire that Ayers was pouring out, “I could also hear the 240 going off above me in the Crow’s Nest, because Ayers was just ripping them apart. I could hear Rainey screaming at Ayers not to melt the barrel on the 240 and to control his fires.”

Specialist Bogar fired approximately six hundred rounds at a cyclic rate of fire from his SAW when that weapon became overheated, and eventually jammed the bolt forward. Specialist Stafford noted, “Bogar was still in our hole firing quite a bit. Then Bogar’s SAW jammed. Basically it just got way overheated, because he opened the feed tray cover and I remember him trying to get it open and it just looked like the bolt had welded itself inside the chamber. His barrel was just white hot.”

After what Specialist McKaig estimated as thirty minutes, Ayers ran out of 7.62mm ammunition for the 240. McKaig remembered, “We had to fire constantly just to get the upper hand…they were coming from the southeast about 50 to 75 meters away. They were all different ranges coming from all different directions. We had to stay low because the fire they were putting down on us was extremely effective.” McKaig recalled: “Thank god we had some natural cover too. The only tree in our O.P. was getting destroyed by everything that would hit it. Branches, sticks, leaves and chunks of wood were landing on top of my helmet.” At least one of the RPGs cascading into the OP also set material located around the fighting positions aflame. Specialist McKaig was appalled: “Me and Ayers also had a fire from an explosion that caught some of our equipment on fire. I remember engaging the enemy and trying to kick out the fire at the same time. I remember telling myself ‘The Army never trained me for this kind of situation’.” ^clxxxi

To maintain fire superiority, or at least fire parity, over the insurgents Ayers and McKaig continued to engage over the edge of the Crow’s Nest with two M-4 carbines. At intervals they would pop up together, fire six to nine rounds at the muzzle flashes ringing the OP, then drop down before they could be engaged. Eventually, Ayers was struck on the side of his helmet, which stopped the bullet. McKaig recalled, “We had to coax ourselves into jumping back up again, because the whole time we were thinking we were going to die. We knew if we jumped up again, we would probably catch one in the face.” But PFC Ayers and Specialist McKaig did just that, and continued to pour fire out of the Crown’s Nest. Eventually the inevitable happened, and Ayers was struck and killed instantly, collapsing over his weapon. Now Specialist McKaig experienced problems with his weapon, “My weapon was overheating. I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn’t charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down.” McKaig reached for Ayers’ rifle, only to discover that it was also out of service, as it had taken an AK-47 round directly through the receiver.

Out of weapons, McKaig suddenly remembered that he still had two Claymores out. A quick glance revealed that at least one insurgent had exploited the lapse in gunfire and emerged from the dead ground to breach the concertina obstacle and assault into the OP. McKaig didn’t hesitate and “cracked off the two Claymores. The first one killed an insurgent that was in our wire. Sparks flew out of him, I don’t know if he had ammo or whatever on him, and it killed him instantly.”

Sergeant Pitts, who had ended up in the southern position having been blown there by the RPG blasts, was also in a critical situation. Pitts had been badly wounded by the initial swarm of RPG and hand grenade blasts, in the right leg, the left leg, and his left arm and hand. His right leg was particularly seriously wounded, and it was bleeding so badly that Specialist Bogar had to cease his one-man SAW barrage to put a tourniquet on it. Pitts complained, “I couldn’t move my right leg at all after that first hit.” Specialist Stafford, badly wounded himself, crawled back briefly into the northern firing position, emptied his 9mm pistol over the sandbag wall, and then reached for his two Claymores. Stafford described, “I grabbed one clacker and I brought it down, took the safety off, and I started clacking and there was nothing. I clacked it probably 10 times and nothing went off.” The Claymore’s wires were run directly on top of the ground, and almost certainly one of the many RPG blasts had severed it. Stafford continued, “Then I saw the other one and so I grabbed it and clacked it. I don’t know, the reports say they had turned them around and stuff like that, so I don’t know if they had come in and turned them around, if they were that ballsy, or if all the RPG blasts had made them fall down. But when I clacked, it blew up and back at us.” Startled, in his own words, “It scared the bejusus out of me,” Stafford grabbed an M-4 carbine that was in the position (either Sergeant Pitt’s or Zwilling’s) and began firing it, “I probably got off four or five rounds before another RPG hit right in front of that wall and tore my hands up really bad. So I dropped the rifle and I was hurting really bad at this point…I’m bleeding out of both legs, arms, hands, stomach.” Stafford crawled back to the southern position, where the other soldiers were at this moment clustered. Specialist Bogar’s suggestions to build the southern position had almost certainly saved the lives of all the soldiers that remained at the OP.

Stafford told Sergeant Pitts that Phillips and Zwilling were gone, Phillips dead and Zwilling probably so, that he was badly hurt, and that “They’re over there, they’re close, they’re throwing grenades, Sergeant.” Pitts became absolutely furious at this, and returned to the now vacant northern firing position. Sergeant Pitts described his lonely stand to the north, “I threw six or seven hand grenades into the dead space into the riverbed…I was cooking them off for about three or four seconds so they would blow up as soon as they got over the concertina wire and landed on the other side.” In between lobbing grenades at his opponents, Pitts called down to the Command Post and described the situation at the OP to them. He told them the OP needed help, urgently. Until it came, Pitts tried to fire Stafford’s 240 Machine Gun, but was unable to effectively do so due to his severe wounds.

At about this moment, as summoned by Sergeant Pitts, the first QRF from the main COP arrived, 1^st Lieutenant Brostrom and Specialist Jason D. Hovater. Lieutenant Brostrom recognized that what the German military referred to as the “schwerpunkt,” the critical point of the engagement, was at OP Topside and that he needed to move immediately to the OP to assess the situation and to gain control of the fight ongoing there. The salvos of RPGs bursting on OP Topside were prominently visible from the main COP. With heavy fire also sweeping the open fields of COP Kahler, Lieutenant Brostrom did not want to weaken the primary platoon defensive position until he had gained situation awareness of the actual circumstances at the OP. Accordingly, he directed only two soldiers to accompany him, Specialist Jason D. Hovater and PFC William Hewitt. Hewitt was the Platoon Medic and based upon transmissions from Sergeant Pitts, Lieutenant Brostrom knew that the medic was urgently needed up at OP Topside, but Hewitt made it only a few steps out of his fighting position at the CP before he was shot through the arm, a serious wound that knocked him out of the battle. Specialist Hovater, 24, had grown up in the mountains of East Tennessee, was a skilled musician, and had only married six weeks before this deployment. He was infamous within the platoon for his sense of humor, and was legendary for his impression of the Battalion Commander. Hovater had a memorized caricature of LTC Ostlund that regularly doubled spectators up with laughter. But Hovater was also an accomplished athlete, and he was acknowledged as the fastest runner in the Platoon. Brostrom had just reenlisted Hovater a month previously. Lieutenant Brostrom wanted Hovater to accompany him on the run up to the OP, because he knew that he could depend upon Hovater to stick with him as he hastened to the schwerpunkt of the contest.^clxxxii

Brostrom and Hovater sprinted together through the intense fire sweeping the flat ground of the COP and then scrambled up the terraces. Standing at the sleeping terrace, Lieutenant Brostrom shouted urgently to Sergeant Pitts in the northern position, and instructed Sergeant Pitts to hand him the machine gun and ammunition. Sergeant Pitts remembered, “I told him where I thought they were and then he disappeared.” Specialist Rainey then reinforced Brostrom and Hovater on the sleeping terrace, and Sergeant Pitts was the last to see any of these three soldiers alive. Although speculative, it appears that it was Lieutenant Brostrom’s intention to establish the M-240 machine gun, to be manned by Rainey and Hovater, on the sleeping terrace in the vicinity of the sandbag wall that Specialist Phillips had initially manned, and had been killed at during the early barrage of RPG rounds. Lieutenant Brostrom certainly knew that there were numerous casualties at the OP that would have to be evacuated (at this point in the engagement the only helicopter LZ was at the southern end of the main COP), and that reinforcements would have to be moved to the OP to help evacuate the wounded and to retain the position. Having just raced through a gauntlet of heavy gunfire at the bazaar and hotel complex, Lieutenant Brostrom would also have known that this position was controlled by ACM weapons, if not actually occupied by the enemy. It appears that his intention was to establish a machine gun position to suppress the ACM in or around the bazaar and hotel (which could be readily engaged from the sleeping terrace), so that the platoon could move between COP Kahler and OP Topside.

Specialist Stafford distinctly recalled of the ensuing engagement on the sleeping terrace:

I heard Lieutenant Brostrom up at the OP talking. He was screaming at Rainey and I could hear them shouting back and forth together and I don’t remember who said it, but they said, ‘they’re inside the wire’ and then I heard a bunch of gunfire and Rainey screaming, ‘He’s right behind the fucking sandbag! He’s right behind the fucking sandbag!’ I don’t know if they were grenades or RPGs, but there was a whole bunch of fire down on the sleeping terrace where we slept. Then all fire from the OP went quiet like there was no outgoing fire anymore.

