The plan is to get to Bagram where we will be assigned a unit. We hope to rotate into the field with this unit, then rotate out again once their mission is complete. From this. we plan to produce a docu-series that will show the inside life of a small combat unit. We have some other plans as well, but for reasons, I won’t say much more.   We have been fortunate enough to hook up with WBRA (PBS/Roanoke), who has agreed to sponsor our series. With this blessing, we have been working for the past several months for funds that will allow us to remain in the field for up to six weeks. To date, the efforts have been relatively slow. We expect that to change soon however. 

Next week we will be receiving our grant proposal. We hired a professional service that is reknowned for its work in helping people like me to professionally and properly present our proposal. We hope this will help us secure the funding we need. For this reason and the fact that we are under the PBS umbrella has our hopes skyhigh that we will soon have the funds to complete this project. 

With that said, imagine my delight and sadness at today’s news. Seems as though we guessed right: 

***ASSOCIATED PRESS*** 

At the Pentagon, orders have been issued to prepare equipment and supplies for the coming offensive, although the operation will not necessarily require additional troops in the region, a defense official said on condition of anonymity. The upcoming operation, first reported by the Chicago Tribune, has been dubbed the “spring offensive.”   Another Pentagon official declined to discuss the possibility that troops would extend operations to the Pakistan side of the border, where al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden (news – web sites) and top lieutenants have long been said to be hiding. But the official said that might have to be the next step. 

Defense Department officials believe current operations in Afghanistan are not having the effect they want on the terrorist network and they are determined to do more, the official said. 

Officials already have said they hope to finally capture bin Laden this year, a development that could benefit President Bush (news – web sites) in the November election. About 11,000 U.S. troops are in the region. 

One senior defense official said Pentagon leaders determined a couple of months ago that it is important to catch bin Laden, more for the symbolism than for his military value.   ”I can say that Osama bin Laden and (and former Taliban leader) Mullah Omar represent a threat to the world, and they need to be destroyed, and we believe we will catch them in the next year,” Lt. Col. Bryan Hilferty, a spokesman for military forces in the region, told CNN. 
***** 
I talked to Col. Hilferty today and we’re still planning to be in country by April 1st. Obviously it all depends on securing funds. I spent an hour on PBS’s “Blue Ridge Live” talking about my mission and I was featured recently in the local paper… still no bites though. Funny thing is, I’ll probably find the money somehow and show the naysayers what’s up. Then things will change.

Pashtun Kids – Musa Qala, Helmand Province, Afghanistan 2009       

As anyone who has followed my work over the years knows, on occasion, I get slammed by someone good; a parent of a soldier, a Marine in the field, a journalist on the way to Oruzgan. Yes, even other journalists have given me grief over the years.  I’ve had some even say that I was akin to a ‘military stooge’ just because I am former military!  How about that.  Because I can speak the language and understand what it means, I am a ’stooge’.    The problem with that is that I get the feeling people believe my mission is a “pro-military mission”.  So I just wanna clear up my anxiety on the issue, even if just for me.  

Be clear:  I do this line of work, when conditions permit, to be able to reach the people that are involved.  I have a great passion for understanding “the people”.  I absolutely love the thrill of walking down the back streets of Kabul, picking a random bakery, climbing into the the small kiln room and having tea with some people I can’t even talk to properly.  Raw culture with primitive means to communicate between us.  Gotta love it.

Fact is, none of this would be possible without the military mission.  Just isn’t possible for two reasons:  My life and the video market.  There is no market for my work that involves the people.  There is a market for military video.  

Early on in my career, I just traveled to travel.  Loved getting shots of the kids.  If you can make the kids smile, you can get into the heart of a village.  The camera is a perfect means to achieve that.  Problem was, there was no market for that type of imagery; at least from what I knew.  It wasn’t until after spending nearly a year in Afghanistan, in 2004, that  I realized the hours and hours of video I had collected, was actually an archive of world history.  After all, I witnessed the first Afghan election from Kandahar (a day I’ll never forget.  It was the highlight of the year).  And to ensure that it became part of the historical archive, I tracked down a distributor who agreed to take my future video on.   That’s when the military connection really took off.

Obviously, other than the preservation of military history, I need the military for security. Hands down, just a fact.  The only way I can get the imagery and the contact with “the people” is with the military.  While I agree it may cause the dynamic to shift some; something is better than nothing.  Besides, in pursuing that, I have had many, many opportunities to interact with “the people” without the military anywhere near me to influence anything.  

Beyond that, when not out working with “the people”, I’m also looking for those ground level military stories that help illustrate the war through the everyday eyes of those serving there. That, more than anything is what draws people to this site:  The ability to get a basic, stripped down, outsider view of something that involves them or their family.

Pro-Afghanistan Blog

It is true that this is a pro-Afghanistan blog.  That is another complaint I get.  Those folks tend to link “pro-Afghanistan” with “pro-military/war”, which isn’t necessarily the case, however.  First and foremost, I want Afghanistan to succeed for the people of Afghanistan.  I know a better life is in their future if a functioning government can be achieved.  It is just going to take time.  Beyond that, a functioning government is the best result for world stability.  For that, I support the ISAF forces assisting this country achieve that.  It is really that simple. 

However, supporting the mission is a personal feeling that I have chosen to make public and in no way influences what I write.  This blog is simply a ground level look at what I see on a day to day basis when I am out in the field.  In between trips, I like to throw out some educated opinions and make some short films as well.  However, the WHOLE idea of this blog is to help you see, feel and understand as much of what I’m seeing, feeling and understanding without actually being there.  That is why the approach to this blog is often times raw and unedited.  Actually it started as a diary to show you the journey an independent journalist will take to do his job.

With that said, I am still dealing with some personal issues that have me grounded for a bit. In lieu of anything else for now, I am re-hashing my 2004 epic journey through Afghanistan that many of you have never read before.  I hope you understand my situation and enjoy this series.  I will try to post the entries as close tho the actual dates as possible.  There will also be a likely intermission in a few weeks due to a pending trip to Haiti.

Enjoy!

Monday January 26, 2004

Well… the new adventure is about to truly begin… I hope. I have decided that it’s time to go to Afghanistan. There are many places I want to go, but for a few reasons, the story in Afghanistan is the one we’re going to pursue.   We are calling this docu-series, “The Backseat War”.  The reason is obvious and is connected to the lack of attention on Afghanistan due to the invasion of Iraq.  Some have asked me, ‘what slant are you going to take?‘. It is a valid question, in a way, but only so based on ignorance of who I am. 

First: I have decided that Afghanistan is the story because I believe that it is a story that would be noticeable enough on the PBS circuit to eventually be distributed internationally. In short: I want my show, “The Battlefield Tourist” to be a benchmark program on PBS that not only solidifies my crew, but also WBRA as players in the field of quality, independent programming. 

So what are we doing? Without getting into too many details, the meat is that Ben and I will travel to Afghanistan where we will embed with an Army or Marine unit that is in an active combat zone. We plan to stay with this unit for up to eight weeks. During this time, we will produce dozens of segments based on the everyday lives of the soldiers and marines on the front line in Afghanistan. This docu-series will focus more on the efforts of these few dozen men instead of taking an empirical look at the situation in Afghanistan. Simply: The goal is to portray as accurately as possible, a day on the front line in the true “War on Terror”. 

Currently we have teamed up with WBRA (PBS-Roanoke) and we have begun the long and expensive task of preparing a grant. The grant money we are looking for will allow a two man team to go to Afghanistan. It allows for post production as well. Additionally, we are budgeting for an interactive website and a photo book to expand on the knowledge presented in the docu-series. 

We are very excited about this and will begin sending out our proposal to various foundations in hopes of securing up to $120,000. To do this, we have hired Grant Proposal and Research Services from Knoxville, Tennessee to help us properly prepare our grant proposal. We believe this extra effort in addition to joining forces with PBS, is what will put us over the top in which we will realize our dreams. 