Specialist McKaig remembered the incident in nearly identical terms: “…there was an insurgent right on the other side of a rock near our sleeping area. I remember hearing people screaming and yelling that he was right over there. I don’t know if it was that insurgent or another insurgent that killed him and Hovater, but shortly afterwards I couldn’t hear them anymore and they were probably killed.” When their bodies were recovered, Lieutenant Brostrom, Specialist Rainey and Specialist Hovater had all been killed by gunshot wounds, Lieutenant Brostrom’s in such a manner that it suggested he had been shot from the side or rear, quite possibly while he was turning his head; Rainey had been shot in the back; while Hovater was shot down through his face into his chest and his weapon lacked its magazine, strongly suggesting that he had been shot in a prone firing position while he was re-loading. Specialist Hovater had not failed in his charge, and he had stayed and fought with Lieutenant Brostrom to the very end.

Shortly after the engagement on the sleeping terrace, Sergeant Gobble “looked back to the North and I could see a man inside the wire. I quickly shot at him but he dove behind a large rock.” The enemy was by this moment very close to the OP. Huddled in the southern position, Specialist Stafford had just had at least two RPGs explode right on top of him, and Bogar had fired six hundred rounds from his SAW directly above his head, but the enemy was so near that Stafford could hear the recoil and cycling of the insurgents’ weapons distinctly. Stafford would later recall, “It sounded to me like they were right up on top of the hill, on top of the hill from the OP. That’s how close they sounded to me.” McKaig recalled that the insurgents began using an intriguing tactic, one which neither he nor anybody else had ever encountered before. Specifically, the insurgents began throwing rocks at them, “The insurgents then started throwing a whole bunch of rocks at us. They apparently mixed some fragmentary grenades in with them as well. As soon as it fell into my hole, my first reaction was to grab it and throw it out, or to jump out. Once I saw that they were rocks, though, I started yelling, ‘They’re rocks! They’re rocks!’ They were trying to get us to jump out.” Since resistance was still coming from the OP the insurgents, who wanted to take at least one American prisoner, were using rocks to attempt to trick the American soldiers into leaving their protection. Fortunately, McKaig recognized the threat for what it was and the ACM ploy failed. At some time during the fight at this point, Specialist Bogar was killed, but nobody saw him fall.

By now ammunition and functional weapons at the OP were beginning to run desperately low. Sergeant Pitts had the M203 and one M4 carbine in his northern fighting position. Stafford’s M240 machine gun had been lost in the vicious engagement on the sleeping terrace, and Phillips’ M14 rifle lay twisted into a pretzel by his side on the sleeping terrace. Ayers’ M240 at the Crow’s Nest was out of ammunition, one M4 there was knocked out with a round through its receiver, and both the SAW and the third M4 were irreparably jammed. Specialist McKaig, the only one of the three soldiers still capable of fighting at this moment, had picked up the remaining M4 carbine and urgently looked around the position:

I only had two magazines left and I knew I needed to save them in case the insurgents jumped over the sandbags. We could hear their voices and they were still throwing rocks at us. I had hand grenades up in my position so I went back up there and threw two hand grenades to the southeast, then I threw another two to the northeast into the dead space where we were taking fire from. I slid back down to where Sergeant Gobble and Stafford were, and by some miracle there was a LAW rocket hanging in a tree nearby. We were taking fire about 40 meters to our southeast from these little mud huts that were there. I saw a bunch of muzzle flashes and movement over there, so I opened up the LAW and tried to fire it. It wouldn’t fire. Sergeant Gobble came to and told me to pull harder on the safety, so I pulled as hard as I could on the safety and then leaned out and fired the LAW rocket. I hit dead center where those guys were. The shooting stopped after that for what seemed like an eternity, but it was only about six seconds.

Nearly out of both ammunition and working weapons, and with only three soldiers still alive and with all of them wounded to some extent, Sergeant Gobble and Specialist McKaig determined to abandon the OP. By this time Specialist Stafford had lost a lot of blood, and was in considerable pain and was floating in and out of consciousness. Sergeant Gobble pushed the rear (west) double wall of sandbags over, and the three soldiers began working their way through this gap and down to the sleeping terrace. Sergeant Gobble tried to check on his brother soldiers lying still on the sleeping terrace, but realized that they were all dead. While doing this, “I didn’t want to leave anyone behind that was alive so I began crawling to the next one and that was when I got shot at by a man on the other side of a large rock inside the OP. Because I was out of ammo and all the weapons around me were inoperable I wasn’t able to engage him.” Avoiding the exposed sleeping terrace and the path that led close to the bazaar, clearly occupied by the enemy, this small band of brothers headed to the 1^st Squad TCP to the southwest. Specialist Stafford had a difficult time getting through the concertina, getting tangled in the wire. Exhausted, Stafford decided “I was pretty sure I was going to die right there.” He finally got through the obstacle and descended, rolling down the terraces, and practically fell into Staff Sergeant Samaroo’s burly arms. Sergeant Sam shouted, “What the hell’s going on in the OP?” Specialist Stafford gasped out, “They’re all dead Sergeant.”

Staff Sergeant Samaroo moved the wounded soldiers back to the protection of the TCP, and began treating the wounds of all three men. What Sergeant Gobble and Specialist McKaig did not realize, was that Sergeant Pitts was still alive and fighting at the northernmost position. The two soldiers had called out to him, but not receiving any response (Sergeant Pitts was apparently busy on the radio attempting to get fire missions, and in any event he was partially deafened by the numerous RPG explosions that had rocked the OP) they believed that he had been killed like everybody else in the OP.

Before he had moved to the sleeping terrace to join Lieutenant Brostrom and Specialist Hovater, Rainey had handed Sergeant Gobble’s M-203 to Sergeant Pitts, in exchange for the machine gun that Pitts wasn’t able to handle effectively because of his many wounds. Pitts put the grenade launcher to good use, “I started shooting them straight up into the air so they’d drop in as close as they could on one side. I was putting them right where I put the grenades and hoped the arc would bring them down into the riverbed.” After he threw all his hand grenades and fired all his 40mm grenades, Sergeant Pitts noticed that “it was quiet and nobody was shooting but me.” A quick survey of the OP revealed that he was by himself. Sergeant Pitts “then got on the radio and told them that everybody was either dead or gone except for me and that if they didn’t send anyone up here, the position was going to fall. I let them know that the enemy was really close.” The enemy was, in fact, so close that Pitts could plainly hear them talking outside the hole. Specialist Hayes, the Platoon Leader’s RTO assisting Captain Myer at the COP Kahler CP, could hear the insurgents talking through Pitt’s hand-mike. Staff Sergeant Benton, at the Command Post, also heard: “Sergeant Pitts say in a hushed tone that he was hit, laying down behind cover, and could hear AAF walking within ten meters of his position.”^clxxxiii Pitts picked up the M-4 rifle that Stafford had earlier discarded and braced himself for the insurgents coming over the wall, fully intending that he was not going to go down without a fight.

Lieutenant Brostrom had designated a Platoon QRF to reinforce whatever position required assistance in the event of an attack. Apparently he had not yet ordered that QRF to move when he personally headed to the OP to assess the situation up there, and was subsequently killed in the brief, violent combat on the sleeping terrace. When the OP went quiet as the outgoing gunfire ceased, SSG Samaroo ordered a fire-team sized QRF to move to the relief of OP Topside on his own volition, with Specialist Hanson and PFC Hamby under his leadership. This QRF had only taken a few steps towards the OP when it encountered Sergeant Gobble and Specialists McKaig and Stafford, and temporarily halted its movement forward to evacuate the two badly wounded soldiers to the TCP where their wounds could be treated. That task completed, SSG Samaroo hastily organized a second QRF consisting of himself, Specialist Michael Denton, Sergeant Israel Garcia and PFC Jacob Sones who had sprinted from their 2^nd Squad position, and struck out for the now ominously silent OP. Sergeant Israel Garcia, 24, Long Beach, California was a career soldier on this third deployment. A true American patriot, Garcia joined the U.S. Army immediately upon graduating from High School in 2002, and had rapidly matured into a highly competent and well respected NCO. “Ira” was a smiling man with a positive personality who loved horses and soccer, was immensely proud of his Mexican heritage, and had married his high school sweetheart shortly before he deployed.

Before his small QRF raced across the open terraces for the OP, SSG Samaroo carefully scanned the hillside where the OP was located for any enemy activity: “…that’s when I engaged a man, shot him, he was directly on top of the OP shooting over a large boulder into the OP.”^clxxxiv At this moment, OP Topside was clearly penetrated by the ACM, and it was effectively overrun and in the ACM’s possession. However, the penetration was momentary, and SSG Samaroo’s vigorous counterattack immediately regained control of the position and drove the very few ACM that had stayed alive long enough to reach OP Topside away.

Following the engagement Specialist Zwilling’s body was found far down the terraces, nearly at the bottom of them, a considerable distance away from the OP fighting positions.^clxxxv The Sergeant that finally located him, in response to a frantic search initiated by 1^st Sergeant Beeson when he realized that one of his soldiers was unaccounted for, remembered being told to:

…start gathering and consolidating all SI [Sensitive Items] from the KIAs and wounded soldiers equipment. I seen a bag at the bottom of the OP so I went down to grab it and I looked over the edge of the terrace and seen Specialist Zwilling lying on his side not moving so I jumped down and ran up to him he was dead already so I called up for help to move him to the LZ he was wearing his IBA [protective body armor] I took it off and rolled him over he had a bullet wound in the left side of his chest and his leg was almost completely blown off from the thigh to the top of his boot.^clxxxvi

Specialist Zwilling was killed or incapacitated by the RPG explosion that had severely wounded Specialist Stafford. It is unlikely that an RPG or grenade explosion could have blown his body the distance from the OP that he was discovered. Specialist Zwilling’s leg had been struck directly with an RPG, and his mortal wounds were so severe that it is also inconceivable that he could have walked or crawled that distance by himself. Specialist Zwilling’s body also contained a closed fracture of the femur caused by “blunt trauma” and numerous abrasions that could possibly have been caused by being hastily dragged over terraces. It is almost positive that the ACM that overrun OP Topside were attempting to remove his body for propaganda purposes and were preoccupied with this effort, rather than entering the OP northern fighting position where Sergeant Pitts waited for them. Specialist Bogar’s body was also found “two terraces down” from the OP, which he would almost certainly not have voluntarily left due to the intensity of the insurgent firing, suggesting that he may also have been removed from the OP fighting position. Specialist Bogar’s body also contained some superficial abrasions that might have been caused by being dragged a short distance. The timely arrival of Sergeant Samaroo’s QRF at OP Topside interrupted the insurgent’s effort and prevented the removal of Specialist Zwilling from the OP, and possibly also precluded the removal of Specialist Bogar.