Be assured that if this first opportunity happens, we will be in a fantastic position to increase the likelihood that we will be able to continue producing this series of programming. If this doesn’t work, I expect to be back in local TV soon, knowing that I did my best.

Note:  My best friend, Ban Davis, passed away April 14, 2007.  He was just 40.

My Connection to Marjah

For several months now, British forces have been clearing, pushing and holding areas around Marjah preparing for this attack.  For at least the past two weeks, allied special forces teams have been infiltrating the town of 80,000 and taking out key enemy leaders.

However, this battle really started last May when reports started coming out of Marjah that Taliban fighters, including foreigners (particularly from Baluchistan, Pakistan) were beginning to mass as the Taliban retreated from a series of offensives British and American forces conducted in the Helmand River Valley and the area around Now Zad (which, btw, were the first major combat orders handed down by Obama – not the current situation in Marjah, which is widely being reported.  Maybe they mean the first major action since Obama’s escalation was ordered?).

Dubbed the Taliban’s “logistic” base, it began gaining major importance to the Taliban after Garmsir fell to US Marines in May 2008.  Coincidentally or not, 1st Battalion, Sixth Marines (1/6) led that attack and will be one of at least two Marine battalions pushing into Marjah.

Another battalion, 3rd Battalion, Sixth Marines (3/6), is also on the forward line of enemy territory (FLET).  Coincidentally or not, that battalion is led by Lt. Col. Brian Christmas. Colonel Christmas was a former officer with BLT 1/6 when they deployed to Oruzgan in 2004. That deployment was hailed as the “most successful” in the history of the war, at that time, but was marred by the removal of its very intense battalion commander, Lt. Col. Asad Khan. Colonel Christmas is also the son of  Gen. George R. Christmas who won the Navy Cross in the Battle of Hue in 1968.

The coincidences relate to me because I have embedded with both units, including time with then Captain Christmas in Oruzgan.  It has been very interesting to follow the lineage of the units I have a tie with, and for the sake of the people in Marjah, I wish you all the best of luck.

My Thoughts

Key to the battle:  The people.  This will be the first major attempt to win reconciliation with the Taliban in this fashion.  This is true.  More recent reports suggest the enemy is a local force more so than a foreign force, which poses a serious dilemma.

So what does reconciliation mean?  Fact is, many of the Pashtun Afghan Taliban are young men fighting for a way of life – for their culture.  They believe their way of life and culture is being forcibly changed – that is why they fight and they aren’t necessarily “terrorists”.  These are the people that need to be pulled away from the islamists.  That is what this attack, and subsequent government/humanitarian effort, will aim to do.

Will it work?  It is a tall order and will take TIME.   Reporters going there six months after the attack and reporting that “nothing is being done”, will be missing the story.  Marjah can be evaluated in 5-10 years for accuracy.

The key to a successful outcome will require some serious discipline.  If the Marines turn this city into rubble, the battle will already be lost.  You can bet that the Taliban will try to create a mass civilian casualty event which will forever prevent the government from having a cooperating population.  If the Taliban are preventing people from leaving and allied forces call in close air support on every house they take fire from, the allies will lose this battle.

Bill is a former P-51 “Mustang” fighter pilot who has more crazy stories than any vet I have ever chatted with. Below is my story that aired Sunday. If you find it interesting, I urge you to research Bill… the full monte is quit amazing.

Bill Overstreet: American Hero

Oh, and if you’re bored tomorrow (December 8), head on down to the National D-Day Memorial in Bedford, Virginia around 1145 and watch Bill be awarded France’s highest award:  The Legion of Honor.

And since no one asked my opinion… I’ll offer it up.  It is an educated opinion after all.

If I were President Obama, this is how I would answer some tough questions:

Q – Mr. President, if these benchmarks aren’t met by the Afghan government, will we withdraw our troops?

A – No, that would be a terrible idea.  What we need to understand is that Afghanistan is literally a world of its own.  This is going to be a challenge of immense proportions that has no option that uses the word failure.  We have to finish this mission for the stability of the region, regardless of what the previous administration’s policy and reasoning for intervention was.

Q – So we write them a blank check with unlimited time?