With no further signs of insurgent resistance, SSG Samaroo and his three soldiers ascended the hill. At OP Topside, as one honest young soldier later recounted, they discovered: “Fucking chaos. All their equipment was destroyed. The enemy had turned their claymores on them and they snuck around and killed most of our guys.” SSG Samaroo and his team immediately got Ayer’s 240 Machine Gun at the OP back into operation, checked the casualties that they could locate (Phillips, Rainey, Ayers, Hovater, and Lieutenant Brostrom) and determined that their brothers were already deceased and beyond any earthly aid, contacted Sergeant Pitts and assessed his injuries, and re-established security from the Crow’s Nest fighting position. They could not find either Bogar or Zwilling, who were well outside of the OP. All four soldiers immediately began to put out fire, and they were instantly involved in an intense firefight in every direction. One of Sergeant Samaroo’s soldiers remembered being engaged: “From all four cardinal directions. They used mortars, recoilless rifles, RPGs, RPKs, PKMs, AKs and anything they could get a hold of. I can’t even tell you how many RPGs hit, there were so many of them.” Sergeant Samaroo’s little group held their own for a few minutes, then another wave of deadly accurate RPGs overwhelmed them. Specialist Denton recalled:

…that’s when my position was hit by, I believe, two RPGs with a third hitting inside the actual OP…The blast blew me outside of my bunker, causing me to land on my head and neck, then the rest of my body hit the ground. I lost my weapon in the process. After that, I started crawling to get away from the position by a few feet and I could hear everyone screaming, including my Squad Leader [SSG Samaroo], that he had been hit.

Sergeant Pitts also remembered:

Garcia was pulling security in the middle area and keeping a lookout. Sones was treating me against the north wall. I was sitting down and he was bandaging me up. That’s when another volley of RPGs and hand grenades came in. I was hit again, as was Sones. That’s when Garcia took a direct hit from an RPG. I thought he was dead from his wounds. I knew Samaroo and Denton were wounded and I could hear Samaroo screaming that he was hit. I don’t remember much after that. I do know that I crawled over to Garcia and talked to him some. Sones and I crawled into the southern position and Samaroo and Denton jumped in as well. I told them that Garcia was messed up. I don’t remember who did it but one of them dragged Garcia into our position. Samaroo needed a radio so I got a multiband inter/intra team radio (MBITR) up so we could talk to the FOB. He told them we needed more people and that they were wounded… Denton started pulling security to the east, despite being hurt, and Samaroo was doing the same towards the north and west. Sones was pretty shell-shocked and Denton’s hand was pretty messed up.

Specialist Denton recounted, “I started looking for a weapon for myself and found one. I couldn’t fire with my right hand, it was hard to stand because both my legs had been hit, but I could stand to pull security to the east where we were still taking fire from the most, where they had snuck up on us, and tried to run us over from.”

One RPG had struck Sergeant Garcia directly on his abdomen, below his body armor. His wounds were catastrophic and mortal. Sergeant Garcia remained conscious for a few brief moments. Sergeant Pitts crawled over to him and held his hand, telling him that they were going to take him home. Sergeant Garcia passed away shortly afterwards, Sergeant Pitts still holding his hand.

When Sergeant Garcia was hit, his radio went “hot-mike” temporarily jamming the platoon frequency, and causing radio problems for a few minutes until the problem rectified itself. Recognizing the gravity of the situation based upon Sergeant Samaroo’s urgent calls for assistance, and with SFC Dzwik extremely concerned that “…I was not tracking on where all my soldiers were,” Dzwik and Staff Sergeant Phillips led a fourth relief party consisting of every soldier that they could lay their hands on, including Sergeant Aass, Sergeant Jesse Queck, Specialist Jeffrey B. Scantlin, Sergeant Grimm and PFC Aaron Davis from the TOW section since their TOW system had now burned down to the ground, augmented by two of the Marine ETTs (Corporal Oakes and Corporal Jones) carrying their M-240 Machine Gun. They temporarily halted at the TCP, throwing a yellow smoke grenade into the road to cover their crossing of the open space, and were guided up to the OP by Specialist Grapes of the 1^st Squad TCP who knew the way to the OP (the other soldiers had never been up there before). At about the same time that this fourth QRF was climbing towards OP Topside, the first AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters finally reached Wanat. The first gun run was performed by Hedgerow 50 at 05:23 against the north side of the brushy area immediately adjoining the OP, the gunner remarking: “There is a guy right on the other side of the trees.” An insurgent is briefly visible through the thermal sights within the brush, immediately engaged by cannon fire. Hedgerow 53 followed it in at 05:24, oriented upon a green smoke grenade thrown from Sergeant Samaroo’s party at the OP, and it placed about fifty 30mm high explosive rounds into the dead ground fifty yards to the east of the OP where Specialist Denton remembered most of the trouble was emanating from. The Apaches had delivered their initial gun run in support of the OP at 05:23 a.m. local, just over one hour after Captain Myer’s first frantic radio call to the TF Rock TOC, and within forty-five minutes of being alerted by the TF Rock TOC.

The Army Aviation component that supported TF Bayonet (and thus Chosen Company and TF Rock) was based at FOB Fenty at Jalalabad Airfield and was provided by 2^nd Squadron, 17^th Cavalry of the 101^st Airborne Division, task-organized as Task Force Out Front. Commanded by LTC John Lynch, a highly experienced OH-58 pilot and Squadron Commander:

My task force at that time consisted of 14 Kiowa Warriors, which was one of my organic troops, as well as a platoon out of 2nd Troop. I had an Apache company-minus with six AH64s. I had a Chinook platoon with four CH47s, a MEDEVAC detachment with three forward support medical teams, three UH60 air ambulances, a Black Hawk assault platoon with six UH60Ls, and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) detachment with four Hunter UAVs. I also had a Pathfinder detachment. Their primary task was to do personnel recovery but we used them to do a lot of other things. They made sure loads were rigged correctly for those odd sling loads and things like that. Those were all of my operational guys. I also had a maintenance troop augmented by folks out of the higher-level and intermediate-level maintenance unit as well as civilian contractors. I also had my forward support troop which, aside from doing vehicle maintenance and running logistics functions on the forward operating base (FOB), they run the forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). Two of those FARPs came into play during the Battle of Wanat. We ran a base FARP at Jalalabad Airfield. We had a forward-based FARP at Asadabad and one at Camp Blessing as well. There was an additional FARP up at Naray but that wasn’t run by my guys. I also had my Headquarters Troop, which consists of the staff and the medics and those kinds of folks.^clxxxvii

TF Out Front had to cover the entire TF Bayonet battle space, consisting of Nuristan, Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman Provinces. The OH-58D Kiowa Warriors could only be operated below 6,000 feet which severely constrained their utility in Nuristan and Kunar. With six AH-64 Apaches TF Out Front had to provide a continuous 24-hour Quick Reaction Force of two gunships; on a daily basis provide a two-gunship escort to cargo helicopters flying beyond certain points (to include the Waigal and Korengal Valleys); and of course comply with mandated crew flight schedules and helicopter maintenance schedules. Mechanical breakdowns and battle damage only exacerbated the limitations to be derived from operating only six gunships over an immense geographic area. When possible, and mission constraints, maintenance constraints, and flight crew constraints permitted, the Apaches were employed on deterrence and direct attack missions. During CONOP Rock Move, because Bella could only be evacuated by rotary wing, there were serious concerns regarding force protection of the valuable helicopters. In the event, no helicopters were damaged during the evacuation. On the night of July 12^th-13^th TF Out Front had a two-helicopter team of Apaches ready at Jalalabad as a QRF; and two MEDEVACs were also ready on the ground. As a result of the successful conduct of the Bella portion of CONOP Rock Move, and with the RIP ongoing although the RIP did not place major demands upon the Apaches, TF Bayonet had not requested any extraordinary measures be taken for the protection or defense of COP Kahler at Wanat. Although basing a flight of Apaches at the Camp Blessing FARP for enhanced responsiveness to the Pech, Korengal and Waigal Valleys was not extraordinary, no such request had been transmitted to TF Out Front. Thus, at the time of the attack on Wanat there were no AH-64 helicopters in the air, or any closer to Wanat than Jalalabad.