A – The fact is, for decades to come, we will be involved in Afghanistan.  We have a budding friendship there in a region of the world that we have the utmost interest.  It gives us a great ally that sits in-between Iran and Pakistan.  Talk about positioning!

But, beyond that, you need to understand that this is a developing country.  The past thirty years has physically and mentally wrecked this country and it will take time and patience far beyond timelines and deadlines.  Twenty… thirty years easy.  

In fact, I believe the US should strike a defense pact with Afghanistan, for a long term security agreement, that will keep our troops aiding and assisting the Afghans until that government decides they no longer need our help.  At the same time, we would go a long way in shedding the image of occupation.  Regardless of what the reasons were when we went into Afghanistan, the mission will not be complete until the country can function as a country, which will leave the region and the world more stable.  Don’t forget about our assumed moral obligation as well.  We have been there eight years; to pick up and leave in the middle would be the worst sign of leadership to countries and to terrorists worldwide.

Q – But the government is corrupt…. they’ve wasted the past eight years!

A – True, but so have we.  Shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan, we started diverting most of our resources to Iraq, putting far to little into this monumental task.  In actuality, we’ve only properly resourced this war over he past two years.  Yes, the government is corrupt.  Keep in mind, it has just been born.  There will be failures along the way.  Look how corrupt the first 200 years of our country was… and still is.  This will take time. 

Q – So you say this should be open ended?

A – No choice.  This will not be finished within my term or terms.  This is going to be an investment in a slightly better world, supported in force by 41 other countries.  This alliance has no option for failure.  We simply cannot leave until we are asked; the strategic importance is too great, the humanitarian importance is too great and the importance in relation to the war on terror is too great.  If we do, it will then just be a matter of time as to when we return.   You think this war is expensive now… wait until you add a return trip into it.

http://www.wset.com/blogs/news/if_i_were_obama_by_david_tate.html

I just received a note from the mother of a survivor from Keating and it seems there’s a concern that the sacrifice will be for nothing.  While I cannot change the world, I certainly can do my part to prevent that fear from becoming reality.  Here’s the note:

Since I found out about this attack I have been glued to the internet looking for any piece of info- perhaps so it will start making more sense. My heart really aches for these guys. People have been so kind and  supportive and I think that is the only way their mental anguish will began to heal.

I believe that one of their biggest needs is to know that the fight and loss of life will not be forgotten and was not done without a purpose. This unit that lost 8 men only had 30 guys to start with, so as you can well imagine, they were a tight knit group. They have to be asking themselves “why?” I sure wish I could ease some pain for them. Sleep for my son, and I am sure for most of them, has not come easily since the battle. I can not to begin to imagine what it must be like to try to close your eyes and relax after what they have been through. I could go on and on…..

I have attached a picture of some of the soldiers from KEATING. They were only eating once a day so I shipped $500.00 worth of groceries to them and the picture was in response to that. ( 2 of the men in the picture were KIA).

 
When *** ( my son) first got there he asked for blankets because what they had were not sufficient.  So I had sent 30 blankets, 100s of batteries, 60 DVDs abd countless baby wipes. Not sure why I am telling you all that, but to let you know their life has not been easy since they landed there.

Thank you for your concern and prayers, it means so much to me.

KIA 10-03-09

Sgt. Joshua Hardt
Sgt. Justin Gallegos
SSgt. Vernon Martin
Spc. Christopher Griffin
Sgt. Michael Susca
Sgt. Joshua Kirk
PFC  Kevin Thomson
PFC Brandon Owens

“The mosque was hit by a Hellfire, and open source now reports that a high profile insurgent named Dost Mohammad was killed there.”

As pointed out by a reader on another forum, Dost Mohammad is the man that lead the attack on COP Kahler during the Battle of Wanat in July, 2008.  So if this report is accurate, and I believe it is, it’s an important change on that battlefield.  He’s also the “shadow governor” of Nuristan for the Taliban.   That probably also means that the insurgent band being pursued following Kamdesh is full of veterans of the attack on Wanat as well?