At 0430 TF Out Front was performing a transition between two shifts (a “night shift” and “day shift”) of Attack Helicopters at FOB Fenty in Jalalabad, executing this transition approximately 45 minutes before BMNT so that the helicopters would be ready to respond to any incidents at BMNT (as was relatively typical). Two MEDEVAC helicopters and two AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters were alerted at 04:37, approximately seventeen minutes after the attack was launched. Seventeen minutes later, at 04:53, the Flight Surgeon recorded the helicopters departing Jalalabad. Approximately 17 minutes were required from Captain Myers’ announcement that “This is a Ranch House type attack” to the helicopters being alerted. Given the intensity of the attack and the need for support at Wanat that was obvious within the TF Rock TOC at Camp Blessing, this appears to be an excessively long response time, which remains unexplained. The ongoing transition caused no delay in response times by the Apaches or Blackhawks. One AH-64 night shift pilot, CW3 Jim Morrow, had not been relieved, and he accordingly flew his Apache into the fight at Wanat.

Once alerted, the helicopters were in the air within seventeen minutes, and made the flight to Wanat in just under thirty minutes. Typical flight time from Jalalabad to Wanat was approximately thirty minutes using the valleys, as a direct route over the mountain ridges is not technically possible due to altitude limitations. Because field artillery was firing from Camp Blessing in defense of Chosen Company, the arrivals at Wanat was slightly delayed while the fire mission was completed. The Medevac helicopters remained at the FARP at Camp Blessing while the Apaches flew directly to participate in the defense of COP Kahler. The Apaches arrived at Wanat at 05:22, and performed their first two gun runs at 05:23 and 05:24, approximately one hour and five minutes after the attack started. This equates with the best estimates of the Chosen Company soldiers, that aviation support arrived somewhere between an hour and ninety minutes after the first RPG fire.^clxxxviii

The arrival of the Apaches was absolutely critical to finally regaining control of the situation at OP Topside. The Apaches immediately began gun runs into the dead ground to the north and east of the OP, suppressing the insurgents lying under cover in these areas engaging the OP, and driving the insurgents back from the OP. Some of the gun runs came in as close as thirty meters from the OP, at the very edge of the dead ground to the north and east. The Attack Helicopters’ fires were devastating to the ACM insurgents attacking the OP. From the moment of their arrival, the insurgents were forced to cede the initiative, which they had enjoyed since they launched the attack. Still, they didn’t leave without a protracted, stubborn fight. They continued to engage the OP, particularly lofting RPGs at the hilltop. Sergeant Aass later noted, “I remember somebody saying they were shooting the RPGs up into the trees. I think they were trying to have the RPGs explode over us and rain down shrapnel on top of us.”^clxxxix The prominent tree that OP Topside had been built against served as an effective aiming point for the insurgents, who lobbed RPG rounds in from several hundred meters away. After the battle the tree was found to be gouged and scored by numerous RPG strikes.^cxc A number of these RPGs proved to be extremely accurate, and even with the Apaches performing regular gun runs, the OP remained a distinctly dangerous location to be. Shrapnel continuously rained down from the incessant RPGs thundering against the tree from all directions. Specialist Davis was badly wounded by one RPG detonation. SFC Dzwik received a minor wound in his arm from another RPG. Corporal Oakes, one of the Marine ETTs, was similarly struck and wounded. The ACM gunners were determined, and remained in their firing positions for at least two hours, until intense attack helicopter and CAS strikes finally drove them away.

At about this time, Captain Myer suddenly materialized at the top of the OP, having run up through the bazaar (which until a few moments ago had been clearly occupied by the enemy) entirely by himself. As Captain Myer himself stated, “I kept getting conflicting reports about casualties at OP Topside.” This was almost certainly because casualties at the OP were being received faster than they could be accurately reported, and because everybody at the OP was wounded themselves by this point. The “hot mike” situation was also occurring at this time, which doubtless impinged upon effective communications. Sergeant Aass, when he made his way up to the OP to regain radio communications at that location, later found multiple hand-mikes out of operation, all riddled with gunshots. Determined to assess the situation for himself, Captain Myer made his dangerous run to Topside, and determined how many of his soldiers were actually wounded, and how urgently Medevac helicopter flights were needed. The answer was all too apparent, that Medevacs needed to be brought in, and that they needed to be brought in immediately. While here, Captain Myer quickly grasped how close the fighting at OP Topside had been when a soldier warned him, “…he yelled out that there was a grenade that hadn’t exploded…I reached down and threw it about twenty meters out of the pit. I remember seeing the spoon sticking out of it and it looking like a Russian grenade.”^cxci

By this time, numerous other soldiers began pouring up to the OP, urged on by radio calls regarding casualties and the desperate situation at Topside, and the fact that the indirect fires, CAS, and Apache gun runs had effectively suppressed the insurgent fire at the main COP. Specialist Scantlin made the climb and began treating the wounded. Specialist McKaig got back into the fight, and began humping boxes of machine gun ammunition up to the hilltop position.

The most desperate fighting at the OP had ended by about 6:30 a.m. By this time, all nine fallen heroes had been recovered. One of the Apache helicopter pilots expressed the sentiments of every American on the ground and in the air when the grim call came over the radio frequency, “We will have additional fallen hero missions to follow. I have a total of Nine KIA.” The pilot swore, instinctively, loudly, violently, and profoundly, “GOD-DAMN-IT!!!”

The Art of Saving Lives – MEDEVACs at Wanat

By this time, MEDEVAC helicopters were beginning to descend on COP Kahler, these flights being initially provided by two MEDEVAC UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters from 1^st Platoon, Charlie Company, 6-101^st Aviation Regiment from the 101^st Airborne Division stationed at FOB Fenty at Jalalabad Airfield. When the call came, the MEDEVACs were in the air “really quick” and made short work of the flight. Almost immediately upon the two MEDEVACs departing Jalalabad (approximately 4:45 a.m.), an additional UH-60 Blackhawk that had been designated as a QRF transportation helicopter was also alerted to serve as a third MEDEVAC. It was airborne just at first light, shortly before 5:15 a.m. To enable it to serve as a MEDEVAC helicopter it was briefly delayed while it picked up Captain Kevin King, the Physician Assistant (PA) for TF Out Front. This flight was called “Profit 71.” It was under the command of CW2 Isaac Smith, and Smith recalled that the crew consisted of: “Captain Paul Minnie was the pilot. I was the pilot in command. Our crew chief was Sergeant Chad Swanson and our door gunner was Sergeant Miranda Stevenson.”^cxcii

These first two MEDEVAC birds were Dustoff 36, commanded by CW3 Chris Hill, Co-pilot was Captain Ben Seipel, Flight medic was Staff Sergeant Matthew Kinney, Crew Chief was Sergeant William Helfrich, and Flight Surgeon was Captain Justin Madill; and Dustoff 35, Commanded by CW2 Wayne McDonald, with CW2 Juan Guzman as Co-Pilot, Staff Sergeant Atwon Thompkins as Flight Medic, and Specialist Neil Crawley as Crew Chief. Normally the Flight Surgeon would not be onboard, but as Dr. Madill remembered, “I knew that when both MEDEVAC are needed there may be multiple patients. I also knew that 04:37 Local was an unlikely time to receive a routine MEDEVAC call.”^cxciii The MEDEVACS, escorted by two AH-64 Apache gun ships, departed Jalalabad at 04:53 a.m. The two birds had to briefly land at Camp Blessing while Field Artillery fires were conducted for COP Kahler, and while Close Air Support utilized the airspace. The Apaches continued their flight to provide fire support at Wanat. While they waited for the artillery to cease firing, the MEDEVACs loaded “Speedballs” a nickname for rubberized body bags filled with ammunition for rapid delivery from helicopters. When the fires cleared, the two helicopters headed in for the relatively brief eight kilometer flight to Wanat.

The two MEDEVACs arrival was noted to have been shortly after the 1^st Platoon QRF arrived from Camp Blessing, and within thirty minutes of the AH-64 helicopters arriving on station to begin providing fire support to the beleaguered defenders of COP Kahler. ^cxciv The MEDEVAC helicopters employed two Landing Zones (LZs) at Wanat- the previously established, formalized LZ at the southern end of the open field at COP Kahler; and a second impromptu LZ on a terrace to the south of the OP. Dustoff 35 went to the LZ at COP Kahler, Dustoff 36 to the OP.

At 05:52 a.m. the first MEDEVAC helicopter, DUSTOFF 35, landed at the LZ to the immediate south of COP Kahler, leaving with five WIA. The MEDEVAC had challenges identifying the LZ as it was obscured by heavy smoke from the burning TOW and two other fires within the COP, and the bazaar building that had been set on fire during the heavy fighting immediately to the east. The smoke and dust was so thick that Dustoff 35 had to pull pitch, and go around for a second time before they could safely land. Dustoff 35 reported receiving ground fire on its approach and landing, to include one noticeable “boom” that rattled the helicopter frame.

At 06:05 a.m. the second Medevac helicopter, DUSTOFF 36, landed on a relatively large, open terrace to the south of OP Topside, and departed with four WIA. Dustoff 36 initially anticipated having to use a jungle penetrator, a heavy “anchor” shaped piece of equipment that could be dropped from the helicopter by winch, that could only retrieve one soldier at a time, and that required the helicopter to hover while the equipment was operated. Upon arriving at Wanat, they were able to successfully identify a single terrace that was both large and flat enough that they could land, and thus there was not a requirement to operate the jungle penetrator. This was fortuitous as hovering while operating a jungle penetrator would have been dangerous, and the Apache pilots were extremely concerned that this tactic would have to be employed, as they continued to observe and engage considerable gun flashes all around the beleaguered COP and OP.

During the flight in, heavy fighting still raged. The Flight Surgeon in Dustoff 36 “…heard our pilots communicating with the Apache crews who were engaging a large enemy force on the east side of the valley.” This was, of course, the enemy force that was located to the east of the OP, and still attacking OP Topside. He also remembered, “En route to the COP Kahler OP I heard the ground element (Chosen 6) guiding our pilots to their location. I heard machine gun fire during the ground elements radio transmissions and saw plumes of smoke on the ground in the area of COP Kahler from explosions.” Both helicopters reported observing ACM on the ground in close proximity to the LZs as they flew in. Both LZs were marked with violet smoke and VS-17 ground recognition panels. Once on the ground, Chief McDonald flying Dustoff 35 could not forget the sights and smells of combat, “The perimeter of the LZ was on fire to the north. There was yelling and screaming coming from the back of the aircraft. I could smell the gunpowder that was spent from rounds expended in the firefight.”^cxcv

When Captain Madill landed with Dustoff 36 he exited the aircraft along with SSG Kinney (the Flight Medic) and sprinted through the concertina to reach the OP and the wounded soldiers there. Stopping at a machine gun crew he observed Sergeant Garcia lying on the ground and realized that he could do nothing for him, and also saw three of the KIA lying on the terrace below. Captain Madill described the chilling interview that ensued:

A U.S. soldier approached me and I asked him if there were any other patients. He responded, ‘No.’ I pointed to the KIA and asked ‘Are they dead?’ He looked at me and stated, ‘They’re gone.’”

With multiple wounded aboard both helicopters, they hastily departed, the Apache gunships calling to them “…that we were taking heavy fire from the east side of the valley.” The MEDEVACs initially flew to the closer LZ at Asadabad until that facility’s limited medical capacity was filled, and then they flew the slightly farther distance to Jalalabad that had more medical capabilities. Following these first flights, a third MEDEVAC helicopter, Dustoff 34, joined them for subsequent medical evacuations, and all three helicopters repeatedly returned to Wanat. CW4 Callaway was the Pilot-In-Charge of Dustoff 34, with Co-Pilot CWO Dance, SGT Tuten as Crew Chief, and SGT Cannaughton the Flight Medic. On all of these flights, the MEDEVAC birds returned with speedballs of ammunition to resupply the soldiers on the ground as they continued to engage the enemy with heavy gunfire.

After the first two MEDEVACs had landed, Profit 71 followed them in. Captain King recalled, “As we came in for a landing, I heard the pilot ask someone on the ground where we should land the helicopter, the shaky voice on the other end said, ‘Don’t care, just land’”. Captain Minnie was able to take advantage of a momentary lapse in the fighting and landed at the LZ to the south of COP Kahler, and five wounded including the badly burned ANA soldier were loaded on board. Initially intended for Asadabad, that facility’s limited medical capability was rapidly overwhelmed, and it was diverted to Jalalabad. During the flight Captain King became seriously concerned with the condition of the badly burned ANA soldier. As Chief Smith remembered:

That was when Captain King said, “How long is it going to take us to get back to Jalalabad Airfield (JAF)?” I informed him of an approximate time, 20 minutes or so, and he said, “It needs to be as fast as possible because this guy in the back isn’t looking very good at all.” Our escorts were the close combat elements so they couldn’t keep up with us at this point. I instructed Captain Minnie to go to 100 percent torque on both engines and fly as fast as possible. I then informed the close combat elements that if we didn’t get back now, there’s a heavy possibility that one of the soldiers would die. So, we flew back, single ship, through the Kunar back into JAF.

Captain King simply noted of his patient’s deteriorating condition, “I needed to get him out of there, so I told the pilot to put his foot down and he did.”^cxcvi

Attempts to ascertain precisely which soldiers were evacuated on which specific helicopter flights have proven to be fruitless. SFC Stockard with the 1^st Platoon QRF honestly remembered, “There was so many MEDEVAC birds that came in I lost count how many birds actually came in that day.”^cxcvii Soldiers on the ground loading their wounded comrades continuously changed priorities as more seriously wounded soldiers were shifted to be placed aboard the helicopters. Additionally, soldiers on the ground just knew that they were loading their stricken brothers onto a MEDEVAC, and didn’t know much less care which helicopter or which MEDEVAC flight it was. Aboard the helicopters, the medics were far too absorbed in the effort to save the badly wounded soldiers, who were “completely covered in blood and dirt,” to even learn their identities.

Sergeant Pitts, badly wounded, was stunned at the courage and skills demonstrated by the 101^st Airborne’s MEDEVAC pilots:

I’ve seen a lot of MEDEVACs but I’ve never seen anything like what they did. It was one of the most amazing things I’ve ever seen. I actually wrote the crew chief of the bird I was on. I couldn’t believe the pilots landed where they did, that exposed. I couldn’t believe it. The Apaches were doing gun runs about 30 meters away.^cxcviii

Sergeant Hissong echoed: “We were still taking fire when I saw the medevac birds come in. What they did next was the single greatest thing I have ever seen a pilot do. Instead of landing down at the COP, they landed on an extremely small flat spot next to OP Topside. They were taking heavy fire the whole time but managed to get our critical casualties evacuated. They landed in that same spot about 10 more times before the end of the day.”^cxcix Although sixteen American soldiers and four ANA soldiers were evacuated, many of them with life endangering wounds, not a single soldier that was placed aboard a MEDEVAC helicopter died. The extraordinary care of the MEDEVAC crews, and their incredible courage in flying into the smoke of burning vehicles and buildings and the heavy ground fire, is solely responsible for this miracle. They were the true angels of the battlefield of Wanat.

Arrival of Quick Reaction Forces at Wanat

Almost immediately upon Captain Myer’s urgent call that he was under “a ranch house style attack”, at 04:30 a.m. the 1^st Platoon of Chosen Company at Camp Blessing was alerted to move as a QRF to relieve Wanat. Assigned as the TF Rock QRF, the 1^st Platoon of the Chosen Few was under the leadership of 1^st Platoon Leader 1^st Lieutenant Aaron R. Thurman, supported by the Company 1^st Sergeant Scott Beeson, and the 1^st Platoon Sergeant SFC William S. Stockard. The QRF filled four HMMWVs. The vehicles were essentially ready to go, and the weapons were already mounted (a single .50 M2 Heavy Machine Gun, two Mk 19 40mm automatic grenade launchers, and a single M240 Medium Machine Gun). The QRF was delayed for a few minutes, while additional ammunition was piled onboard the HMMWVs for COP Kahler. A quick operations order was issued, and the QRF departed Camp Blessing at about 05:15 a.m., just at BMNT. SFC Stockard noted: “The sun was starting to come up so it wasn’t too dark. We didn’t have NODs mounted or anything. We could see fine.” The QRF absolutely raced up the road from Camp Blessing, even knowing that there was only a single road into Wanat, and that employing ambushes or IEDs along a route to a TIC was a common ACM TTP. Running considerable risks to help their brothers fighting for their lives at Wanat, 1^st Platoon never slowed down, and used their heavy weapons systems to fire into every ravine and draw along the road, and every other known or likely ambush position. The trip from Camp Blessing to Wanat usually required ninety minutes. The 1^st Platoon QRF made it in 45 minutes. Apache gun tapes show the four HMMWV convoy approaching the TCP at 06:01 a.m., at that point almost certainly within five minutes or less of arrival at Wanat.

As can well be imagined, the situation that the 1^st Platoon arrived at was extremely confused. The TOW HMMWV and HESCOs were burning in the main COP, and the stall in the bazaar was furiously blazing from the heavy exchange of gunfire raking it from the American positions. The smoke from these various fires drifted to the east and piled up over the COP and road, obscuring visibility. OP Topside was still under intense attack. Communications between the QRF and COP Kahler were spotty at best, obscured by both the terrain and the combat action that the main COP was still engaged in. Heavy enemy fire continued to pour from the bazaar, hotel and mosque sweeping across the road. Only a few American soldiers remained at the 1^st Squad TCP as most of them had moved to relieve OP Topside. The four HMMWVs stopped briefly at the TCP. The lead truck was welcomed to Wanat by a wave of small arms fire and an RPG that impacted within twenty meters of it.

Accounts by the various members of the 1^st Platoon QRF are somewhat confused, as the soldiers were on unfamiliar terrain that was partially obscured by the dense, drifting smoke; and they almost immediately entered into close and intense combat with the insurgent force in the bazaar/mosque/hotel complex and atop the OP. Staff Sergeant Kyle Silvernale, one of the 1^st Platoon Squad Leaders, was introduced to the realities of the situation immediately upon his arrival when he linked up with Sergeant Hissong at the TCP, as described by Sergeant Hissong:

When they arrived I ran from my position to link up with them. The first person I saw was SSG Silvernale. I don’t remember the conversation but he later told me that when I got to him he asked me where the enemies were. He said I just looked around and didn’t really answer him so he asked me again and I said “I didn’t know”. He said “What do you mean you don’t know” and my response was “…they’re everywhere man.”^cc

The 1^st Squad’s HMMWV blocked the road, and had to be moved aside for the convoy to proceed. To augment the depleted manpower at the TCP, 1^st Platoon dropped two soldiers there. Additionally, the 1^st Platoon Medic who had accompanied the QRF bailed out of his HMMWV and immediately ran to the Casualty Collection Point (CCP) located at the CP to assist with the numerous casualties on the COP. 1^st Sergeant Beeson, accompanied by his RTO, also exited his truck to reach Captain Myer and ascertain where his services were most needed. A quick shouted conversation and the 1^st Sergeant immediately turned and sprinted towards OP Topside.