One thing for sure, though; Kamdesh and Wanat may as well have been the same thing.  The similarities are so numerous it’s like Ground Hog’s Day.

Battle for COP Keating

I don’t know ALL the facts, only what I overheard on the satellite radio. COP Keating was (past tense) located on low ground, near a river, surrounded by mountains – a poor place to have to defend to begin with. The village of Kamdesh was nearby, as was a mosque. About two platoons and a cavalry troop headquarters occupied the COP – Combat Outpost. If you Google COP Keating, you will find a Washington Times article describing the austere conditions there, written earlier this year. I was on duty from 0600-1800 (6 a.m. until 6 p.m.) on Saturday, 03 OCT 09, and heard, first-hand, the events I am about to recount transpire.

I took notes as the battle unfolded. Things were relatively quiet when I came on shift at 0600. Not too long afterward, I heard a call sign describing taking small arms fire at his position. (That in itself is not alarming – I hear that frequently because I hear satellite radio transmissions from all sorts of units who operate in Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman and in Nuristan Provinces, where this happened.) The situation, then began to deteriorate. The Troop Commander – urgently – requested rotary wing gunships to support him. He was told they were 45 minutes away, and that he should use his 120 mm mortars. He replied that the mortar pit was pinned down, and that the could not employ his 120 mm mortars. I did not know until I saw an aerial photo later that day, after I got off shift, that the COP was located in a “bowl,” surrounded on nearly all sides by high ground. The insurgents were shooting down into the mortar pit from above. The 120 mm mortars from OP Fritshe, a few kilometers away were able to help a little, but it was not enough.

Not too long after the fight started, the Troop Commander said that he had a KIA, and several wounded. Uh-Oh – now this is getting serious. Not too much longer after that, the Troop Commander, in a voice that was not panic’d, but which had a sense of urgency said, “We’ve got people inside our wire!!!” He said that he had lost communications with some of his elements at different places on the COP. He had had to abandon his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and all the various means of redundant communications there (MIRC Chat, Blue Force Tracker, tactical FM radios, etc.) His only means of communication was the satellite radio he was using. He said he urgently needed air support. The number of KIA began to climb.

He kept asking about the helicopters – his higher headquarters said they were “30 minutes out…” He said that if he did not get help soon, they were going to be overrun. He had consolidated the Soldiers he had, to include dead and wounded, in a tight perimeter on part of his COP. He advised that the Afghan National Army (ANA) side of the COP was completely overrun and was on fire. The insurgents had gotten into his perimeter where the ANA latrine bordered his perimeter, after they had overrun the ANA camp. His Entry Control Point (ECP) where some Afghan Security Guards (ASG) had been had been overrun. The ANP Police Checkpoint had been overrun and he was taking a heavy volume of fire from that. He was taking a lot of RPG fire from the mosque. His Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was under insurgent control. He kept asking about the helicopters. He was told, “Passing Checkpoint 12…” He said, “I’m telling you that if they don’t get here f***in’ soon, we’re all going to f***in’ die!!!” Shortly after that, his Squadron Commander came up on the radio and told him that he was going to be OK, that help was on the way. The SCO said that he needed to come up on FM and talk to the helicopters, who should be ariving very soon.

The Troop Commander said that the Harris was all he had at the moment, and asked that the Squadron relay. It was, obviously, a very anxious time. I was afraid that at any moment, the Troop commander would just stop transmitting, and that would mean that they were likely all dead and dying. Someone asked the Troop commander what his target priorities were, and he said that “anything outside the wire” was controlled by bad guys. He mentioned that he needed gun runs at a particular wall, and mentioned certain Target Reference Points (TRP’s) such as “the putting green” and “the diving board.” Finally, the helicopters arrived and began killing insurgents. It became clear, however, that it was such a target-rich environment that much more air support was needed. The helicopters gave the defenders enough breathing room to better position themselves, reload, etc.

Under the umbrella of the gunships, the Troop Commander said that he was going to try to re-take some of his camp. The SCO calmly encouraged him to “fire and maneuver.” As they regained some lost ground, the Troop Commander said that he was finding some of his unaccounted for Soldiers, and that they were KIA. He gave their battle roster numbers. Things were looking better, but it was still a fierce fight. I could hear a cacophony of machine gun fire when the Troop Commander keyed that microphone to talk. The mortars were still pinned won, with one KIA and wounded in the mortar pit. After only a short time, gunships had to leave to rearm and refuel, heading to FOB Bostic. (FOB Bostic was hit with indirect fire, also, throughout the day.)

The weather in the high passes interfered with the helicopters. Close Air Support in the form of jets were on the way, and the Troop Commander was asked to provide Target Numbers, which he did. He was still being pressed on all sides, still taking a heavy volume of small arms fire and RPG’s. He had regained some buildings, but had not been able to re-capture all his perimeter. He found at least one MBITR and was able to communicate with aircraft a little better.

Once the jets arrived overhead, they began to drop bombs on the masses, the swarms of insurgents. Usually, the insurgents conduct a raid at dawn, do their damage, and flee. Not this day. I looked at my watch, and it was after 1000 and the insurgents were still attacking, even though it should have become clear to them after the close air arrived that they could no longer hope to completely overrun the camp.  The Close Air was on station continuously after that, and as soon as one plane dropped its bombs and strafed, another came down to hit targets – some very close to camp. The mosque was hit by a Hellfire, and open source now reports that a high profile insurgent named Dost Mohammad was killed there.  A target described as a “switchback” was bombed repeatedly and the insurgents seemed to simply re-occupy it only to be bombed out of it again. (Several pieces of weapons and equipment has since been found there.) The “North Face” was also repeatedly bombed and strafed. A plan was developed to get reinforcements to COP Keating.

Because it was still “too hot” to land helicopters, they were flown to OP Fritshe and had to walk to COP Keating. Asked about his ammunition (Class 5) at about 1300, the Troop commander said that he was “red” on 7.62 link and MK19 ammunition. Not too long after that, he stated that he was “black” (supply exhausted) on 7.62, but still had a lot of .50 caliber. More KIA were found, and the Troop Commander said that they were missing their sensitive items (weapons, night vision, MBITR radios – things like that.) The KIA number rose to 5. There were constant updates on a particular wounded Soldier who had a broken leg and a crushed pelvis. They said that he had lost a lot of blood, but was on an IV, and was “hanging in there.” The Troop Commander said that he had two ANA KIA, and several wounded, still with him. He said that a lot of the ANA – about 12 – had broken and run when the COP began to be overrun. (Some of their bodies were found nearby the next day, along with some ASG who were wounded.) The Troop Commander said that the insurgents had made off with the ANA’s B-10 Rocket Launcher.

Throughout the day, the air support targeted a B-10 launch site, but it was unclear if it was the same system that the ANA had lost of not. The SCO got on the net and said that there was a plan to bring in a CH-47 Chinook as soon as it got dark, with attack helicopters overhead, and that they would bring in ammo and Soldiers and evacuate the wounded and dead. The SCO said that he would fly in, also. During the battle, the SCO always seemed calm and gave a lot of encouragement to the Troop Commander on the ground. He asked for updates (Situation Reports – “SITREPS”) but he did not nag the Troop Commander for it every 5 minutes. He let the Troop Commander fight the fight, frequently asking him what he needed and asking him how he and his Soldiers were doing, offering encouragement, but not micromanaging.

The fighting continued all day, even though it was not as intense as it had been in the early morning. As the relief column approached from OP Fritshe, it got into a brief fight, quickly killing two insurgents and capturing their ICOM radios and RPG’s. Then, they continued on toward COP Keating. The fire that had completely leveled the ANA side of the COP was spreading from building to building, and was setting the COP on fire. The Troop Commander and his Soldiers had to evacuate their TOC again, because it caught on fire. Many of the barracks buildings caught on fire and burned, taking the Soldiers’ possessions with them. Only one or two buildings were left by the time it was over.