Lieutenant Thurman split his small force into two squads, one under his personal direction that he immediately led against the bazaar, and a second squad under Platoon Sergeant SFC William S. Stockard followed 1^st Sergeant Beeson up to OP Topside. Two of the HMMWVs remained at the TCP where they would have freedom of movement. By this time the fighting at the TCP was nowhere near as severe as it had been just a few minutes earlier, but at several times it swelled up and the fighting became furious. Although 2^nd Platoon soldiers had denigrated the conduct of the ANA, one of the 1^st Platoon soldiers who had just arrived was quite complimentary of their response to incoming enemy fire:

As I was pulling security…I heard incoming small arms whizzing by. Specialist [blank] yelled to me that the fire was coming from the compound to the west, he informed me of tracers coming out of the compound, so I traversed my turret and returned fire once I recognized the source of the fire. Ten meters to our north on the west side of the road was an ANA bunker. Four ANA were inside, they were shooting and taking fire from the same compound. As I fired into the windows, the ANA would fire an RPG into that same spot. Contact with the compound was over in roughly ten minutes.^cci

The other 1^st Platoon soldier at the TCP related a nearly identical story: “We began taking small arms fire from the windows of a compound to the west. Corporal [blank] returned fire with the M240B into the compound. Four ANA were also at the checkpoint and began firing with RPG’s and PKM into the compound. After about ten minutes of continuous fire into the compound we stopped receiving small arms.”

The remaining two HMMWS drove aggressively forward, past the bazaar to the northern end of the bazaar close to the mosque and hotel. According to 1^st Sergeant Beeson, an extremely experienced soldier who passed through this area en-route to the OP, he believed that this aggressive movement by the two heavily armed HMMWVs was entirely unexpected on the part of the insurgents, and the immediate onslaught by a portion of 1^st Platoon caught them entirely off guard.

It was Lieutenant Thurman’s first full-fledged firefight as he charged into the bazaar, and he had chosen a real knife fight for his inauguration. The driver of the lead truck, which mounted an Mk19 40mm grenade launcher, described the intense combat he immediately found himself embroiled in:

I drove my truck through the bazaar on the road to the north, past the hotel and mosque. I parked the truck using a rock wall as cover and blocked the road with the truck. Specialist [blank] shot a round with his M4 at the building to northeast doing a recon by fire. Immediately after his shot the truck came under PKM fire, Specialist [blank] shot the Mk19 at the house and then a LAW when the ammo can was empty. I got out of driver’s seat and went to the back seat and prepped another ammo can so he could reload. I then went back to the driver’s side door and covered Specialist [blank] while he reloaded the Mk 19. I opened up with my M249 [SAW] at the house and received effective SAF from the house. Sergeant [blank] handed me an AT-4 to shoot, and took my M249, I got down off the road onto a lower terrace and shot the AT-4 at the house and hit the bottom floor. Specialist [blank] then handed me another AT-4 he had in the turret for me to shoot, I went to the side of the truck and shot again at the house and knocked out a bottom floor window, at that point we stopped taking fire from the house. Sergeant [blank] brought me a SMAW-D [M141 Bunker Defeating Munitions] and told me to shoot the house. I went to the same place I had shot the second AT-4 from and prepped the SMAW-D to fire it, but a MEDEVAC helicopter came in and I put the safety back on. After the MEDEVAC helicopter left I fired the SMAW-D at the house, but it went short and hit two terraces down from the house and bounced into the trees around the house and detonated. I got my M249 back…and started scanning for enemy we then came under effective small arms fire from the draw to the east to the road to the north. I engaged the enemy in my draw with my M249 and Specialist [blank] engaged them with the Mk19. I went back the passenger seats and prepped all the Mk19 ammo cans…I went back to the drivers door and continued to engage enemy in the draw and in the bushes past the hotel. I received heavy small arms fire whenever I came up behind the door to shoot.

The assault squad was covered by the other HMMWVs: “…one to two AAF tried moving through the closest alleyway to myself to try and get behind the Mk 19 truck and the dismounts as they rounded the corner past the mosque. As soon as I had seen the AAF moving to try and get around the bazaar myself and the truck to my 5 o’clock engaged heavily with M240 [7.62mm machine gun] and .50 cal. After about thirty to forty rounds I no longer see any AAF trying to maneuver in the alley.” Sergeant Hissong observed Lieutenant Thurman’s two HMMWVs roll past him:

When the trucks started to move through the bazaar, the enemy started firing a lot of [RPG] rockets, but 1^st platoon returned with a massive amount of fire from their machine guns. It seemed like they drove the enemy out of the bazaar by the COP but the OP was still taking fire. The CO had already told the Apaches to level several enemy occupied buildings in the area and they were doing a pretty good job with that, but it still seemed like I was hearing about a new casualty at the OP every few minutes.^ccii

Sergeant Aass watched the fight in progress:

A first lieutenant pushed through the bazaar and they had eyes on a compound that we were taking some pretty heavy fire from. The 1st Platoon guys were trying to mark the compound with 203 rounds and I was trying to get the Apaches to come in on what they were shooting at to destroy it, and eventually they did. They pretty much turned that building to ruins. I remember [Staff] Sergeant Silvernale from 1st Platoon getting on the radio and announcing that he was going to clear the hotel. I made sure nobody was firing at the hotel and he went in there with two or three other guys and cleared the hotel.^cciii

Staff Sergeant Silvernale also described the intensity of the fighting that he engaged in, along with his Platoon Leader, as he cleared the bazaar area:

…I moved forward using the truck as cover from the direct fire we were receiving from the bazaar. I then moved to the mosque…unsure that Staff Sergeant Joshua A. Salazar truck would make it through the bazaar I laid down covering fire into the bazaar and hotel. While waiting for the second truck to push through the bazaar Specialist [blank] and myself received two near RPG misses. The first RPG impacted the east wall of the mosque about four meters from us. The second RPG impacted the same wall but about three feet from our position knocking me flat down on my back. I received shrapnel in the left hand from the RPG and Specialist [blank] received shards of glass from the Mosque window in the right and left forearm. Getting back up I started to lay additional cover fire into the bazaar and hotel until SSG Salazar truck passed through. Moving to the northern end of the bazaar behind the second truck I noticed a fresh blood trail leading through an overhang between the hotel and the building just north of the hotel. Pushing past the building just north of the hotel my element came in to heavy enemy contact once again. We started taking effective direct small arms fire from the north and east. Multiple enemy positions to the east of our position, one directly behind the hotel…Six AAF due east of the draw about 100 meters, four AAF the house due east approximate 200-250 meters away unknown number of AAF, and the white house to the north approximately 400 meters four AAF….moved into the bazaar and started clearance operations throughout the bazaar. Starting at the 2^nd floor northeast corner of the hotel clearing a foot hold, I moved through the northeastern most room to the window in order to throw frag [grenades] down on the enemy position in a flanking maneuver. Once clearing the foot hold we cleared the rest of the bazaar using an axe we found inside the hotel and shotgun to breach.^cciv

While the fight in the bazaar was going on, Sergeant First Class Stockard carried a squad up to strengthen OP Topside. The OP was no longer under direct assault, but heavy and accurate small arms and RPG fire was still being directed at it from at least three promontories that overlooked it, and insurgents remained ensconced in the various dead spaces surrounding it. The first of these was a house approximately one hundred to 150 yards to the southeast and above the OP; the second was a large house/compound across the Wayskawdi River valley three hundred yards to the northeast; and the third was a large compound to the south of the TCP and COP. 1^st Sergeant Beeson had by now reached OP Topside: “We just continued to hold our position under fire. We then took an RPG right above my head that hit the rock and a tree and forced me to the ground. Right after that either an RPG or a grenade landed in the CP area and blew up cutting the LRAS in two pieces and wounding [three soldiers].”^ccv SFC Stockard recalled succinctly, “They shot RPGs and everything else they could at us.”^ccvi To help with the insurgents that remained in close proximity, SFC Stockard threw a number of fragmentary grenades to his front. Another soldier in the firing position with him recalled, “Things died down a little while later.”

The ACM defenders in the area did not leave on their own volition, and they put up determined resistance. The driver of one of the HMMWVs remembered, “I was going to turn the truck around in case we needed to move quickly. As soon as I turned the truck around a volley of RPGs started hitting inside the wire [just to the west of the road]. Lieutenant [Thurman] jumped back in the truck. I looked to my left and saw an RPG explode about five meters from my truck. I told Lieutenant Thurman, ‘Sir, those RPGs are RIGHT here!’ He said, ‘I know, drive!’” He also recalled of the intensity of the fire that the ACM was directing at the 1^st Platoon: “A bunch of RPGs started blowing up to our 9 o’clock. Maybe ten to fifteen RPGs. I’ve never seen that many RPGs hit at once before. It literally took my breath away to see. During this time we were still being effectively engaged by PKM and small arms. Specialist [blank], the gunner of Staff Sergeant Salazar’s truck, called out that he saw enemy in the trees between us and Topside. We engaged that area with small arms, frags [fragmentation hand grenades] and Mk-19. We just couldn’t seem to kill all of them.” After a stiff fight Sergeant Silvernale’s squad cleared the ACM from the bazaar, hotel and mosque complex. Once the enemy were pushed out of the buildings, Lieutenant Thurman had Sergeant Silvernale throw yellow smoke grenades directly onto the enemy positions to mark them, and then called in multiple Apache gun runs onto their heads, some as close as only meters away from Chosen Company soldiers. These gun runs were extremely accurate, and they proved devastating to the ACM. At 6:39 a.m. the first Hellfire missile was launched from one of the Apaches into the large compound to the northeast of the COP, across the river valley. When more ACM fires continued to pour out of the building, a second Hellfire slammed into it at 8:20 a.m. in response to the terse, exasperated command from the ground, “Level the buildings.” The wave of nearly continuous Apache gun and rocket runs began to slowly but perceptibly knock down the ACM resistance. The tide of battle began to turn about one hour after the onset of the onslaught, and by 8:30 a.m. the Americans has clearly regained the initiative. The balance of the scales of battle had been tipped in the direction of the beleaguered Chosen Few by the two Hedgerow Apache flights with their amazingly accurately delivered fires, the prompt response of the 1^st Platoon QRF in driving furiously to Wanat; and the aggressive actions of the 1^st Platoon QRF upon its arrival. After 8:30 a.m. the combination of attack helicopters and CAS ensured that the ACM never regained the initiative.

TF Rock responded aggressively, and additional QRFs began to pour into Wanat as transportation assets could be rounded up. The second Battalion QRF dispatched to Wanat was the 3^rd Platoon from Able Company, accompanied by the Company TAC and a Scout Section which traveled by HMMWV from Camp Blessing and arrived at about 8:20 and assumed responsibility for the defense of the COP. This QRF was commanded by Captain David Nelson of Able Company, and consisted of six HMMWVs and thirty soldiers (25 from the 3^rd Platoon led by Lieutenant Brostrom’s best friend and Ranger buddy, Lieutenant Kennedy; and five from Company Headquarters). Lieutenant Kennedy had also been concerned about his friend’s mission, later documenting: “I didn’t like the fact that it was only one platoon and there was no plan to insert Americans onto the high ground to establish OPs, especially with how much enemy activity had gone on the prior missions.”^ccvii As he pulled into COP Kahler and began to look for his friend, Lieutenant Kennedy understood that his worst fears had been realized.

As soon as Captain Myer reported over the radio, “This is a Ranch House style attack” his fellow company commander Captain Dan Kearney of Battle Company alerted his entire company for an impending movement to Wanat. In the event, only one platoon was finally moved up to Wanat, the 3^rd Platoon led by 2^nd Lieutenant Michael Moad, a 2006 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. This platoon arrived by CH-47 Chinooks, and reached Wanat several hours after the 1^st Platoon QRF had arrived (at about 1:30 p.m.). Lieutenant Moad’s Platoon was immediately assigned responsibility for OP Topside. Lieutenant Moad and his Platoon Sergeant, SFC Barbaret, were extremely displeased with the tactical position of OP Topside. As SFC Barbaret observed, “My initial perception on the battlefield was why are we in the low ground, where are the fortifications, and why don’t we own any high ground?” Moad and Barbaret felt that the dead ground to the north and east could not be adequately covered from the position, and they observed that an Afghan compound 150 yards to the southeast overlooked the entire position. Accordingly, Lieutenant Moad transferred the OP to this compound, as he subsequently described:

I took the remainder of my platoon to the large compound about 150 meters to the east of OP Topside in the high ground. The compound offered dominating observation above the village of Wanat and a good majority of avenues of approach into the proposed Combat Outpost. Moreover, this position was previously used as an attack position against Chosen Company evident by the large amount of expended AK-47 brass. Lastly, we were not actually first to this location; however, one squad from the Able Company QRF had occupied and maintained this position until we relieved them in the mid-afternoon. Once in position, I had my platoon re-clear the compound and then selected positions for my soldiers to man while offering them the best cover and concealment. We used the compound as our defensive position and then sent out Reconnaissance and Surveillance teams to search the nearby area for any PIR. We set out claymores in all likely avenues of approach and began to use surrounding rocks and sandbags we had carried into Wanat to build up defendable positions. Once in position my PLT Forward Observer and I conducted terrain denial operations by using the 120mm which was still in operation around the Chosen Command Post. By nightfall, we broke down the OP Topside and moved the rest of my platoon and the Scout section to the Compound.^ccviii

Throughout the day additional assets continued to arrive at Wanat. A reduced TF Rock TAC (Tactical Command Post) reached Wanat at about 7:30 p.m. on July 13^th, and a small American Other Defense Agency (ODA) contingent, supporting a sizeable command of ANA Commandos, also landed by helicopter. By now, there were over two hundred ANA and American soldiers present at Wanat, many of them elite Afghan commandoes who were highly experienced and extremely well trained special operations soldiers.

Additional reinforcements continued to arrive on July 14^th. The eighteen highly skilled and trained soldiers comprising a Platoon of 101^st Airborne Pathfinders arrived, and initiated careful clearance efforts of all dead ground around the Chosen company positions.

The Waigal District ANP detachment had not supported the Chosen Company defense of COP Kahler in any manner whatsoever, even though their District Headquarters was located directly in the combat zone. One Chosen Few Sergeant specifically recalled, “We pushed past COP Kahler down the road and received fire from alleyways and a house on the other side of the draw, and we returned fire. The ANP compound was in the vicinity to my left about 200 meters. There was no fire coming from there; they were not engaging the enemy though they could have. After the fight, I saw ANP walking around like nothing had happened. Their uniforms were all clean. They were carrying RPK and AK weapons.” The ANA Commandos at first light on July 14^th marched on the District Center, disarmed the ANP, and initiated a careful clearance of the town of Wanat itself. What the Afghan commandoes found proved to be both alarming and disconcerting. The ANP District Center, which served as the headquarters for a twenty man police force, was discovered to contain:

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  76 AK-47 automatic rifles;

  
  
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  11 RPK 7.62mm light machine guns;

  
  
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  Three PKM 7.62mm general purpose machine guns;

  
  
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  Six RPG launchers;

  
  
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  Three 12-gauge shotguns;

  
  
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  One grenade launcher; and

  
  
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  Six 9mm Pistols.

The majority of these weapons had been recently fired, and large quantities of 7.62 mm ammunition and RPG Grenades were discovered. Sergeant Grimm also noted:

In the Wanat ANP compound I saw it was untouched [his emphasis], though it was on the ingress/egress route of the AAF that attacked from the mosque and bazaar. I saw a lot of expended brass inside their perimeter, southwest side (facing us). ANA commandoes found a lot of bloody uniforms. All the ANP were in fresh brand new uniforms, which is unusual since they are only issued one uniform and usually they are dirty. They also appeared freshly shaven with razor nicks on their faces. There were also over one hundred weapons, including AKs, PKMs, PRKs, RPGs, pistols and shotguns. They were dirty and had recently been fired.^ccix

Combined with the weapons that were found in the ANP compound by the Afghan Commandos, the evidence was considered to be overwhelming that the ANP had been in collusion with the ACM insurgents. As a result, the District Police Chief was subsequently relieved of his duties and arrested; and the ANP was disarmed. The District Governor was also arrested, although he was later released.^ccx

Over one hundred structures in Wanat were searched, every single one of them vacant. Within one house, a large medical cache suspected to treat ACM casualties was located, along with used BDUs.^ccxi Another building yielded four AK-47 automatic rifles, two Realistic@ model TRC222 40 channel hand-held radios, floodlights, blasting caps hidden inside a first aid kit, detonator cord, and a video camcorder with the tape still inside it. Sergeant Justin Grimm, now serving as a standard infantryman since his TOW system had melted down to its suspension, was able to assist with the clearance of Wanat. In one house, Sergeant Grimm observed “I saw about six ANP ID cards, a four-inch stack of laminate, loose photos, everything to make ID cards. There was a camcorder and weapons.”^ccxii

Throughout the remainder of July 13^th and July 14^th small engagements continued unabated. Several of these were small parties of insurgents who were in hiding, and were attempting to ex-filtrate Wanat. By now, ISR assets to include a Predator UAV was scouring the countryside adjacent to COP Kahler, and the ACM were rapidly identified and engaged with various assets to include mortars, artillery, and CAS. Captain Pry noted of this augmentation of resources for Wanat, “It took at least an hour for the Predator UAV to move all the way to the engagement area from where it was diverted, which I believe was south of Jalalabad at the time that it was diverted.”^ccxiii Throughout the night of July 13^th-14^th, additional small groups of ACM insurgents continued to probe the American perimeter, seeking to identify gaps in the American defenses that they could in turn exploit. Their attempts were invariably brought to a quick cessation through the vigorous application of overwhelming American firepower, to include the presence of a devastating AC-130 gunship. By the afternoon of July 15^th, the Americans had expended an impressive amount of firepower at Wanat, to include almost one hundred 155mm artillery rounds; numerous bombs from various types of airplanes include A-10s, F-15s and AC-130 gunships; hundreds of 30mm cannon rounds, several score of 2.75” rockets, two Hellfire missiles delivered by the extremely accurate Apaches; and additional Hellfires delivered by other assets including UAVs.^ccxiv However, with the exception of a limited number of artillery projectiles and the majority of the Apache strikes, nearly all of this ordnance had been expended after 06:30 on July 13^th.