As night approached, the Troop Commander told someone (S-3? FSO?) that if the air cover were lost, and if they were attacked again, they were “done.” The Troop Commander was assured that he would have adequate air support. The CSM came up on the net and asked the Troop Commander to try to expand his perimeter in order to try to get accountability of everyone. The Troop Commander said that he “just can’t do it, I just don’t have enough people. I have too many wounded.” The CSM said that he understood, but that he was looking at a cold body on the Predator feed near the maintenance building, and thought that that might be the final missing soldier. (It was later determined that that was not him.) The Troop Commander said that there were “a lot” of dead insurgents lying dead inside his perimeter, and he could be seeing one of those.

I went off shift at 1800. At that time, there were 6 US KIA, and one missing, later found and determined to be KIA. I do not know where the 8th KIA came from: either one of the wounded died, or earlier there was a mistake in regard to accountability.

The next day (Sunday, 4 OCT) when I came to work, I learned that they had found the unaccounted-for Soldier(s) and had made it through the night. During the late morning, the SCO came up on the net and briefed someone about the situation. He said that of five (5) HMMWV’s, only one was still running. They had counted eight (8) RPG impacts on one HMMWV alone. He said that the HMMWV’s were shot all to pieces. The camp Bobcat had a window shot out, but was still running, and they were still using it to move things.

There was a lot of UXO’s (unexploded ordnance) that made the area hazardous, such as unexploded US mortar rounds that had been scattered, as well as AT-4’s and Javelin’s. Most of the Soldiers on the COP had lost all their possessions except for what they were wearing. A plan was already being developed to get them new TA-50, uniforms, boots, toiletries, etc. once they were extracted. There were a lot of sensitive items that needed to be lifted out, because they are serial numbered items that needed to be accounted for, but most everything was ruined. They discussed whether to insert engineers with a lot of explosive to blow everything up, or whether to call in air strikes after everyone was evacuated and try to destroy what was left that way. Even at this point, they were still taking the occasional odd, angry shot or rocket fire.

As I type this, I am still listening to the folks who are left at COP Keating, figuring out what to destroy, how best to destroy it (demo vs. aerial bombs or rockets) what to fly out, and making a plan on how best to get that done so they can abandon and close the COP.

‘So what’, you say. Well, depending on what you need in life… and if you actually have disposable income for video production(s), here are some ideas:

1. Videos for business websites.
2. Educational Presentations (re: Afghanistan) – Could be a library, classroom, VFW, etc…
3. Video Business Cards – A 3 minute video put on dvd the size of a business card.
4. Recruiting Video – This is for high school athletes working a coach for a spot on the college team.
5. Weddings.
6 Family Events (Reunions, birthday parties, etc.).
7. Project Documentation.
8. Adventure Vacations.
9. Freelance Video Needs in Conflict Zones.
10. Team Videos.
11. Class Videos.
12. Music Videos… and the list goes on.
13. Commercials.
*Still photography is also available.

Times are tough so I offer competitive prices, ideas and consultation. Drop me a note if you have questions, ideas or needs.

RICHMOND, Va. (AP) About 130 soldiers from a Manassas-based Virginia Guard military police unit are returning to Virginia after serving in Iraq since December 2008.

Guard officials say the 266th Military Police Company is scheduled to return Thursday. The unit is made up of soldiers from across Virginia.

The soldiers operated throughout Iraq as part of a team that trained, mentored and coached more than 1,000 Iraqi Police officers. They also conducted numerous missions and combat

patrols across the country.  During their tour, soldiers from the unit earned 21 Bronze Star Medals, four received Combat Action Badges and one received a Purple Heart.

21 Bronze Stars and four Combat Action Badges.  Are you kidding?   Four guys see combat and 21 get the Bronze Star?

The problem is the “V” device.  Get rid of it.  The Bronze Star is a hero’s medal; not an ‘atta boy’ medal.  Stop giving it for meritorious purposes. Redefine it I say!

It just sucks that there’s this whole slew of Bronze Star license plates out there that have the same meaning to the general public.  It’s almost a disservice considering the average person can’t distinguish between a man who single-handedly knocked out two machine gun nests on Tarawa versus an admin clerk who served the general a great cup of joe.