Although there was by now considerable combat power in Wanat, there still appear to have been problems with command and control as exercised by TF Rock. The Brigade commander never visited Wanat, nor did any representative from CJTF-101. LTC Ostlund, TF Rock Commander, visited Wanat several times but did not remain on-site. The TF Rock TAC was under the supervision of Major Scott Himes, the TF Rock S-3 or Operations Officer. It should be noted that the TF Rock TAC actually only consisted of Major Himes, the FSO, a single RTO, and two riflemen for security.^ccxv Lieutenant Moad from Battle Company remembered that after briefly talking to the two Company commanders at Wanat and receiving his platoon’s assignment, “I did not speak to Captain Myer again for the duration of my stay” and “I did not hear or see from him [Captain Nelson] again as well.”^ccxvi Lieutenant Moad made no mention of seeing any higher ranking officer than Captain Myer or Captain Nelson at Wanat. Upon his arrival, Major Himes “…found the SF team leader and discussed the way ahead. His initial desire was to conduct an approach march to the northeast along the valley floor with a march objective of Qualay-e-gal (four kilometers to the east).” In other words, the Special Forces commander wanted to aggressively maneuver to seal off the major route of ACM ingress, supply and logistics, and egress that ran down the deep defile of the Wayskawdi Khwar by seizing the small village of Qualay-e-gal, which entirely commanded every route through the Wayskawdi Khwar valley. If adopted, this tactical approach would certainly have been risky, although the massive quantity of American firepower and ISR assets would have clearly mitigated such risks, and it had the potential of inflicting a significant (if not crushing) defeat upon the ACM. Major Himes instead felt that “My concern was that we did not have adequate forces securing our northern flank” and thus the large and skilled Afghan Commando force was piecemealed to providing local security to COP Kahler. The American SF and Aghan commandos retained forty men within Wanat to serve as a powerful QRF, and pushed out after dark in all directions to seize and secure high ground to the northwest, northeast and southeast. By now an AC-130 gunship was also on station, and with these measures any ACM efforts directed against Wanat were doomed to fail. However, the fleeting opportunity to cut off the ACM retreat and inflict a catastrophic defeat upon the insurgents slipped away as the sun set over the towering ridges around Wanat.^ccxvii

TF Rock issued the Battalion TAC at Wanat a pair of contingencies at 1700 on July 14^th, to either continue with the construction of the permanent COP, or to withdraw from the town. The officers and soldiers on the ground began to plan for either option.

Evacuation

UPDATE: THIS SECTION WILL BE REVISED BASED UPON CJTF-101 INTERVIEWS

Lieutenant Matthew Colley, the Assistant S-2, recalled the moment that the decision was made to withdraw from COP Kahler:

I was present when the decision was being made to eventually withdraw from the VPB…Bayonet 6 asked ROCK 6, who in turn asked CHOSEN 6 what should occur. The decision was made from the ground commander and was agreed upon throughout the chain of command.^ccxviii

Just as a variety of factors had influenced the decision to establish COP Kahler at Wanat, a range of factors influenced the decision on the night of July 14^th to evacuate. As described by a member of the TF Rock TAC, the initial recommendation came from Captain Myer, Chosen Company Commander, to leave Wanat. That recommendation was vetted by both the TF Rock and TF Bayonet Commander, and was shortly afterwards confirmed by the CJTF-101 Commander, Major General Jeffrey J. Schloesser. The core logic of this approach was later provided by both Captain Myer and LTC Ostlund. Captain Myer:

After the fight on July 13^th in Wanat, the situation for occupation was drastically changed. No matter how much coalition forces conducted I/O to explain/battle the circumstances for occupation of Wanat, it would be viewed as hostile. The population in and around Wanat had clearly supported the enemy and did not maintain the conditions for coalition force support and projects. Wanat is ideal because of the ground LOC open to the rest of the BN, but that would take significant manpower to keep open.

TF Duke had a significant role in the decision to leave Wanat. It could have been handed to them, but with significantly more personnel required to hold the ground and expand influence on the population. From my understanding, that is personnel that they were not willing to put there.

LTC Ostlund:

Working the LOOs was going to take an incredible influx of resources for security, the district governor was going to need to be replaced, the market was shot up [in fact one building in the bazaar was burned to the ground] and we were not going to reward the area with $1.4 million in projects – the conditions radically changed on the morning of 13 Jul 08 and the Wanat population priced themselves out of our desire to assist them at that time.

The incoming unit was not able to assume Bella and was unwilling to assume Wanat (COP Kahler). I supported pulling out of the area, finishing the hard ball road to Wanat, which would allow for safer and routine patrolling into the area, while the governor was replaced and the police were replaced or retrained, and the population was re-engaged. I thought the argument – “we paid too much to abandon this place” was a DUMB emotional v. logical, tactical, and supportable argument.^ccxix

At the heart of the decision, TF Duke simply had no interest in assuming responsibility for COP Kahler at Wanat. Given the apparent hostile population (a population which had been strongly pro-US in May 2007), and the powerful attack that the ACM had been able to launch on the morning of July 13^th, TF Duke apparently felt that Wanat was too “hot” a location for them to operate from. Since the incoming unit refused to operate it, COP Kahler was to be abandoned.

On the morning of July 15^th, the final word came down from CJTF-101 through TF Bayonet and TF Rock that Wanat would be abandoned, and the American force immediately began the process of withdrawal. Helicopters began swooping down into Wanat, and trucks began pouring up from Camp Blessing, and as assets were available and supplies could be loaded the retrograde movement was implemented. The final helicopter flight contained the seven remaining Chosen One mortar men and their mortars. By 4:30 p.m. on July 15^th all of the Americans had returned safely to their respective COPs.^ccxx Only a few partially filled in fighting positions remained of COP Kahler. The Americans had abandoned Wanat to the insurgents.

Aftermath

As the sun slowly set on the battered buildings of Wanat in the evening of July 13^th, both contestants had sustained heavy losses. American casualties were nine killed, and 27 wounded. Of the wounded, sixteen were seriously enough wounded that they had to be evacuated from the battlefield, while eleven were treated at Wanat and returned to duty. Five ANA were wounded, four seriously enough to be evacuated. All of the American KIA had been sustained in the first two hours of combat (between 04:20 and 06:30 in the morning). On the day that he heard that his brother had been killed, Air Force Airman Zwilling completed maintaining his U-2 for a flight over Afghanistan before he headed home for his brother’s funeral. The U-2 flew overhead with a memorial to Specialist Zwilling proudly adorning its nose.

ACM casualties are, of course, speculative. The ACM insurgents are highly skilled at evacuating their wounded and dead from the battlefield, and recovering their casualties is such an extremely high priority for the insurgents that it can best considered to be a primacy. It is rare for American soldiers to do more than locate a few scattered blood trails. 1^st Lieutenant Michael Moad, Platoon Leader of the Battle Company Platoon dispatched to augment the QRF to Wanat, was assigned responsibility for OP Topside. While there, he assessed his surroundings:

As I sat in the OP I observed the 30mm cannon strafe marks in the ground just 1-2 meters outside the OP itself just in front of the sandbag defensive wall which was ultimately inside the wire about 10 meters from the sandbags [Lieutenant Moad was describing the sandbag wall on the sleeping terrace, and observed 30mm rounds that were fired during the second gun run at the insurgent in the brush just north of the OP at 0524]. I believe this is where the AAF was killed and lay until recovered by the Scouts… I remember the body distinctly: he was wearing traditional Afghan top and bottom clothing. I think the top was blue and bottoms were tan. He was wearing a green rack system, though I didn’t check the contents. From what the Scouts said, he did have an AK-47….^ccxxi

The body of a single ACM was recovered from the concertina wire at the OP, where he was entangled. This is almost certainly the insurgent that Specialist McKaig killed with his Claymore. The Chosen Company soldier who recovered his corpse recalled: “I seen an enemy KIA in the wire…we pulled him out of the wire he was wearing a chest rig and off white clothing and a BDU coat under his top after getting him out of the wire we pulled him down over near the OP and searched him the enemy KIA had three AK-47 mags on him all were empty no AK-47 was found. Nothing else was on the enemy KIA.”^ccxxii The Afghan commandos that had reinforced Wanat identified the dead ACM as being “Arab” rather than Afghan, strongly intimating that he was a foreign fighter. Estimates of ACM KIA range from 21 to 52, with another 45 believed to have been WIA, based primarily upon SIGINT intercepts from various sources.^ccxxiii Certainly the ACM force had been catastrophically injured, possibly to include the loss of key leadership, although assessing the extent of their losses is almost impossible because the ACM regularly dissolves into small parties to ex-filtrate from the scene of an engagement. The camcorder that was subsequently recovered from the village of Wanat was clearly intended to document the tactical victory that the ACM expected, but the fact that no videotape of this assault has materialized as of March 2009, nor have any ACM claims of successes or accomplishments achieved at Wanat been trumpeted as an IO victory, suggests that the ACM had very few, if any, accomplishments or advantages achieved at the tactical level to exploit.^ccxxiv

With the evacuation from Wanat, there was no longer a coalition presence in the Waigal Valley. Ranch House had been evacuated in October 2007. Bella had just been evacuated on July 8, 2008. Wanat was evacuated on July 15, 2008. With this action, fourteen months of campaigning by 1-32 Infantry, and fourteen months of campaigning by TF Rock, from April 2006 through July 2008, had been abrogated. The Waigal Valley residents who had cooperated or worked with the coalition forces for the past three years were abandoned to their fates at the hands of the insurgents. An entire valley had been ceded to ACM control.^ccxxv